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Mancher Psychiater hat ausgesprochen, er wolle sich nicht mit Phi-
losophie belasten, seine Wissenschaft habe mit Philosophie nichts zu 
tun. (…) Aber die Ausschaltung der Philosophie wird trotzdem für 
die Psychiatrie verhängnisvoll.
K. Jaspers, Allgemeine Psychopathologie, 
In the last decades cross-disciplinary work between philosophy 
and psychiatry has steadily been gaining momentum. The last 
few years have witnessed an explosion of what G. Graham and 
L. Stevens have called ‘philosophical psychopathology’ (99). 
This dissertation will link some serious philosophy with psychi-
atric practice. The starting point was a cri de coeur by Bill Ful-
ford that in psychiatry a new paradigm of integration is needed 
(). Following Fulford, two dominant types of psychiatry 
were crossing the psychiatric landscape as a cart track during 
the twentieth century: the biological and the hermeneutic (or 
constructivist) approach. Anti-psychiatrist T. Szasz was among 
those who led the way in claiming that mental illnesses are not 
brain diseases but ‘problems of living’. At the heart of Szasz’ proj-
ect was his conviction that psychiatric diagnosis in essence is an 
evaluative project (9, The Myth of Mental Illness). The current 
strongly biological orthodoxy in psychiatry takes another line: 
modern brain science will unravel the mysteries of the mind. It 
will reveal the causal disease processes underlying mental dis-
orders. What patients need is new effective medical treatments 
instead of existential reorientation. Both types of psychiatry 
lead to what John Locke would have called ‘enthusiasms’, and 
try to consume one another. Fulford found ‘that neither mind-
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only accounts of psychopathology, characteristic of some forms 
of anti-psychiatry, nor brain-only accounts, characteristic of the 
more triumphalist among biological psychiatrists, are sufficient’ 
(: ). An adequate account of psychopathological cases re-
quires both. 
Kenneth S. Kendler, M. D., in a programmed essay Toward a 
Philosophical Structure for Psychiatry devised a thought experi-
ment to clarify this point: ‘Imagine that there are  discrete 
levels, with the mind-brain system between DNA on one hand 
and the clinical manifestations of schizophrenia on the other. 
Researcher  is conducting linkage and association studies that 
attempt to directly relate levels  and  but would provide no in-
sight into the intervening levels. Researcher  is trying to under-
stand, at a basic molecular level, the actions of a putative altered 
gene transcript, thereby trying to move from level  to level  
or . Meanwhile, researcher  is seeking to understand the neu-
ropsychological deficits in schizophrenia, trying to clarify the 
link between levels  and . Although biological reductionists 
might declare the work of researcher  to be more “scientific” 
and valuable because it is more basic, I hope that this thought 
experiment makes it clear that we can make no such judgments 
a priori. There are many links in the chain, and their ultimate 
value and scientific fruitfulness are unlikely to bear any strong 
relationship with where on the causal chain (or, more realisti-
cally, network) they sit’ (). Kendler calls for explanatory plu-
ralism. We should stop searching for big, simple explanations 
and developing ‘grand theory’. Rather, we should settle for a rig-
orous integration of multiple disciplines and perspectives on psy-
chiatric disorder. Philosophy is one of the engaged disciplines. 
 Am J Psychiatry  () March : -.
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Philosophers can be found on each of the  floors, and one of 
their main contributions – I think – is that they can help to keep 
the conceptual house in order. Philosophers can be the window 
cleaners of the house of research. Philosophers can also chal-
lenge the dualism inherent in seeing mental illness as physical 
illness or as life problem, and propose new ways of integration. 
To this enterprise I want to contribute. And, like Fulford, I think 
that a fruitful way of getting started is to examine the notion of 
agency (Fulford : ). Here is why. Psychiatry deals with 
fundamental questions of what it means to be human. It is not 
just a brain with which psychiatrists are concerned, not even 
just a mind, but a real person. The relevant unit of analysis in 
psychopathology is persons, whatever insights may be derived 
from studies of their component parts and systems. In current 
practical philosophy, agency is a matter of the highest concern 
and philosophers are trying to capture personhood in terms of 
agency and practical reason. Simultaneously, recent work in psy-
chopathology suggests that there are aspects both of our general 
concepts of disorder (Nordenfelt, 97) and of specific areas of 
psychopathology (e.g. delusion and thought insertion in Ste-
phens and Graham, ; or akrasia in Campbell, ), which 
are more readily understood in terms of disturbances of action, 
that is, of the characteristic mode of activity of autonomous 
agents. A lot of pathology seems to be connected with the expe-
rience of failure of ‘ordinary doing’. So here is common ground 
that I will try to explore. This is my plan.
In the first part of my dissertation I will make it my duty to de-
liver a philosophically convincing theory of personhood in terms 
of agency. Like other animals human beings act. But there is 
something distinctive about the nature of human action. In vir-
tue of a certain type of self-consciousness humans are conscious 
of the grounds of their actions. They act for reasons and can 
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make choices. This distinctive feature of human agency, reason, 
brings with it two capacities. First, human agents can take con-
trol of their actions and have to work out how to do that. They 
have a capacity for normative self-government. Second, when-
ever human agents take control over their actions, they are mak-
ing themselves the authors of their actions. They are faced with 
the task of deciding who to be. As rational agents, human be-
ings also have a capacity for normative self-constitution, i.e., for 
constructing norm-governed or practical forms of identity. It is 
this practical form of identity that I am after in my dissertation. 
In the first chapter it will be argued that a neo-Kantian rea-
son view of persons, most prominently and eminently defended 
by Christine Korsgaard, cannot be satisfactory. Such a view had 
better be developed into a narrative view of the person. 
In chapter two I present a candidate for such a picture: Marya 
Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution view. Although I elabo-
rate the theory she offers, the basic narrative ideas are, I think, 
essentially right, or at least point in the most promising direction 
I know of. 
With that narrative conception before us, my next concern 
will be with applying my view to specific practical issues. I want 
to concentrate on the use of advance directives in mental health 
care. Considerable attention will be drawn to Ulysses contracts. 
These are written by an author who is competent to consent to 
medical treatment, stating how he wishes to be treated under 
coercion in the event of becoming episodically a psychiatric pa-
tient (think of manic or schizophrenic psychosis). Also a related 
biomedical procedure will be considered: advance directives in 
the case of Alzheimer’s disease. Both procedures have in com-
mon that they bear upon pre-commitment. Both are cases of 
an earlier self being in command of a later self, that is, of an 
earlier self exercising authority and imposing his or her will on 
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a later self. This raises the question of (respect for) autonomy. 
So, before I embark on the project of applying my view to psy-
chiatric practice, I will have to make room for the problems of 
autonomy (and orthonomy) of the person. Developing a theory 
of autonomy that is related very closely to my theory of narra-
tive identity will be the task of the third chapter. My proposal 
builds on the work of Harry Frankfurt and Michael Bratman 
on autonomy. Succinctly put: I think persons are autonomous if 
they identify themselves wholeheartedly with their self-consti-
tuting narrative. As a final step, I claim that Schechtman’s basic 
story about personhood has to take on board some account of 
autonomy and that Michael Bratman’s view on self-government 
is a good option. 
Chapter four will try to solve the pre-commitment puzzle cases 
in which pathologies might undermine agency and the autonomy 
of the person. I will argue that my theory of narrative identity 
provides a criterion that enables to discern pathological states of 
personhood. Considering Ulysses contracts, it will become clear 
that they are conceptually dubious and lead us to two problems. 
First, there is a problem with personal identity. The identity 
problem centres on the identity relation between the author of a 
Ulysses contract, and the patient who is taken to fall under the 
authority of it. There is a second and related conceptual prob-
lem. Ulysses contracts are said to derive moral authority from 
the principle of autonomy. But if it is claimed, as some philoso-
phers do, that the person now is not the person of the coming 
action, the exercise of autonomy becomes inexplicable. I think 
that these puzzles of identity and autonomy are solvable and that 
the use of Ulysses contracts is morally justifiable. Things become 
more complicated when we consider the parallel case: the use of 
advance directives by patients suffering from severe Alzheimer’s 
disease. The rest of the chapter will be an attempt at clarifying 
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these puzzles too. It will turn out that, in my narrativist view, 
there are no surviving arguments for a moral justification of the 
use of advance directives in the Alzheimer’s case.
Let me go back for a second to Kendler’s thought experiment 
and make two final methodological remarks. The first is that my 
approach to philosophy will make liberal use of empirical results. 
I am interested in the scientific progress made on the other floors. 
As a philosopher I have a distinctive voice, but I do not have my 
own, independent and immanent access to reality. The philo-
sophical attitude is a scientific one of rational account, rigorous 
argumentation and openness for discussion of standpoints. Yet, 
to understand and interpret everyday experience, philosophy can 
only be practised in critical interaction with one or more of the 
empirical sciences. In addition to discussions of inspiring posi-
tions of classical and contemporary colleagues, philosophers have 
to relate their insights to authoritative scientific interpretations. 
They should be open to what they can learn from the other dis-
ciplines. This is not undisputed, especially in practical philoso-
phy. It is said, for example, that such an approach confuses the 
first-personal perspective with the third-personal perspective. To 
my mind however, the two perspectives are twisted together. A 
person can never conceive of his own conceptual capacity from 
a purely third-personal perspective, because he can conceive of it 
only with that capacity, and hence from a perspective in which 
it continues to occupy first-person position. Trying to break into 
the first-personal realm from the outside is like trying to break 
into the room where you are sitting. 
 I kidnapped this analogy from the dissertation of Marc Slors (). 
For another helpful picture see D. Velleman, in Buss S. & L. Overton 
(): .
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The second remark is a related one and concerns the readers 
of this dissertation. Efforts of cooperation with other scientific 
disciplines are to little avail if presented in inimitable argot. Al-
though my aim is to develop a good philosophical argument, 
my dissertation tries to be more than a piece of philosopher’s 
philosophy. It will also be readable and useful (I hope) for other 
academics operating on, as Edmund Husserl would call it, ‘a 
higher level of naivety’.
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1: IDENTITY AND PRACTICAL REASON
 
Our deeds determine us, as much as we determine our deeds.
G. Eliot
1.1 Accounts of human agency: a state of play
What is a human action? Philosophers of action traditionally 
define this topic by studying the following problem: What is 
the difference between a bodily movement (a mere happening) 
and a human action? Or, as Ludwig Wittgenstein famously re-
phrased the question: ‘What is left over if I subtract the fact 
that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?’ (Philo-
sophical Investigations: § ). We tend to think that whatever 
happens is caused to happen by other happenings. But if we 
make things happen, those events owe their occurence to us, 
to persons. We are not simply caught up in the flow of events; 
we seem to intervene in it by producing some events and pre-
venting others. We seem to act upon and change the world and 
our path in it. But how can a person make things happen in a 
world where events are caused by other events? What makes 
an action ours, rather than something that just happens in us? 
How can it count, after all, as an intervention – or, for that 
matter, as ours? 
The standard answer to this question goes like this. We want 
something to happen, and we believe that some behavior of ours 
would promote its happening. These two attitudes of desiring 
and believing jointly cause the relevant behavior. Because these 
attitudes also justify the behavior that they cause, that behavior 
eventuates not only from causes but also for reasons. Thus, for 
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example: You want to know the time. You believe that looking 
at the bell tower will result in your knowing the time. These 
two attitudes cause a glance at the tower, thus manifesting their 
characteristic causal powers as a desire and a belief. The de-
sire and belief that cause your glance at the bell tower are your 
reasons for glancing at it; and because you engage in this be-
havior for reasons, you make it happen. Knowing the time is, 
of course, only one small example, put to illustrate the claim 
made for the standard view of agency: in order for a chain of 
events to constitute a person’s making things happen, it will 
have to constitute his doing something for a reason. The stan-
dard model connects the person’s role in producing an action to 
behavior that is based on and performs for reasons. Reasons are 
closely associated with personhood. One of the premises un-
derlying the standard model of agency is that causation via a 
person’s reasons qualifies as causation by the person himself. 
There is a problem, though. The standard view fails to specify 
the way in which action involves causation by reasons. As Velle-
man demonstrates, there is a category of ungoverned ‘activities’ 
(as opposed to actions) containing the things that one does rath-
er than merely undergoes, but that one somehow fails to regulate 
oneself autonomously. Slips of the tongue are Velleman’s example:
one has reason to say something but is saying something differ-
ent. These ‘activities’, as Velleman calls them, are in one sense 
made happen by the subject; in another, they are made to happen
 Borrowed from Donald Davidson, the foremost exponent of the stan-
dard view and first major source of the revival – after Wittgenstein – of 
the idea that actions are to be explained, causally, in terms of mental 
states or events.
 This section partly keeps track of D. Velleman, : -.
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despite him. So, what the standard story describes is not hu-
man action par excellence. Human agency comes in degrees. 
And full-blown human action occurs only when the subject’s 
capacity to make things happen excludes movements to which 
a person is impelled by motives over which he has no control. 
So, the standard view seems to be an account of motivated ‘ac-
tivity’. It specifies the way in which behavior must be caused in 
order to qualify as a purposeful ‘activity’, but not how it must 
be caused in order to qualify as autonomous action. Autono-
mous action requires something more than motivation by rea-
sons.
The best sustained attempts at a repair of this flaw in the stan-
dard view are contained in the work of, inter alia, Harry Frank-
furt, Christine Korsgaard and David Velleman. Harry Frank-
furt adds a mechanism modifying the motivational forces at 
work. It surveys our motives, blocking or inhibiting some of 
them, and reinforcing others. The result is a hierarchical view 
of agency. Autonomous action, according to this view, is behav-
ior motivated by the desires and beliefs by which the subject 
wants to be motivated. The difference between ‘activity’ and 
full-blooded action is that in the case of the latter, the agent 
identifies with his operative motives. Frankfurt’s candidate that 
might constitute the agent’s self-identification is second-order 
motives: the behavior that persons make happen is that which 
is caused by their first-order motives as reinforced by higher-or-
der motives. So, according to Frankfurt, higher-order satisfac-
tion with one’s motives makes for agent-origin and constitution 
of the person. Christine Korsgaard and David Velleman, for 
their part, take a more rationalistic stance. They define autono-
mous action as behavior whose first-order motives are perceived 
as reasons and are consequently reinforced by ‘higher-order mo-
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tives of rationality’  In their view, persons are somehow identi-
fied with their own rationalities.
I take it that up to now the most elaborate avenue of inquiry into 
personhood and personal autonomy in terms of agency is the work 
of Christine Korsgaard (99, 99, 999, , 9). Korsgaard 
offers a solid and eloquent neo-Kantian phenomenology of re-
flective agency and goes on to derive an attractive account of the 
person in terms of deliberative action. I think that her work is vi-
tal to clear up the relationship between agency and personhood.7 
So, let me first discuss in extenso the argument on self-constitu-
tion put forward by Christine Korsgaard during the last decade.
 This is Velleman’s (obscure) phrase. He wants to exclude movements 
produced by motives which the agent endorses without regarding them as 
reasons. What Velleman is after is ‘something like a desire to be actuated 
by the best reasons’ (: ).
 The Kantian famously is concerned with what people do and empha-
sises their agencies. Kant pointed out that as a rational being I can view 
myself in two different ways. On the one hand, I can view myself as a 
natural entity, whose behavior is causally determined by certain other 
natural phenomena. But I also can consider myself as an entity that freely 
performs actions, an entity that deliberates, chooses, and originates ac-
tions. It is from this practical standpoint, Kant says, that we view our-
selves as agents, and as the authors of our actions. 
7 I’m using the concept of a ‘person’ rather loosely here and as an equiva-
lent of ‘self ’ and ‘identity’. What I mean by those terms is personhood in 
a practical, unreflective sense. In everyday life people take themselves to 
have identities or to be a self or a person or somebody. What they mean by 
those terms are the characteristics they have that distinguish them from 
others.
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1.2 Actions and persons 
Christine Korsgaard contrasts her picture of the person with 
what she calls a Combat Model of the person (999, 9). In a 
Humean variant of this Combat Model the person’s actions are 
just the result of the play and combat of the psychic forces within 
him, reasons and passions among them. The problem then arises 
that we seem to have lost view on an agent. For, the agent seems 
to be something over and above these forces working on him, 
something that can intelligibly be said to determine himself to 
action. We could add such a person as a sort of captain who 
stands ready to stop things that go wrong and to continue things 
that go well, but then a new problem arises: we are completely 
mystified by the existence of a separately existing entity that 
chooses to identify with one of the parts. So, Korsgaard rejects 
the Combat Model as an unclear picture of the person, and pro-
poses an alternative: her Constitutional Model (999: -). She 
baptises it the Constitutional Model, because its clearest appear-
ance is in Plato’s Republic, where the constitution of the human 
soul is compared to the constitution of a polis or city-state. The 
agent is something over and above his parts, just as the political 
constitution of a city-state is something over and above the citi-
zens and officials who live there. A state is not merely a group of 
citizens living on a shared territory. We have a state only where 
these citizens have constituted themselves into a single agent that 
performs actions and so has a life and a history. They have, that 
is, adopted a way of resolving conflicts, making decisions, inter-
acting with other states, and planning together for an ongoing
 Hume himself denied that we are ever intimately conscious of what we 
call a ‘self ’. See his A Treatise of Human Nature, Book One, Part IV, Sec-
tion VI, .
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future. For a group of citizens to view themselves as a state, or for 
us to view them as one, all we need is to grant an authoritative 
status to certain choices and decisions made by certain citizens, 
as its legislative voice (99: -). Korsgaard takes the state as 
an agent defined by its deliberative procedures. A literal political 
constitution is laying out the city’s mode of deliberative action, 
the procedures by which its collective decisions are to be made 
and carried out. And just as a political constitution makes it pos-
sible for the citizens to function as a single collective agent, the 
everyday work of deliberative action is constitutive for a human 
being to function as a person.9 
What, then, is deliberative action? Korsgaard’s answer is as fol-
lows. What makes human beings different from the other ani-
mals, is that they are self-conscious. They are conscious, not only 
of the outside world, but also of their mental states, i.e. of the 
workings of mental forces in them. For non-human animals life 
is mapped out by their instincts. They pursue what they desire or 
flee what they fear. Human beings on the contrary are aware of the
9 Korsgaard stresses that we can see the Platonian parts of the soul as 
the three parts of a deliberative action: appetite makes a proposal, reason 
decides whether to act on it or not and spirit (thymos) carries reason’s deci-
sion out. If the agent conforms to the dictates of reason, it is because he 
identifies with his constitution, which says that reason should rule. This 
line of thought also supports Plato’s analogy between the city and the soul. 
Reason corresponds to the rulers and its function is to direct things; spirit 
corresponds to the auxiliaries and its function is to carry out the orders of 
reason; and the appetites correspond to the rest of the citizens (farmers, 
merchants, craftspeople...) who provide for the city’s needs (999: ). Note 
that spirit or ‘the sense of honor’ as the executive function of the soul re-
quires some hermeneutic effort. It seems to be something with a cognitive 
and affective aspect (9: 9-).
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potential grounds of their actions and capable of choosing a way 
of life. Their capacity to turn their attention to their own mental 
states and activities is also a capacity to reflectively distance them-
selves from them, and to call them into question. As a human 
being, I can perceive some situation as dangerous, and find myself 
with an instinctive impulse to run. But when I bring that impulse 
itself into view, when I reflect on it, then I can call it into question: 
‘Shall I run? Does this situation really give me a reason to run?’ 
And now I have to decide. So, self-consciousness is making it pos-
sible to transcend mere reactivity in my relation to the world. It 
puts me in control. Instincts no longer exclusively determine what 
I do. Inner and outer forces make proposals for action, but I may 
or may not have reasons to act in the way they propose. The pro-
posals are something I need to reason about and to decide upon 
deliberately. As a self-conscious being I act for reasons and I am 
free, in principle, to endorse or reject any proposal reflectively and 
to act accordingly. Nothing is a reason for me except what I make 
a reason for myself. That is, my decision whether to act on a reason 
or not takes the form of a self-determining action. What distin-
guishes deliberative action from mere behavior and other physical
 Korsgaard is aware of the fact that some animals (apes, dolphins, 
elephants, parrots) have rudimentary forms of self-consciousness. The 
empirical evidence on these matters is, she thinks, inconclusive. But there 
is no question for her that human beings are self-conscious in a very par-
ticular way (9: -).
 A similar idea is what R. Jay Wallace defends as volitionalism in Three 
Conceptions of Rational Agency. The distinctive feature of a volitionalist 
conception of rational agency is the postulation of a kind of motivation 
that is directly subject to the agent’s control, and independent of the dis-
positions and desires to which the agent is passively subject (999: -
).
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movements is that it is authored – it is in a quite special way at-
tributable to the person who does it. It springs from and is in ac-
cordance with the agent’s constitution, that is, the way the mental 
forces of the agent are put together, like the people in a city, and 
give the agent the kind of unity he needs to be the author of his ac-
tions. So, according to Korsgaard, the work of practical delibera-
tion is not only taking control of what to do, but at the same time 
it is a work of unification. An authored action has to come from 
the person working together as a whole (999: ). It is worth point-
ing out that Korsgaard’s self-constitution model also provides a 
standard for good action with this. Good actions are actions that 
are most truly a person’s own, i.e. actions which most constitute 
the person as their author and which most fully unify the person. 
I realise that I have been summing up different claims very 
quickly. I will return to those claims later. It suffices that it has 
become clear by now that persons have a form of identity that 
is constituted by their reasons and choices. What gives persons 
their identity is the reasons they autonomously adopt for them-
selves. Fully developed humans are consciously involved in the 
construction of their identity and do not exist, so to speak, prior 
to their reasons. Constructing, creating, (re)shaping, maintain-
ing, improving, in all these ways constituting a kind of identity 
is the everyday work of their practical deliberation. Of course, 
the human form as such is given by nature. Humans share it 
with the species. But nature sets each human being a task. He 
must make himself into a particular person (someone saying ‘I 
want to make something of myself ’ is just describing the human 
condition). He must give and choose reasons for his actions in 
a way that is self-determining and self-constituting. So, what 
 Note that there is no paradox here. The picture is not of a craftsman 
who is, mysteriously, his own product (Korsgaard 9: -). 
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gives humans their identity is what they do, i.e. their charac-
teristic activity. Personal identity is in a quite literal way con- 
stituted by choice and action. Let me elaborate this a little 
more. 
1.3 Practical identities
Korsgaard’s jumping-off point, as we have seen, is the obser-
vation that human consciousness has a reflective structure. 
Reflective distance from our impulses makes it both possible 
and necessary to decide which ones we will act on: it both en-
ables us, and forces us, to act for reasons. Reflection enables 
and forces us to make rules for ourselves, and it makes these 
rules or reasons obligative. There is a tight connection between 
the answers we give to the questions that reflection poses us in 
the practical realm and the conception we have of our iden-
tity. An agent adopts reasons in the form of conceptions of 
himself as someone’s friend, or as a doctor, or whatever. The 
conception of one’s identity in question here is not a theoreti-
cal one. It is a description by which we want to understand 
ourselves and by which we value ourselves and find our lives 
to be worth living and our actions to be worth undertaking. 
It is a conception of a practical identity, that is, a normative 
conception of oneself that can take the form of an endorsed 
collection of rules for deciding what considerations count as 
reasons for us. For an average person there will be a jumble of 
such conceptions. As examples of practical identities, Korsgaard
 I am avoiding Kantian parlance here. I use reason or rule as synony-
mous with law. Reasons (laws) have binding (legislative) force.
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catalogues: being a human being, a man or woman, citizen, 
mother, friend, student, egoist, catholic; being a member of an 
ethnic group, family, profession, or movement; being someone’s 
lover and so on (99: -, -7,  and ). And all of these 
practical identities give rise to sets of reasons, because they de-
termine what ‘counts’ for us. These reasons express our identity, 
and establish a relation which we have to ourselves. They direct 
us to do what we think it would be a good idea to do, and that 
in turn depends on who we think we are. To violate them is to 
lose part of yourself (‘I couldn’t live with myself if I did that!’). 
There are two questions Korsgaard’s argument seems to leave 
open. First, if we act for reasons that count for us, we take these 
reasons from different practical identities; but it remains unclear 
how different identities coincide and constitute one person. To 
have plans or reasons taken from different practical identities is 
not to say that one is a unified person. Second, there seems to 
be a deep element of relativism in her account. Whether reasons 
can bind us depends on the way that we value our identities. Yet 
most of the self-conceptions that govern us are contingent. We 
are born into a certain family and community, perhaps even into 
a certain profession or craft. Different reasons hold for different 
identities. And if desired, we can walk away from them. So, why 
should it matter whether we live up to the demands imposed on 
us by contingent citizenship, motherhood, or profession? How
 Elsewhere Korsgaard rejects the idea that ‘gender has to be or should 
be a deep fact about the identity of a human being’ (in ‘A Note on the 
Value of Gender-Identification’ in Nussbaum M.C. & J. Glover (99) 
(eds). Women, Culture and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press: ). There is also no mention of race or sexual 
orientation. This is observed by C.W. Gowans. 
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can we be bound by obligations which spring from conceptions 
of our identity which are not in themselves necessary? Korsgaard 
thinks she can put worries over the unity and the contingency of 
practical identities to rest. I will return to her discussion of these 
(related) issues in a moment. Let me first consider her instructive 
presentation of failing unification.
1.4 Defective action
Korsgaard describes five different kinds of self-constitution (she 
follows Plato who in Books VIII and IX of the Republic dis-
tinguishes five different ways in which the human soul may be 
governed, comparing them to five different kinds of constitu-
tions possible for a city): the good way (monarchy or aristocracy) 
and four bad ones, growing increasingly worse: timocracy, oli-
garchy, democracy and tyranny (999: 7-). The good constitu-
tion is truly unified. Defective constitutions lead to disunity and 
to that extent undercut agency. I will concentrate here on the 
democratic and the tyrannical person. The democratic person 
in contemporary philosophical jargon is a kind of ‘wanton’. He 
puts his experiences on an equal footing and governs himself 
only in a minimal sense. The coherence of his life is completely 
dependent on the accidental coherence of his desires. It is merely 
an accident that some impulse leads to an action, and it is also 
merely an accident if that does not happen. To see the problem, 
consider the story of Anne-Marie: 
 Korsgaard does not insist on the fact that there are five types of con-
stitution. There are more. She reminds us of Plato’s dictum that ‘there is 
one form of virtue and an unlimited number of forms of vice’ (9: ).
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Anne-Marie is a  years old woman and was born with ADHD 
(Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder). As far as she can re-
member her life has been one big chaos. She’s a great collector. Her 
living room is full of knickknacks, piles of CDs, countless books, a 
prie-dieu with paternoster, and lots of photographs. She’s not able 
to throw away or let go things, because she cannot organise. Her 
inner life is the very same. Her head, she says, is like a chock-full 
repository. Sometimes, something is falling out of it unintentionally; 
she goes on to act or to speak thoughtlessly, and in no time runs into 
difficulties. Moreover, she is not capable to select or filter sensory 
impressions. She has to react to every observation: sounds, pictures, 
smells, temperatures. Willy-nilly. Everything is equally urgent and 
in need of her immediate response: a car passing by in the street, the 
conversation with her friend, the noise of the airco, a brainwave, 
and her clothes that feel like twisted: they all try to be at the centre 
of her attention simultaneously. Like this, Anne-Marie is skipping 
and living from one subject to another. In her own words: “Although 
I’m living in overdrive, I’m spinning around on site. I cannot build 
up valuable and enduring things. I’m reading three novels at once 
and never read to the end. I cannot sit out a movie, because I can-
not follow the plot; there are too many associations. I cannot enjoy 
sex, because I continually get up to do other things. As an adolescent 
I was a rebel without a cause, hunting on thrills and kicks. I had 
lots of boyfriends, but I was isolated; a long relationship took three 
days.” And the story goes on. Adult ADHD-patients typically are 
‘people of twelve professions and thirteen disasters’, as the Dutch 
saying goes. Anne-Marie first worked as a teacher (but she forgot 
names, prepared the wrong lessons and repeatedly lost her students’ 
examinations). Then she became copy editor and again lost her job. 
Her life was in shatters. At the age of  a psychiatrist made her 
diagnosis, and Anne-Marie was having therapy. She took up her 
life again and started to read and gather everything on ADHD. 
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She worked as an ADHD-expert for the Dutch ADHD Patients 
Association (called ‘Impuls’) and went to a school of acting, quite 
sure that, thanks to ADHD, she will never turn into a grey mouse.
The problem of this ‘wanton’ is that she is at the mercy of ac-
cident. Her choosing by lot is only in a minimal sense different 
from not choosing at all. She drops her projects in the face of 
the slightest temptation or distraction. She may be almost com-
pletely incapable of effective action. Korsgaard says that what 
the wanton illustrates is absence of action; the wanton is a case 
of mere privation of self-government.
The tyrannical person goes in the opposite direction. He is 
consistently ruled and unified. In a sometimes horrifying imita-
tion of unity and simplicity the tyrannical constitution is gov-
erned by one sole desire, which subordinates the entire soul to its 
purposes, leaving the person an absolute slave to a single domi-
nating obsession. Plato tells us the tyrannical soul is governed by 
a nightmarish erotic desire, and envisions tyranny as a kind of 
madness. For modern people it is hard not to think of extreme 
forms like the addict or the psychopath. Their relation to their 
obsession is like a psychotic’s relation to his delusion: the psy-
chotic is able, and prepared, to organise everything else around 
his delusion, even at the expense of a loss of his grip on the real 
world (Korsgaard 999: note 9). The psychopath may actually 
view his victim as asking for the violence inflicted upon him, 
for example, because he needs to see him that way. And for the
 Published in the Dutch magazine Flair, January 999. Wantons, in 
Frankfurt’s rendering, are not even interested in the cumulative outcome 
of their competing first-order desires. So, speaking strictly, Anne-Marie is 
not a wanton. She has a problem.
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addict a house is not full of somebody else’s furniture but of 
things he can sell for the money for the drug. The tyrannical 
person may act for reasons and it’s true that he is governed and 
unified, but Korsgaard stresses that he is not self-governed. He 
does not decide what is worth doing. He’s more or less con-
demned to reenact some important scene, some desire that has a 
hold on him, and that takes over. To that extent he’s internally 
enslaved (9: 9-7). 
1.5 Unifying agency
Let me now elaborate the Korsgaardian idea of the unity of the 
person in more detail. Why do I think of myself as one person? 
Korsgaard points out two reasons, both practical, for conceiving 
ourselves as a unified agent at a time as well as over time (99: 
-). The first reason stems from the raw necessity of elimi-
nating conflict among my various psychical functions. Because I 
have only one body with which to act, I must conceive myself as 
a unity in order to so act. Sharing a common body my psychical 
functions must work together. Secondly, there is practical unity 
implicit in my deliberative standpoint. The idea is this: I have 
various reasons for or against acting on certain competing incli-
nations, and in deliberating, I weigh these reasons and I choose 
which ones should count as good or better reasons for acting.7 
Identifying with this way of choosing imposes a practical unity
7 By choice Korsgaard does not mean arbitrary choice, like choosing 
a stamp from a stamp booklet, or like wantonly choosing by lot. This 
raises questions about sufficient criteria on which Korsgaard can set good 
choices apart from less good choices. I will pursue this complication in 
section ..
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upon me. Choosing to act for a reason is pulling my mental 
forces together into a unified system, into a single agent (as the 
classes in a polis make up the unity of a constitution). At first 
blush, it may seem odd to suggest that my unity as an agent at a 
single time is explained by my deliberative standpoint. Most of 
the time there may be neither a conflict among different reasons 
nor need for deliberation. When I think of myself as one person 
at a particular time, I may be doing several things at once, e.g. 
peel potatoes, listen to a Bach toccata on CD, and keep an eye 
on my four years old son playing on the floor. I certainly con-
sider all these actions to be unified as mine at that time, but I 
cannot easily feel the unifying force of the deliberative stand-
point here. When I turn from synchronic unity of agency to 
diachronic unity of agency, the unifying force of the deliberative 
standpoint becomes more plausible. Most of the things I do that 
matter to me take up time (health, careers, friendships, fam-
ily lives...). In choosing them I identify with something from 
which I will derive my reasons: being a father or a good soldier. 
The choice takes me some way into the future and I need to 
identify with that future in order to be what I am even now. I, 
then, both construct continuity of agency and of identity. It is 
necessary to be one continuing person over time in order to carry 
out, or even make, life plans. In Korsgaard’s words: ‘We are one 
continuing person because we have one life to lead’ (99: ). 
Thus, on close inspection, it is practical reason that requires us 
to construct a unified identity for ourselves. The need for the 
unity of the person is imposed on us by the necessity of practical 
deliberation. We would not be able to make plans, choose careers 
etcetera, if we were not to conceive ourselves as one. This unity 
is perfectly consistent with drastic changes, Korsgaard argues, 
provided that the changes are the result of actions by the person 
himself or reactions for which he is responsible. Where I change 
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myself, the sort of unity needed for identity may be preserved, 
even if I become very different. Where I am changed by wholly 
external forces, the unity is not preserved. Only changes that are 
of my own doing are authorial changes that preserve my unity as 
an agent. So, changes made for reason. 
I should mention one more thing with regard to Korsgaard’s 
account. Korsgaard adds that authorial changes are changes that 
respect the fundamental identity that stands behind our practical 
identities. Let me explain. Though most of a person’s practical 
identities are contingent, the necessity of having some practical 
identities is based, not on one or another particular contingent 
practical identity, but on what stands behind them all: a per-
son’s human identity as a ‘reflective animal who needs reasons 
to act and to live’ (99: ). As reflective beings, humans must 
ultimately come to see their humanity itself as an essential and 
foundational feature of their practical identities. The reason for 
conforming to practical identities springs from their ‘member-
ship of the party of humanity’, i.e. from their identity simply as 
valuable-qua-human. We can query the importance of a practi-
cal identity. But we cannot ignore the fact of the human condi-
tion that people have no choice but to be rational and to act on 
reasons. This involves an inescapable commitment to endorse 
the value of reflectiveness and – because reflectiveness is a ba-
sic characteristic of human beings – of humanity generally, not 
simply my reflectiveness or my humanity. Ultimately, it is the 
very fact that I encompass human (ident)ity, that is constituting 
me into a unified person. Humanity cannot be shed. It seems
 Korsgaard also notes that ‘when they can communicate, two different 
people can integrate their functions, and, for purposes of a given activity, 
become a single agent’ (99:9). We can think of a good marriage. And, 
as we already know, a corporation or a state also can be a collective agent. 
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impossible not to value my own humanity. I cannot ‘un-think’ 
or ‘de-constitute’ myself by claiming that my humanity lacks 
value; I’m still giving reasons then and thereby presupposing and 
valuing my own humanity. Humanity is an organising principle 
that I must follow.9
I pointed earlier (in section .) to two difficulties in Kors-
gaard’s argument: the unity problem and the threat of relativ-
ism. It is time to enter into the second difficulty: Why should 
we suppose that obligations that issue from contingent practical 
identities are normative for us? How can we be bound by reasons
which spring from conceptions of our identity which are not
in themselves necessary? The content of our reasons clearly is
drawn from natural and social resources, from contingent prac-
9 For Michael Smith it is conceivable that my reflective self should want 
me not to be reflective. Therefore, in his view, Korsgaard cannot be pos-
sessed of a premise from which she can draw the conclusion that I have to 
value my own reflective nature (999: 9-). I agree. People have an op-
tion not to identify with their reflective nature and not to take it as their 
‘most inner nature’.
It is important to note that Korsgaard’s argument leads into moral ter-
ritory. Valuing one’s own humanity requires valuing the humanity of all 
persons (99:  and -). Korsgaard calls this ‘the Moral Law’: the 
principle which demands people to act only on reasons that they can 
share with all rational beings who live together in a cooperative commu-
nity. She distinguishes between ‘the Moral Law’ and the purely formal 
‘Categorical Imperative’: the principle which demands people to choose 
only reasons for action they can regard as universal laws (99: 99; 9: 
). In her view, there is a path of argumentation between the two. I am 
sceptical about a conception of practical reason whose core principle is the 
principle of morality. Vide my discussion with David Velleman about the 
moral value (dignity) of humanity in ..
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tical (social, religious, professional, ethnic, relational, political 
&c.) identities. Korsgaard’s answer in a nutshell: some principles 
set standards for the form of our reasons and determine what 
counts as a reason. Korsgaard intimately relates her model of 
self-constitution to the principles of practical reason. Let me 
now detail the normativity part of the story.
1.6 The normativity of the principles of practical reason
We saw that it is in the internal world created by self-conscious-
ness, that reason is born. Self-consciousness as the source of rea-
son opens up a space of reflective distance between our impulses 
and responses. In this space the question whether our impulses 
give us reasons arises, but, in order to answer that question, we 
need principles which determine what we are to count as good 
or bad reasons. As in the state we do not just need some con-
stitution, we need a constitution that results in just laws and 
righteous policies. In the context of the argument of the Repub-
lic, the constitution of a state is committed to the principle of 
justice. On the Korsgaardian story, the basic principles for self-
constitution or being a person are the principles of practical rea-
son, namely, efficacy and autonomy. Efficacy and autonomy 
 The two principles of practical reason, efficacy and autonomy, cor-
respond to the two Kantian imperatives. On Korsgaard’s account, in fact 
there is just one imperative here: act in accordance with a reason you can 
will as a universal reason. The choice of actions must be governed by a 
categorical imperative. The hypothetical imperative merely specifies the 
kind of reason we are looking for – a causal reason, a practical reason. 
And that thought is already contained in the idea that what we are look-
ing for is a reason that governs action (9: 7-).
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set standards for the form of our reasons. Unless we reason in 
accordance with these principles, we will not succeed in being 
one person at all. Efficacy or the principle of instrumental rea-
son says that if we will an end, we must will the means to that 
end. An agent is efficacious when he succeeds in bringing about 
whatever state of affairs he intended to bring about through his 
action. Autonomy is the other principle of reason for the domain 
of action that directs an agent insofar as his actions are in some 
clear sense self-determined or his own. That is, an agent has to 
act in accordance with a reason that can, in principle, be adopted 
by any, hence by all, ordinary agents. In other words, an agent 
has to act in accordance with a reason he can will as a universal 
reason. Reasons are the sort of things that people give and re-
ceive, exchange and refuse. If any consideration is to count for 
 Here, we have to do justice to Korsgaard’s refinement of the conception 
of universality. She enters two caveats. Firstly, because reasons are quite 
specific to the situations at hand, universality may require a high degree 
of specificity. And secondly, Korsgaard distinguishes three ways in which 
we can take rules to range over a variety of cases. To start with, a reason 
can be treated as general when we think it applies to a wide range of cases. 
If we think of a reason as merely general, and we encounter an exception, 
nothing happens. We expected there to be some exceptions. Second, a 
reason can also be treated as absolutely universal, when we think it applies 
to absolutely every case of a certain sort. And it can be treated as provi-
sionally universal when we think it applies to every case of a certain sort, 
unless there is some good reason why not. If we encounter exceptional 
cases, we go back and revise the reason, bringing it a little closer to abso-
lute universality to which provisional universality essentially aspires. The 
reasons with which we operate in everyday life are, runs the Korsgaardian 
account, provisionally universal reasons (9: 7-). 
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me as reason-giving, it also has to count as a reason for others (or 
for a later self) in similar circumstances.
The principle of autonomy avoids two extremes, i.e. the two 
forms of defective self-governance sketched above. For one 
thing, it shows that reasoning cannot be a matter of deference 
to any antecedently given external standard (an obsession for 
example); external standards can only justify insofar as inde-
pendent reasons are offered for accepting their putative author-
ity. For another thing, reasoning cannot be a matter of lacking 
all standards, that is, of anomy or randomness. Korsgaard con-
siders this option at length and comes up with an ‘argument 
against particularistic willing’ (9: 7-). It is her objection 
against ‘wantonness’. Particularistic willing would be taking 
some consideration as a reason to do A, thinking that you can 
use it just this once and then, so to speak, discard it without 
any implications for any other case. You do not even need a 
reason to change your mind. Such particularistic willing makes 
it impossible for you to distinguish yourself, your principle of 
choice, from the various impulses on which you act, Korsgaard 
says. It eradicates the distinction between you as a person and 
the impulses in you. There is nothing left then that is the per-
son or the agent; nothing that is your self-determined will as 
distinct from the play of impulses within you. You are not one 
person but a series, a mere heap (in Aristotle’s phrase), of un-
related impulses. To become a unified agent who can be the 
author of his actions, you have to take your reasons to be intel-
ligible to yourself at later moments and to others. Korsgaard 
concludes that the reasons of a person must have ‘type’ char-
acter. When reasons only have ‘token’ character and the dif-
ference between ‘type’ and ‘token’ reasons cannot be made, we 
can no more distinguish someone who has a particularistic will 
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from someone who has no will at all. In other words, we must 
take your reasons for action to be universalisable, or at least 
provisionally universalisable. Such reasons may be very specific 
but universalisable they must be.
In fairness to Korsgaard, it must be noticed that, according to 
her view, something more is needed for the unification of the 
person than merely the formal principles of practical reason. In 
fact, Korsgaard proposes an Aristotelian-Kantian theory on self-
constitution. To the rational constraints for being a person Kors-
gaard adds the Aristotelian idea that a person, like pretty much 
any substance or entity, is a functionally organised unity. Persons 
are so organised as to serve some purpose or function. They want 
to realise their nature, because that is how a person functions. 
Aristotelian theory says that the good for a person rests in its 
well-functioning as the kind of being that it is in circumstances 
favorable to that well-functioning. So, human persons have ca-
pacities and limitations, needs and interests that arise from their 
general human nature and not just from the particular nature 
 In my estimation, Korsgaard conflates two interpretations of the uni-
versalisability requirement. One is that, in order to have normative force, 
my public reason must be a shareable reason, that is, a valid reason for all 
rational agents resembling me in all relevant respects. The other interpre-
tation is that my reason in order to have normative force must be accept-
able for all rational agents. Shareability differs from acceptability. It does 
not follow from the fact that my reason is intelligible and shareable, that 
other people have to be pleased with my entertaining such a reason and 
have to accept it. This raises the question of how on a public conception 
of reasons in terms of shareability alone Korsgaard’s universalisability re-
quirement is going to get us into moral space.
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(identity) that they have carved out for themselves. Looked at 
this way, one has to say, as Korsgaard does, that the unification 
task for a human person has two parts:
i. to function well in the identity he has chosen for himself, 
and to be in the circumstances that enable him to do that, and
ii. to have an identity that enables him to function well as a 
human being, and to be in circumstances that enable him to do 
that (Korsgaard a: Lecture Three).
Let us recap. What are the lessons about persons that we can 
draw from Korsgaard’s self-constitution view? Korsgaard be-
lieves that persons are in a quite literal way constituted by 
action, in other words, by the simple fact that they have to 
act. Action is necessary. To be a person is to be engaged in 
the everyday work of practical deliberation, that is, to be en-
gaged in constantly choosing and reason-giving. The basic 
rules for being a person are the normative standards internal 
to action, i.e. the principles of practical thinking. Reason’s 
own principles (de facto universalisability) just are the prin-
ciples of choosing and acting in a way that constitutes us 
into a person. What Korsgaard is trying to argue is that the 
principles of practical reason are constitutive standards of ac-
tion, and therefore, of us. They unify us into agents that can 
be the authors of our actions. Normativity and unity, in her 
view, are closely connected to each other. The principles of 
practical reason are principles of the unification of agency. 
Not only do we feel ourselves compelled to act for reasons, 
we want to be unified persisting reason-givers. Successful or
 Korsgaard does not mean logical, causal or rational necessity. It is a 
necessity humans are faced with (9: ). 
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good actions are actions which most constitute the person as 
their author and which most fully unify the person. The conclu-
sion Korsgaard is looking for is that the necessity of conforming 
to the (moral) principles of practical reason comes down to the 
necessity of being one and of maintaining our identity. I will 
now turn to some worries about Korsgaard’s project.
1.7 Some demystification
My worries circle around the unification theme. To begin with, 
I think Korsgaard’s argument that the deliberative standpoint 
imposes unity on agency and personhood is not successful. 
Korsgaard overestimates the unifying role of the human rational 
abilities. How so? 
For a given person, many different and incompatible possible 
practical identities are valuable. Choices have to be made among 
the practical identities – more precisely among the reasons they 
generate – that are possible. Moreover, we do not ordinarily sup-
pose that any such identity is as good as any other. Some practi-
cal identities are better than others and we ought to seek those 
that are among the best. Trying to understand the full meaning 
of Finnegan’s Wake, for example, is preferable to watching re-
runs of your favorite TV quiz Lingo as often as possible. And we
 Note that, on the Korsgaardian story, good and bad can be taken here 
without problem in a moral sense. Korsgaard offers us moral anthropol-
ogy. Reason’s own principle is the principle that really unifies the person 
and also the principle of the morally good person. In Korsgaard’s view, 
integrity in the metaphysical sense – the unity of agency – and in the 
moral sense – goodness – are one and the same property. 
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normally think that a hobby like making mountain trips is pref-
erable to collecting beer bottles. All these activities can be object 
of concern and become an organising principle in a person’s life. 
Now, to adopt or to give up a practical identity, as reflective 
beings, we must do so for some practical reason. What source 
of reasons is left, one could ask, to base a choice on (given that 
we choose among morally permissible self-conceptions)? At this 
point Korsgaard’s principle of autonomy comes into play, since 
to act for a reason is always to act on the basis of some ‘universal 
law’. But none of the examples above necessarily would conflict 
with the universalisability constraint, that is, would be unreason-
able or impermissible. So, it remains perplexing how there could 
be a basis in Korsgaard’s normative principles of practical reason 
alone that explains how one reasonable practical identity could 
be better than another. We cannot rank practical identities in 
importance on account of making practical reason, in particular 
the requirements of universalisability, the sole arbiter. Although 
practical identities are defined to an extent by reference to the 
categories of practical reason, universalisability cannot per se 
provide guidance for determining how to choose between differ-
ent practical identities. Requirements of rationality demand not 
to violate formal standards like consistency or universalisability. 
Such logical standards are value-neutral. They do not answer 
questions of assessing the weight of reasons we have for doing Y 
or refraining from doing Y. So, the question whether we do have 
good reasons for valuing and choosing a practical identity can-
not depend on the question of fulfilling or violating the formal 
standards of rationality. It is beyond their scope. 
Korsgaard admits that there is a problem here. She sees that 
 C. W. Gowans () also stresses this point. 
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we need some method of balancing our various ends against one 
another when they cannot be practically combined. She tags this 
method ‘the missing principle, something besides the instru-
mental principle and the categorical imperative, since neither of 
them will do this job’ (9: 7). She continues: ‘I have no for-
mulation to offer for a formal version of the missing principle. 
(…) But it seems clear to me that if we could formulate a version 
of the missing principle that is formal rather than substantive, 
then it should be easy for me to make my case about how its 
normativity is to be established. What I mean is that it seems 
rather obvious that a formal principle for balancing our various 
ends and reasons must be a principle for unifying our agency, 
since that is so exactly why we need it: so that we are not always 
tripping over ourselves when we pursue our various projects, so 
that our agency is not incoherent’ (9: ).
I’m not sure that there will be much more to reveal about this 
mysterious ‘missing principle’ in the future. I think we better 
acknowledge that practical reason often under-determines our 
choices. Practical reason can select rationally permissible alterna-
tives, but it is impossible for us to realise all permissible reasons 
at once. And the injunction ‘try to realise as many permissible 
reasons as possible’ also runs into difficulties, because in many 
cases our reasons turn out to be incommensurable. There is room 
for choice and we have to content ourselves with our choice. We 
can only be ‘satisficers’.
For similar reasons the formal principles of practical reason 
cannot per se account for the unity of persons and cannot per 
se hold together the person as a unity, or so it seems to me. An 
example may bring this point home. Let us examine how the 
 I’m indebted to Joseph Raz on this point.
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principle of universalisability works in a situation of choice, 
when different alternative practical identities are under consid-
eration. Suppose (I borrow this case from Richard Rorty, 7: 
9) there is a Catholic doctor who thinks she would rather die 
than kill a fetus, and who now turns out to be a desperate rape 
victim’s only hope. She asks herself: ‘Should I retain the practical 
identity I presently have, or rather develop and cherish the new 
identity I shall have to assume if I do what my present practical 
identity forbids?’ The doctor may find herself going back and 
forth between a proposed new practical identity and her old rea-
sons, trying to fabricate a possible identity which will integrate 
both. All the reasons for action this doctor is weighing certainly 
will be universalisable, that is, they all will be reasonable for oth-
er people in the community. To put the point in Korsgaardian 
terms: the reasons for being a non-killing Catholic doctor will be 
provisionally universal reasons (see note ). In the rape’s victim 
case we may have encountered an exception to those reasons or 
rules. But the reasons for being a killing doctor in cases of rape 
victims will also be provisionally universal reasons. What, then, 
is the absolutely universal reason to which these provisionally 
universal reasons aspire? It’s not at all clear how a principle of 
universalisability can affect the (dis)unity of this person, who 
has a very strong urge to pursue a new practical identity that 
is generally forbidden by her Catholic identity. The physician 
is unwilling to give up either that new identity or the old ties 
to Catholic milieu and identity, and does not know what to do. 
Looking for reasons to guide her, she only faces an arbitrary 
choice among various universalisable reasons. I do not think, as 
Rorty puts it frivolously, that the doctor’s problem ‘simply’ is a 
question about which of the many available suppliers of alterna-
tive practical identities she should buy from (7: 99). But I 
am also unmoved by the Korsgaardian suggestion that some for-
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mal normative principle – as an invisible magnet – attracts and 
unifies the doctor’s reasons. Formal constraints on what counts 
as a reason, i.e. the principle(s) of practical reason, cannot pro-
vide for substantive guidance to our thinking about the unity of 
practical identities. I can agree with Korsgaard that the reasons 
to act which I autonomously choose are part of what holds me 
together. I also subscribe to her idea that what counts as a reason, 
to be a reason at all, must be a public reason, i.e., it must have 
normative force that can be shared by all rational human beings. 
Finally, I can even feel the force of Korsgaard’s master argument 
that there is one practical identity that I cannot simply doubt: I 
cannot easily question my human identity as a creature capable 
of reflective questioning and acting on reasons. I think all this 
is on the right lines. To my mind, however, the rational capaci-
ties that human nature supplies do not by themselves make it 
possible for human beings to reach rational unity. Here I take 
a decisive departure from the Korsgaardian picture. Korsgaard 
overemphasises the unifying force of reasons. Of course, human 
beings will strive for some unity to realise their different plans, 
intentions, and concerns in their one and only human life. If 
we think of the person as a more or less coherent collection of 
practical identities, as a collection of reasons that somehow fit 
together into a whole which is sufficiently unified to make action 
possible, then bringing the aspects of our practical identities to-
gether into some kind of an integrated whole is important. The 
person in question will try to realise some homeostasis, some 
kind of ‘reflective equilibrium’. Yet, my point is that the basic 
consistency of a person’s reasons only in a limited way contrib-
utes to the person’s unity; and that it certainly is not the only 
contributor. Working its way into or out of a practical identity is 
a matter not just of adopting or rejecting principles of practical 
reason but also of undergoing psychological change. In order to 
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reach a new ‘integrity’ our Catholic doctor will have to change 
dramatically. Changing a set of available reasons often requires 
substantive psychological change.7 Persons are constituted by 
their reasons, but they also are embodied and embedded entities. 
They are co-constituted by their psychological make-up and the 
circumstances.
It should be conceded that Korsgaard tries to deal with this 
problem. Her considered view is that a person is not solely iden-
tified with his reasons, and so regards his incentives as alien 
things: ‘Neither the incentive nor the principle of choice is, by 
itself “the reason” for the action; rather, the reason is the incen-
tive as seen from the perspective of the principle of choice.’ (99: 
). So, it is rather the case that the person is identified with his 
constitution, and that his constitution says that reason should 
rule. Furthermore, Korsgaard brings her self-constitution view 
in step with Aristotelian metaphysics: persons are functionally 
organised unities, who in that way try to preserve and maintain 
their form of life. Nevertheless, Korsgaard is very clear about the 
forces that are taking the lion’s share of the unification job: these 
forces stem from practical reason. The principles of practical rea-
son are the glue that holds the person together in one piece.
The objection might now be raised that Korsgaard has given 
us a second argument for the unity of persons. As noted earlier, 
she does not only stick to the unity of the deliberative stand-
point, but also stresses that the human body imposes unity on 
agency and personhood. However, her elaboration of this point 
is a bit disappointing. To put it briefly, Korsgaard’s self-consti-
tution view remains almost silent on the declared importance of 
the body. This is, so I believe, a serious flaw in her position. To
7 David Velleman () makes this point in his essay Willing the Law. 
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see why, consider what can happen if one takes a reason view 
without embodiment to the extreme. That is, if one derives the 
unity of the person from a rational point of view alone.
How such a line of thought may exactly weaken the unifying 
role of the body and lead to increasing disunity of the person 
is what we can learn from Carol Rovane’s congenial but much 
more radical normative analysis of personal identity. We can read 
her argument as a reductio ad absurdum of Korsgaard’s emphasis 
on rational constraints. In The Bounds of Agency Rovane offers 
a psychologically based account of personal identity, which de-
nies that personal identity can be defined in terms of the human 
body. Neither does Rovane follow the Lockean view in equat-
ing a person with a phenomenological viewpoint, that is, with a 
single locus of conscious experience. We learn from her norma-
tive analysis that ‘there is one person wherever there is one agent 
who has its own rational point of view, and who is committed 
to achieving overall rational unity within it’ (99: 9). On 
Rovane’s account, personal identity should be defined in terms 
of the unity of a rational point of view, and the boundaries of a 
person in terms of the bounds of a rational viewpoint. As a con-
sequence, in the case of a human being, there is a practical pos-
sibility to adopt different rational points of view and to commit 
to different unifying projects. Humans in principle develop the 
rational and practical abilities by which they could realise mul-
tiple persons, if only they had a reason for doing so. In the case 
of our Catholic doctor, according to Rovane, there is an option 
for a double life – a fragmented human life in which two distinct 
persons figure (contra a life of constant pain and frustration
 A rational point of view, according to Rovane, is the point of view from 
which a person deliberates and that constitutes its psychological economy 
and unity.
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as the physician is struggling to pacify two practical identities 
that are, ultimately, irreconcilable; or struggling to cope with the 
sacrifice of one of them). Within a single embodied human be-
ing with a single consciousness, Rovane argues, distinct persons 
can be formed, that is, multiple rational points of view, each with 
its own commitments to its own overall rational unity and uni-
fying projects. There is no preference for integration, as it is not 
the case that such integration constitutes personhood more fully 
(assuming that each of the ‘alters’ satisfies the stipulated defini-
tion of a person). Rovane entails the equal status as persons of 
both multiple and integrated persons.9 Here is her well-known 
example (99: 7-77). Suppose you are committed to pursuing 
the following different activities: philosophical work, a teach-
ing career, and the study of music. Let us take for granted that 
you are an individual person with a commitment to achieving 
overall rational unity within your particular human life. This 
ensures that you never pursue these coordinated activities in 
complete independence of one another. You will always bear in 
mind how pursuing one would affect your ability to pursue the 
others, thereby also ranking the activities in importance. Now 
imagine that the activities were pursued completely independent 
of one another without any effort to rank them in importance, 
and without any effort to arrive at all-things-considered judg-
ments that take them all into account. This sounds as a descrip-
tion of irrationality, or of a chaotic psychological economy. But 
it could equally well be a description of a case where several dis-
tinct persons exercise their agencies in complete independence of 
one another. The thought is that there might be, cohabiting in 
the same human being, a philosopher, a teacher, and a musician. 
9 Also of group persons, but I leave aside the possibility of group persons 
here.
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Each person might well pursue its unifying project (we can 
imagine that each wants just three or four hours a day). In this 
case, it is not clear why it is necessarily irrational to oppose the 
goal of overall rational unity within this human being. Multiple 
persons can have reason to enter into certain sorts of cooperative 
arrangements in order to share a common resource – as can any 
other individual persons who need to share resources. And their 
acts of cooperation can be seen as acts of cooperation by three 
distinct persons, who satisfy the condition of personal identity 
specified by Rovane’s normative analysis of personal identity.
I think that Rovane’s reason view is very instructive. It puts 
the bodily and phenomenological ‘givenness’ and ‘separate-
ness’ of persons in brackets with far-reaching and dubious 
consequences. The unity of the person disappears. We can 
now meet a team of possible persons in one human body: our 
neighbor can be a music-practicing-person, an integrated person 
and a group person (as a member of a string quartet) at once. 
And the human rational and social nature makes it possible to 
live on both sides of the borders of these overlapping persons and 
to draw the lines time and again. For Rovane there is no fact of 
the matter about boundaries between persons. At any given time 
it is unclear with which person – or even with how many – we 
are interacting. 
I conclude that the rational viewpoint alone cannot account 
 For a similar case against the ‘Cohabitation Claim’ see Eric T. Olson 
() in Was Jekyll Hyde?. Olson rejects the ‘Cohabitation Claim’ be-
cause it rules out our being things made of flesh and blood. Thinking 
carefully about what we are, and especially about what non-mental prop-
erties we have, he argues, we will see that there is simply no room for two 
or more of us within one human being.
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for the unity of the person and that thinking so has deplorable 
consequences. Rovanean persons certainly are not what Kors-
gaard has in mind. If such indeed is the case, then Korsgaard’s 
reason-based view has to do more to block the proliferation and 
disintegration of the person. A plausible way to go would be to 
give the body a more prominent and elaborated role in the uni-
fication of the person.
1.8 First findings
Let me sum up the line of thought so far. My plan in this 
chapter was to provide an account of personal identity in terms 
of agency. My point of departure was the ongoing debate on 
human agency, more specifically the camp of David Velleman 
and Christine Korsgaard, who define human agency as behav-
ior whose first-order motives are perceived as reasons and are 
consequently reinforced by, in Velleman’s phrase, ‘higher-order 
motives of rationality’. I singled out the self-constitution view 
of Christine Korsgaard, who offers a picture of reflective agen-
cy and goes on to derive a very elaborate account of personal 
identity in terms of deliberative action. Humans are born for 
action, she states, and agents are moving through a ‘space of 
reasons’. They have the capacity to deliberate, that is, to choose 
for acting on reasons about what they would do if their rea-
sons were to survive a process of reflective scrutiny. When an 
agent reflectively does choose which reasons he is to act on, 
and, when he acts on these reasons, he does act in ways that 
are constitutive of his self, viz., of his identity. So, on the Kors-
gaardian account, identity is practical identity and is bound up 
with practical reason. The substantia nigra of self-constitution 
is the normative force of practical reason. It is the normative 
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consistency of reasons that is constitutive for personhood and 
for the unity of personhood. I agree, but that is where praise 
must end. 
As I have tried to convey, Korsgaard overestimates the uni-
fying power of human rational abilities. Her idea that human 
beings by nature have rational capacities that ought to achieve 
overall rational unity within themselves is not convincing. I can 
accept that reasons, to be reasons at all, must be shareable. But 
reasonable permissibility as such does not ground unity. All that 
can follow from Korsgaard’s account, as far as I can see, is that 
human beings can achieve overall rational unity. The rational ca-
pacities that human nature supplies do not by themselves dictate 
to what extent human beings have to reach rational unity and 
how to do it. It is true that Korsgaard, taking her lead from Ar-
istotle, adds extra resources to support her unification argument. 
In spite of this, the unifying role of practical reason, c.q. the 
Korsgaardian principle of autonomy (universalisability), turns 
out to be overblown. 
I think we have to be modest about the unification business 
and to accept a more moderate ‘reason view’ that leaves room for 
timely incoherence, discontinuities and drastic changes. Think 
back for a moment to our doctor’s dilemma. One of the things 
this person can do to get rid of her inter-identity conflicts is to 
give up her commitment to overall rational unity and to con-
struct a new practical identity to suit the occasion. That is, she 
can accept temporary incoherence or a far-reaching change of 
her person. In the moderate view I suggest, persons are consti-
tuted by a self-reweaving network of reasons, that is, a self-cor-
recting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, but not 
all at once. We can think here of Neurath’s famous boat. All per-
sonal reasons are experimental, fallible, and replaceable like the 
planks of Neurath’s ship. This is not to say that persons aren’t 
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committed to unity. For the most part persons do not want to 
be like wrecked ships. But to lead the more or less unified lives 
of more or less unified persons, all these persons need is a Hu-
mean reading of instrumental reasoning instead of Korsgaardian 
‘principled reasoning’. And in addition to means-end reasoning 
they can adopt a Humean conception of ‘reflective rationality’, 
some steady and general point of view in order to correct their 
idiosyncrasies. I’ll have more to say about the Humean reading 
of reasoning in chapter three.
For now, it will be clear that Korsgaard’s self-constitution view 
is leaving us unsatisfied and that it can only be a reasonable start 
for a viable theory of persons in terms of agency. In closing, let 
me say something about the direction we need to take. My pro-
posal is to develop the reason view of personhood into a narra-
tive view. Reasons for acting always are the elements of a possible 
storyline along which to make up what we are going to do. What 
serves as the rationale for acting, or as the grasp of what an actor 
is doing, is a whole story. So I propose to connect a picture of self-
constitution in terms of agency with, in this case, the narrative
 Although I think persons cannot definitively banish wantonness. Per-
sons also look much more like a tyrant than Korsgaard seems to accept. 
The tyrannical person actually remains a puzzle case for Korsgaard in 
showing that strong unity can stand apart from agency-at-its-best. I think 
the force of the reasons to reject this despotic type of defective person-
hood as ‘too great a unity’ and ‘unity achieved in the wrong way’ mainly 
is a moral one. Tyrants like the mafia kingpin and the addict clearly are 
harming other persons. But what about the single-mindedness of a pas-
sionate scientist, tennis player, parent, artist, monk or animal protection-
ist? Those we most esteem tend to have some all-consuming passion. 
More about ‘obsessive’ human lives in chapter three. 
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self-constitution view of Marya Schechtman. I have at least three 
arguments for such a move. First, stories are, in all probability, 
the easiest and most natural way to put in order our experiences 
and our knowledge. They seem to be a natural place to look for 
an adequate understanding of personhood. Second, a coherent 
self-constituting story will do better justice to the multiplexity, 
the discontinuities, and the changes of the person than unify-
ing reasons can. In a narrative view on persons the unity con-
straint can be replaced by a demand for coherence, and reason 
can play a less normatively potent and more instrumental role. 
Moreover, formal constraints on what counts as a reason can be 
supplemented with substantive constraints that provide for sub-
stantive guidance in our practical lives. A third argument for de-
veloping the reason view on persons into a narrative view is that 
Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution view can be linked up 
better with the human body. It can repair the second failing of 
Korsgaard’s self-constitution theory mentioned above: the lack 
of an elaborated theory on the embodiment of persons. Reasons 
alone cannot be supposed to do the self-constituting and unify-
ing work. Also emotions, desires and the human body do their 
share. Preliminary work is already done here by Marc Slors in 
defending the importance of ‘basic narratives’ (). A second 
avenue of research can be opened by Antonio Damasio’s theory 
of feeling (999). According to Damasio, neither practical rea-
soning nor being a person are possible without bodily feeling. So 




My life, it seems to me, is ridiculously shapeless. I know what makes 
a good narrative, and lives don’t have much of that – pattern and bal-
ance, form, completion, commensurateness. It is often the case that a 
Life, at least to start with, will resemble a success story; but the only 
shape that life dependably exhibits is that of tragedy – minus all the 
grand stuff about nemesis, fortune’s wheel, and the fatal flaw. Tragedy 
follows the line of the mouth on the tragic mask (and the equivalent 
is true of comedy). You rise to the crest and then you curve down to a 
further point along the same latitude. That’s the only real shape lives 
usually have – and, again, forget about coherence of imagery and the 
Uniting Theme.
M. Amis (), Experience, London: Jonathan Cape, 
2.1 Narrative self-constitution
In The Constitution of Selves (99), Marya Schechtman pushes the 
discussion on personal identity forward by separating two ques-
tions and dealing with each in its own terms: the re-identification 
question and the characterisation question. The re-identification 
question asks what makes a person at time T identical with a 
person at time T. More precisely: Can we provide a criterion of 
personal identity that defines the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for saying that a person-stage at T and a person-stage at T 
are stages of the same person? The characterisation question asks, 
most simply put, which actions, experiences and characteristics 
(beliefs, desires, values and other psychological features) are to be 
attributed to a given person to make him the person he is. What 
characterises him as a person? The re-identification question is 
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the stake of a debate on logical and ontological identity, while the 
characterisation question is at the forefront of the debate on prac-
tical identity. For my purposes I will focus on Schechtman’s 
response to the characterisation question here: her ‘narrative self-
constitution view’ according to which persons create their identi-
ties by constructing, telling, and enacting an autobiographical 
narrative – a life story. The question is how this is done.
In Schechtman’s view not all individual human beings are per-
sons. Individuals may have rich experiences, but they constitute 
themselves as persons only by coming to think of themselves 
as persisting subjects who have had experiences in the past and 
will continue to have experiences in the future, taking certain 
experiences in the past, present and future as theirs. In early 
childhood – at the age of three according to some personality 
psychologists –, human beings can attribute experiences to 
themselves that are removed in time. Windows appear as it were 
 The two debates move up to each other but do not find each other. 
D. Parfit is the owner so to speak of the metaphysical identity-question; 
C. M. Korsgaard, M. Bratman, the late B. Williams, D. Velleman, M. 
Schechtman and H. Frankfurt are prominent workers on the practical 
identity-question. 
 Since the mid-9s personality psychology has witnessed a strong up-
surge of interest in personal narratives and life stories. The turn toward 
narrative began with Silvan Tomkins and the development of ‘script the-
ory’. The most extensively articulated approaches developed in the 9s 
are D.P. McAdams’ ‘life-story model of identity’ and H.J.M. Hermans’ 
‘theory of the dialogical self ’ (McAdams 999).
It should be emphasized that self-narration presupposes a number 
of skills. What skills? These are controversial waters. Shaun Gallagher 
e.g. lists four cognitive capacities for narrative competency: capacity 
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in the house of human existence – windows at the back that are 
oriented to what one has been through; and windows directed 
towards the future. The experienced present, the remembered 
past, and the anticipated future begin to inform and influence 
each other; they begin to interact mutually in a way that pro-
duces a unified experience. This organising or processing of 
experiences creates an understanding of oneself as an evolving 
person. Different elements spread out over time form an ongo-
ing dynamic system – a narrative – that integrates to produce a 
person that extends over time. ‘The formation of an identity-
constituting narrative alters the nature of an individual’s experi-
ence in a way that extends consciousness over time, producing 
a persisting experiencer who is the primary experiencing sub-
ject’ (Schechtman 99: 9). So, according to Schechtman, it is 
the living and telling of an in time extended story (a narrative) 
that constitutes the self or the person. A narrative unifies ex-
periences and creates a person through processes of attribution 
and appropriation. While expressing their lived experiences in 
a connected chronicle, human beings experience a protagonist 
and identify themselves as this person. They weave stories of 
their lives and their doing so makes them entering the world 
of persons. To put it metaphorically: persons are like Homer’s
for temporal ordering, capacity for minimal self-reference, episodic and
autobiographical memory, and capacity for meta-cognition (7: -
). In Narrative and Moral Life Tatjana Tietjens Meyers lists eight skills 
(among the skills) that contribute to self-narrativity (: -). I put 
these matters to one side here.
 I’m working here with an unanalysed ordinary understanding of 
narrative. There is no agreed criterion for sharply defining narratives – 
and certainly none in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
58  practical identity
Helena, who – in captivity – was weaving a tapestry showing the 
battle between the Greeks and the Trojans – exactly that which 
constituted her identity (Ilias , ). That said, it will be clear 
that autobiographical narratives are both fictional and factual 
– fictional, because we create ourselves; and factual, because we 
really are the characters whom we create. Our running autobi-
ographies give us considerations that serve as reasons for acting; 
they guide our speech and our doings. Human lives are narrative 
quests to live up to self-conceptions.
2.2 Constraints on self-constituting narratives
Of course, not just any narrative will do. A view that any nar-
rative self-conception is identity-constituting would be commit-
ted to the obviously false claim that persons cannot be igno-
rant, mistaken, self-deceived or mendacious about themselves. 
The narrative self-constitution view avoids this result by plac-
ing constraints on the kind of narrative that can constitute a 
person’s identity. Schechtman offers three candidates for con-
straints on self-constituting autobiographical narratives: the de-
mand for intelligibility, the articulation constraint and the real-
ity constraint. 
 It’s important to note that the absence of narrative does not necessarily 
need to be seen as a negative state, but just as a phenomenologically dif-
ferent one from the having of such a narrative.
 A similar Homeric example is Ulysses’ wife Penelope, who avoided a 
new identity by drawing her tapestry out into wire every night.
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Demand for intelligibility
Individuals constitute themselves as persons by creating self-con-
ceptions that take the form and logic of a conventional, linear 
narrative. There has to be a coherent plot to produce psychologi-
cal intelligibility and a well-defined character. Incidents, actions, 
and experiences do not become intelligible if viewed in isola-
tion, but if they are interpreted as parts of a broader, ongoing 
story that gives them their significance, i.e. if they cohere with 
some other elements of the story. The requisite form and logic 
by which the various parts of the narrative fit together are those 
associated with the ‘Zusammenhang des Lebens’ (W. Dilthey).7 
Narrative self-conceptions look very much like a coming of age-
story. Of course, coherence is not a categorical demand. Traits 
are supposed to support one another, but narratives can be over-
all intelligible even if there are a few anomalous parts (out of 
character-elements). Also there is the conflicted story of an ado-
lescent experiencing an identity crisis, or the disjointed story of 
a person with dementia, or the frozen story of a severely trauma-
tised person. There is no precise measure. The narrative self-con-
stitution view needs to accept a somewhat vague and fluid idea of 
7 Philip Roth’s novel Exit Ghost (7) offers a nice pair of complete 
opposites. Larry, the protagonist’s neighbor, is ‘a meticulous, finicky man 
who seemed to believe that life was safe only if everything in it was punc-
tiliously planned (…). An only child, Larry was sent to live with relatives 
on the Naugatuck River southwest of Hartford (…), and there, in a boy’s 
diary of “Things to Do”, he laid out a future for himself that he followed 
to the letter for the rest of his life; from then on, everything undertaken 
was deliberately causal.’ The protagonist himself is desperately cultivating 
‘rash moments’ and performing actions that are completely at odds with 
everything he planned and tried to realise during his life.
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a standard narrative. Although a range of narrative styles can fall 
under the category of a traditional linear narrative, Schechtman 
also holds that a self-narrative that deviates beyond a certain de-
gree from the form of a conventional story does not constitute 
a person. The question of just how different a narrative must be 
before it is removed from the family of narratives making up the 
standard form, or is ruled out as identity-constituting altogether, 
is ‘largely an empirical one’ for her (99: ). 
The articulation constraint
To have a narrative does not mean to have a fully expressed au-
tobiography. Most people simply live and have no time or reason 
to articulate full-life narratives. An autobiographical narrative is 
more than a way of thinking about ourselves in reflective hours: 
‘How we appropriate actions and experiences to make them part 
of our consciousness is much more like how we appropriate ele-
ments of food to make them parts of our bodies than how we 
appropriate books to make them part of our library’ (99: ). 
So, in the main having a self-narrative is a matter of psychical 
organisation. Still, Schechtman stresses that an identity consti-
tuting narrative should be capable of ‘local’ articulation. This 
means that persons should be able to explain why they do what 
they do, believe what they believe, and feel what they feel. Per-
sons usually can account for their experiences and actions by 
showing how these are part of an intelligible life story with a 
comprehensible subject as its protagonist. In other words, the 
self-narrative constituting one’s identity cannot remain totally 
subterranean. And, according to Schechtman, there is a problem 
if persons have difficulty articulating their stories; or if they do 
it inaccurately, i.e., if their reasons for believing what they do 
may be quite different from what they take them to be (‘self-
blindness’). Schechtman asks us to think of a man who sincerely 
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believes he loves his brother, but frequently acts towards him in 
ways that suggest hostility. This person’s hostility may not be 
part of the explicit story the person tells of himself, but it may 
still be part of his implicit self-conception in a very real way as 
expressed in his behavior, emotions and beliefs. So, Schechtman 
makes a difference between explicit and implicit self-narratives. 
In the brother example the implicit and the explicit narrative 
diverge. The person even explicitly denies what the implicit story 
tells others. Schechtman: ‘Although the hostility is not part of 
the story this person tells of himself, then, it can still be part of 
his self-conception in a very real way’ (99: ). Explicitness is 
not a prerequisite for an element’s being part of a person’s self-
conception. The articulation constraint should not be taken to 
require absolute transparency. But it also says that elements of a 
person’s narrative he cannot articulate are only partially his -‘at-
tributable to him to a lesser degree than those aspects of the nar-
rative he can articulate. It implies, moreover, that if the inability 
to articulate one’s narrative is sufficiently widespread and severe, 
the overall degree of personhood can also be compromised’ (99: 
). Because the brother is unaware of his hostility, Schechtman 
argues, this implicit element is hardly appropriated and only par-
tially his. It is less identity-constituting. Its influence is rigid and 
automatic (like posthypnotic suggestion); mysterious. But this 
may not prevent us from thinking that subterranean features of 
our narratives are revealing of who we are, because they fill in 
the pieces that can make the incomprehensible elements of our 
explicit stories intelligible.
 Our intuitions often run to the contrary: we are inclined – thanks to 
Sigmund Freud – to think that forces lurking deep in someone’s uncon-
sciousness are more definitive of whom he really is and that the real story 
often is the one not told.
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The reality constraint
The last of Schechtman’s constraints is that identity-constituting 
narratives must match with reality, so as to allow for the con-
trast with people who are, for example, psychotic, ignorant about 
themselves, or self-deceived. The facts with which the self-nar-
rative needs to cohere can be split into two basic categories: ob-
servational facts (information taken in immediately through the 
senses) and interpretive facts (conclusions about the meanings or 
implications of those facts). When my neighbor believes himself 
to be Charles Darwin he is deeply out of touch with reality. He 
is making an error of fact and therefore he is not living in the 
same world as other people, the world in which Charles Darwin 
died in . Pressing the ‘neo-Darwin’ by asking him questions 
will reveal one or another major anomaly in the individual self-
narrative. Errors like this decrease the degree of personhood of 
the individual making the claims.9 Thinking of interpretive in-
accuracies Schechtman gives the example of paranoia. Paranoiacs 
do not make errors about the observational facts, but they see the 
facts as having implications wildly different from those others 
make. Their conclusions drawn from the facts are unwarranted. 
Of course there are light and more familiar cases too: someone 
believing he is treated unsympathetically, or being taken advan-
tage of, or that his work is appreciated, while it is absolutely not. 
Such errors of reason as well compromise self-constitution. So, to 
be a person one needs more than a particular kind of subjective 
orientation toward one’s life. The conception that an individual
9 It is quite uncommon to draw a distinction between various degrees 
of personhood, as Schechtman does. But having a narrative is a matter of 
degree. A developing child does not create a self-narrative all at once, nor 
does a patient suffering from dementia lose narration in one devastating 
moment.
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applies to himself must also mesh with a more intersubjective ac-
count of his life – roughly the story that those around him would 
tell (Schechtman 99: -). In brief: the reality constraint says 
that narrative self-constitution is always kept in check by social 
and cultural practices, and by objective facts about the world. 
One of these facts not yet mentioned is that persons always are 
intimately connected with a human body. Persons literally have 
their unique place under the sun. They are singular points of view 
and action. It may well be an empirical fact that all actual person-
hood is secured for a large part through bodily continuity. 
 This is also a conceptual point. Human embodiment and self-narra-
tive are conceptually related. Suppose angels have a life story; angelic and 
human biographies will be as chalk and cheese.
 Lynn Rudder Baker also stresses that human persons are constituted by 
human bodies. They are embodied and embedded (situated in the world). 
But human persons, in her view, most fundamentally are persons, just as 
a bronze statue is most fundamentally a statue, not a piece of bronze. The 
distinguishing mark of persons, according to Baker, is their capacity for 
a first-person perspective. A first-person perspective is the ability to think 
of oneself in the first-person without recourse to any name or description 
or demonstrative, e.g., expressing thoughts as ‘I wonder how I shall die.’ 
When I speak of narrative selfhood, I am considering a much thicker 
concept of the self than what Baker means by the first-person perspective. 
A narrative self is not required for a first-person perspective (as Luria’s 
famous Zasetsky-case demonstrates). A first-person perspective is neces-
sary, but not sufficient, for an idea of a self in the sense of a coherent and 
comprehensive life story, of which one is the subject. I agree with Baker 
that there is no way for an adequate account of a narrative self to avoid 
the first-person perspective (Baker : 7-). It makes possible much 
of what matters to us: inner lives, reflective agency, or self-constitution. 
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Let me summarise Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution 
view. Human beings characteristically exist in time. They live in 
the present, relying upon realised possibilities in the past and in-
tending to realise possibilities in the future. They have a special 
relationship with their own experiences in the present, past, and 
future. They are time-binding organisms that are reflectively 
concerned with their own temporal existence. This reflectivity 
is mediated by narratives. Narrative structure pervades everyday 
life as the manner in which the flow of experiences and actions is 
organised over time (Then..., and then..., and then...). And nar-
rative is the organising structure from which a person emerges 
who experiences and acts. In Schechtman’s view, a human being 
constitutes himself as a person in the unity of an autobiographi-
cal narrative. And such person-constituting narratives have to 
meet three conditions: they must be intelligible, articulate, and 
real.
2.3 The missing ingredient
I basically agree with Schechtman’s line of thought, although her 
view is not undisputed. Especially the articulation constraint is
 Closer inspection reveals that Schechtman’s three constraints on self-
constituting narratives are intertwined. Intelligibility presupposes the re-
ality constraint. Personal experiences can only be intelligible for outsiders 
against a background of a considerable amount of sense of reality. And 
how could a self-narrative be intelligible, if not articulated in one way or 
another? In her 7 description of the narrative self-constitution view 
Schechtman does no longer mention the intelligibility constraint. Narra-
tive self-conceptions must meet the reality constraint and the articulation 
constraint.
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much debated. Hilde Lindemann Nelson, for example, argues in 
Damaged Identities. Narrative Repair that ‘in claiming that what 
we can’t articulate about ourselves isn’t as fully self-constituting as 
what we can, Schechtman fails to acknowledge that one’s identity 
isn’t simply a function of one’s self-knowledge’ (: 9). My 
thought here is that we have to keep in mind that self-narratives 
remain partly implicit, unreflected and unarticulated. Other-
wise, it is as if I am claiming that if you cannot wear your heart 
on your sleeve then you have not really got a heart. Neither can 
we assume that the best selves are to be found on the side of 
the most explicit of our interpretations. Accepting the articula-
tion constraint does not imply: the more articulated, the better. 
But above all, we have to accept the fact that persons are not 
transparent; not for other people and nor for themselves. Schecht-
man’s description of the ‘self-blind’ brother is an example; it leads 
to a conflict of interpretations between the story of the brother 
– let me call him Vladimir – and the story of other ‘experts in 
normal behavior’, who tell him repeatedly that his behavior
 I fully disagree with Lindemann Nelson’s conclusion that there is 
enough reason to jettison all of Schechtman’s constraints on self-consti-
tuting narratives and to make a fresh start. Schechtman herself refined 
the articulation constraint in 7. She now recognises that narrative ap-
proaches to identity correctly have been criticised (e.g. in G. Strawson 
, or O. Flanagan’s 99 critique of Charles Taylor’s conception of 
narrative identity) on the grounds that they tie the conditions of person-
hood to an improbable degree of articulacy and intellectual reflection. 
In her 7 response to Galen Strawson’s critique of narrative identity, 
Schechtman distinguishes weak, moderate and strong versions of the no-
tion of narrative identity, arguing that strong versions, such as Taylor’s, 
are susceptible to critique of the articulation constraint. I shall return to 
the articulation contraint in ..
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de facto asks for other interpretations, i.e., other attributions 
of reasons than he himself can offer. According to the experts, 
Vladimir’s actions speak louder than his words. Vladimir denies. 
What I described and endorsed so far as Schechtman’s nar-
rative self-constitution view is still under construction. There 
have been several improvements. The most important one is 
about the role of emotion in narrative self-constitution. In  
Schechtman publishes an article by way of supplement to her 
narrative theory of persons. She is unhappy with the fact that 
narrative accounts fail to capture the distinction between psy-
chological changes which are survival-threatening, that is, which 
bring about a loss of identity, and those which are benign, that is, 
those which bring about identity-preserving development. The 
mere existence of a comprehensible narrative of change is not yet 
enough to preserve identity. That self-narratives meet the coher-
ence requirement – internal coherence and ‘external’ coherence 
with reality – is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one 
 The crucial requirement for self-constitution is that narratives be co-
herent..Self-constituting narratives require internal coherence, i.e., the 
demand for intelligibility, and ‘external’ coherence, i.e., the reality con-
straint. Apart from ‘coherence’ Schechtman also uses ‘cohesiveness’, ‘con-
nectedness’, and ‘consistence’. Consistency usually means that there is 
no logical contradiction between the parts of a whole. Coherence is a 
broader concept. It includes connectedness and consistency. Coherence 
means that parts do go together very well. In Schechtman’s narrative self-
constitution view coherence establishes the norm in two senses of this 
term. Firstly, coherence is normal; it obtains for the most part. For most 
of us, most of the time, things do make sense, hang together, and are 
going somewhere. And secondly, it is the normative standard, which also 
determines that which deviates from it.
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to identify the characteristics of identity-preserving change. The 
missing piece, Schechtman argues, is empathic access (: ): 
‘Empathic access involves a situation where the original psycho-
logical make-up is, in an important sense, still present in the later, 
psychologically-altered person. The earlier beliefs, values and de-
sires are recognised as legitimate, and are given, so to speak, a vote 
in personal decision-making’ (: ). Memory-connection, 
e.g., not only is a cognitive relation to the past, but one which is 
thoroughly infused with affect. What is at the core of empathic 
access to memories is the affective connection to the past, together 
with its behavioral implications. More than just cognitive recol-
lection, the emotions that belong to the past experiences are still 
there. Schechtman thus redefines her narrative self-constitution 
view as follows: ‘The most satisfying view of personal identity 
will be a combination of a narrative view with empathic access. 
The basic idea would be that personal identity over time consists 
of the existence of a coherent narrative of change which includes 
empathic access. The narrative provides a basic level of continu-
ity while the empathic access provides the additional ingredient 
necessary for true personal survival’ (: ).
The point clearly echoes Schechtman’s interpretation, in The 
Constitution of Selves, of John Locke as a self-constitution theo-
rist (99: -). According to Schechtman Locke provided an 
insight that yields a plausible understanding of how persons cre-
ate an autobiographical sense of self. Personal identity, in Locke’s 
view, is constituted by sameness of consciousness. This claim re-
quires interpretation and it is common to view Locke as holding 
a memory theory of personal identity. Unfortunately, interpret-
ers of Locke are focusing exclusively on the cognitive aspects of 
consciousness. Consciousness is thought of as a faculty of know-
ing. This is not, however, the aspect of consciousness that Locke 
most emphasises, says Schechtman. The aspect of consciousness 
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that Locke most stresses in his discussion of personal identity 
is the affective side. He paints a picture of consciousness as the 
faculty whereby we experience pleasure and pain, happiness and 
misery (99: ). Locke draws a connection between the affec-
tive aspects of consciousness and the appropriation of particular 
actions and experiences when he tells us what makes a particu-
lar body (in the present) one’s own. It is the fact that someone 
experiences what happens to certain bits of matter – that their 
condition directly affects him in the dimension of pleasure and 
pain – that makes them part of his consciousness, and so makes 
them his. The same, says Locke, is true of immaterial substance. 
Insofar as someone is immediately caused pleasure or pain by 
the present states of a particular soul, that soul is, presently, hers. 
Present actions and experiences are made part of a person’s pres-
ent consciousness by affecting his well-being or causing him 
pleasure or pain. Locke tells us that persons make past actions 
and experiences theirs on just the same grounds. So, in his view, 
past actions and experiences become those of a present person 
if they affect present consciousness, causing the person pleasure 
and pain in the present. On this reading, we extend conscious-
ness back in time to some past action or experience by caring 
about it in the appropriate way – by feeling its effects. 
The objection may now be raised that it still necessarily is the 
memory of some past event that causes the affect. Schechtman 
denies. There is more to the story, Schechtman argues, because
 A disagreement with Korsgaard here. According to Korsgaard’s view, 
until a person consciously incorporates his unconscious nature into his 
own reflective view, c.q. into his unified identity, that unconscious nature 
cannot be fully part of the person. See her 9 comments on Jonathan 
Lear’s Tanner Lectures Irony and Identity at Harvard University (b).
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we have known since Freud that the past can affect present well-
being without being explicitly remembered: ‘Locke points out 
that past events can become part of present consciousness by af-
fecting us in the present along the dimension of pleasure or pain. 
This can happen in a straightforward way – as when some mem-
ory causes guilt or remorse – but it can also happen in a more 
subtle way, by contributing to a person’s overall sense of self. Our 
pasts give us our conception of who we are and what life story 
we are living, and this conception may well intensify or mitigate 
present emotion. (...) To have a narrative self-conception on the 
view I am urging is thus to experience the events in one’s life as 
interpreted through one’s sense of one’s own life story, and to feel 
the affect that follows upon doing so’ (99: ). Locke seems to 
imply that the future (anticipations) does so as well. 
Schechtman’s emphasis on the emotional aspect of narrative 
self-conception, to my way of thinking, is right. Moreover, it 
 More authors are emphasising the emotional component in self-narra-
tives. Peter Goldie is a good example in his The Emotions: A Philosophical 
Exploration (); in Narrative and Perspective; Values and Appropriate 
Emotions (); or in Narrative Thinking, Emotion, and Planning (9). 
And Owen Flanagan, providing his readers with a brief sketch of his own 
life and listing five general features of a self-narrative in The Problem of 
the Soul, says: ‘It conveys a certain way it feels to be me, which is not in 
every case explicitly stated (nor, perhaps, can it be), but that is sensed by 
both you and me. What I am able to say about my life comes with emo-
tional coloration’ (: ). Schechtman’s narrative view is essentially 
Owen Flanagan’s: Persons are beings-in-time; so life-stories have tempo-
ral structure. What persons are able to say about their lives comes with 
emotional coloration. Self-constituting narratives are abstractions; they 
consist of memories, surmises and interpretations (: -). 
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draws attention to the bodily anchoring of self-narratives. At this
point, some insights of Antonio Damasio, a neuroscientist, may 
clear a further path.7
2.4 The feeling of what happens
As a neuroscientist, Antonio Damasio asks: what are the biologi-
cal circumstances that permit consciousness of a self? Answering 
this question is anything but easy, but Damasio thinks that there 
are possible solutions. Starting from empirical data, he outlines 
the following hypothesis. 
Human consciousness is not monolithic. We can distinguish 
simple core consciousness from complex extended consciousness. 
These two types of consciousness correspond with two types 
of selves: a core self and an autobiographical self. In addition, 
Damasio presupposes a third kind of self, called the proto-self. 
Each self depends on its predecessor. The autobiographical self 
rides on top of the core self, which rides on top of the proto-
self. 
Damasio begins by stating two fundamental assumptions 
behind his picture of the self. First, unlike cells in the liver or 
7 Two remarks here. Firstly, I do not think that philosophy must sim-
ply defer to science. However, when a philosophical thesis has empirical 
implications, and the empirical implications are prima facie plausible, 
then I think the empirical implications speak in favor of the philo-
sophical thesis. Secondly, let me emphasise that what science teaches us 
cannot be determined from outside the space of reasons. Any attempt 
to take up a scientific third personal position is itself a first personal 
intentional act. 
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lung, which perform their assigned biological business but do 
not represent any other cells or business, neurons in a brain rep-
resent objects or events occurring elsewhere in the organism. 
Neurons are commanded by biological design to be about other 
cells and other actions. They are born cartographers of the ge-
ography of an organism and of the events that take place within 
that organism. Second, the brain possesses devices (located in 
the brainstem nuclei and the hypothalamus and the basal fore-
brain) that are aimed at managing the life of the organism in 
such a way, that the internal chemical balances indispensible for 
survival and well-being can be maintained continuously. The 
brain devices that regulate the state of life therefore represent, 
of necessity, the continuously changing states of the organism 
as they occur incessantly. Those devices have the natural means 
to represent the entire anatomy and the current functional state 
of the whole living organism. So, Damasio’s point of departure 
is that the self has a biological foundation that can be found 
in the brain devices which represent moment by moment the 
continuity of the same individual organism interacting with the 
environment (: -). 
Let me now discuss in more detail the three selves Damasio 
wants to discern. The proto-self is unconscious and constituted 
by the ‘interconnected and temporarily coherent collection of 
neural patterns which represent the state of the organism, mo-
ment by moment, at multiple levels of the brain’ (999: 7). Key 
aspects of the state of the organism are: the state of the internal 
milieu, viscera, vestibular system, and musculo-skeletal frame. 
We can imagine a lobster or a human fetus in the first trimester 
as possessed of a proto-self. 
The core self is conscious. Dogs, cats, and human infants 
have core selves. The core self inheres in the second-order, non-
verbal account that occurs whenever an object modifies the 
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proto-self. Now the organism, plus the external object (say, a 
face or a melody) or the internal object (say, a toothache), plus 
the reaction modifying the state of the organism are mapped 
as neural patterns. The biological essence of the core self is 
the representation in a second-order map of the proto-self be-
ing modified. The mechanism at work here is the generation 
of an imaged, non-verbal representation of the object-organism 
relationship, that is, a ‘wordless narrative’ – with protagonists 
(the organism and the object) and a period of time (begin, 
middle, end) – about the state of the organism, the arrival 
of an object, and the changing state of the organism. The 
mechanism has two clear consequences. The first consequence 
is the enhancement of the image of the causative object. This 
object is, so to speak, set out from less-fortunate objects, made 
pregnant, and becomes a ‘fact’. The second consequence is 
that a sense of self emerges from being able to represent the 
modification of the proto-self; one acquires a core self, that is, 
a transient protagonist of consciousness, generated for any ob-
ject that provokes the core-consciousness mechanism. Any or-
ganism possessed of a core self is a subject of experience. Be-
cause of the permanent availability of provoking objects (the 
core self can be triggered by any object and the objects never 
run short) the core self is continuously generated and thus ap-
pears continuous in time. Actually, it is created pulsatively 
 Several problems haunt the idea of mental imaging. Bennett and 
Hacker criticise Damasio’s representationalism in the seventh chapter of 
Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. Damasio admits that we have 
no idea how neural patterns can be transformed into mental representa-
tions, into a ‘movie-in-the-brain’. Here, he concedes, human empirical 
knowledge still is dramatically lacunal.
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and rebuilt again and again out of a stream of ‘narratives’ as a 
series of ephemere appearances. The mechanism of production 
of core self undergoes minimal changes across a lifetime. Dam-
asio is quite sure ‘that virtually all of the machinery behind core 
consciousness and the generation of core self is under strong 
gene control. (...) The genome puts in place the appropriate body-
brain linkages, both neural and humoral; lays down the requi-
site circuits, and, with help from the environment, allows the 
machinery to perform in reliable fashion for an entire lifetime’ 
(999: 9). 
Let me make two final remarks on the core self. First, note 
that Damasio does not invoke the infamous homunculus-in-the-
brain, a ‘mini-me’ who interprets the situation. The second-order 
representation occurs in neural structures such as the thalamus 
and the cingulate cortices. It presents within the mental process 
the information that the organism is the owner of the ongoing 
mental process. It creates a sense of a first-person, a sense of self. 
Returning to the well-known metaphor of the mental process 
as a movie-in-the-brain, Damasio’s solution is that the sense of 
self emerges within the movie, so that it is a part of the movie. 
There is no need to posit a spectator for the movie-in-the-brain. 
The first-person subjectivity is constructed from the ground up, 
based on the same kind of sensory mapping needed to construct 
the object representations made conscious by the sense of self. 
A second and, for our purposes, more important remark is that 
the sensory mappings of self are imagined as feelings. The sense 
of self emerges as a special kind of feeling, the feeling of what 
happens in an organism caught in the act of interacting with an 
object. 
Let me now turn to the extended self. The extended, autobio-
graphical self requires maturation of autobiographical memory, 
which probably requires, at least in the human case, that one 
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have language or be in the process of acquiring it.9 The auto-
biographical self is constituted by memories of individual experi-
ence of the past and of the anticipated future. These memories 
are a residue of records of core self experiences that became dis-
positional. Those records can – as internal objects – be activated 
as neural patterns and turned into explicit images. So, a crea-
ture with autobiographical memory partakes of more than just 
passing states of consciousness. It can see and hold its life, or 
segments of its life, in view. Invariant aspects of an individual’s 
biography form the basis of autobiographical memory that grows 
continuously with life experience and can be partly remodeled to 
reflect new experiences. Sets of memories which describe iden-
tity and person can be reactivated as a neural pattern and made 
explicit as images whenever needed (see note ). Each reactiva-
tion of representations operates as a ‘something to be known’ 
and generates its own pulse of core consciousness. The result 
is the autobiographical self of which we are conscious. So the 
autobiographical self requires the mechanism of core conscious-
ness in two ways. Firstly, it requires the presence of a core self 
9 Damasio does not mean to suggest that only creatures capable of ac-
quiring humanlike language can possess autobiographical selves. Chimps 
and bonobos all have trouble learning human language but presumably 
utilise ‘concepts’ in self-comprehension. Note that Damasio does not 
place consciousness, either in its core or extended levels, at the pinnacle of 
human qualities. Consciousness is necessary, but not sufficient, to reach 
the current pinnacle. At the end of the chain, extended consciousness 
permits conscience. That is what we can find at the top of the complexity 
heap outlined by Damasio (999: ). Unfortunately, the author does not 
explain why this ‘inner voice that warns us somebody may be looking’, as 
H.L. Mencken defined conscience, is so special.
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to begin its gradual development and, secondly, each reactivated 
memory only can be realised by generating its own pulse of core 
consciousness (999: 7). According to Damasio, autobiographi-
cal memory develops and matures under the looming shadow of 
an inherited biology. However, much will occur that is depen-
dent on and regulated by the social environment. The autobio-
graphical self is the brain state for which the cultural history of 
humanity most counts. Self-interpretations are always embedded 
in larger historical and communal meaning-giving structures. 
Like Schechtman, Damasio opts for a modest understanding 
of the narrative self. Narratively constituted selves are coherent 
and stable, if less than fully unified and consistent constructions. 
All in all, we do not have a self sculptured in stone and, like 
stone, resistant to the ravages of time. We are more like the sand 
castles on the beaches of our childhood. No component remains 
the same for very long. Nothing is sacred. In Damasio’s words: 
‘Our sense of self is a state of the organism, the result of cer-
tain components operating in a certain manner and interacting 
in a certain way, within certain parameters. It is another con-
struction, a vulnerable pattern of integrated operations whose 
consequence is to generate the mental representation of a living 
individual being. The entire biological edifice, from cells, tis-
sues, and organs to systems and images, is held alive by constant 
execution of construction plans, always on the brink of partial or 
complete collapse should the process of rebuilding and renewal 
break down. The construction plans are all woven around the 
need to stay away from the brink’ (999: ). 
 More on the narrative self and the core self (or ‘minimal self ’ as he 
calls it) in S. Gallagher  and in S. Gallagher & D. Zahavi  
(ch. ). A defense and analysis of the experiential dimension of selfhood 
76  practical identity
What is the upshot of all this for a narrative view on person-
hood? Let me draw two lessons. Damasio’s theory describes 
the biological antecedents of the self and the neural circuitry 
for each developmental stage of the self, including the auto-
biographical self. His informed speculations make clear, in the 
first place, that narrative selfhood is always embodied selfhood. 
Narrative selfhood builds on a more primitive and foundational 
core self, which consists of being pre-reflectively aware of the 
first-personal appearance of experiential phenomena. The core 
self is the invariant dimension of first-personal givenness in the 
multitude of changing experiences. And this self-experience has 
[continuation of note 5] – the core self – also can be found in phenom-
enological literature, for example in the work of Edmund Husserl, Mi-
chel Henry, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. This experiential dimension of 
selfhood is what phenomenologists often call the sense of ipseity, i.e., the 
sense that an experience is my experience (the ‘mineness’ of experience). 
Shaun Gallagher () very insightfully delineates three different levels 
of explanation. There is a level of non-conscious, sub-personal neural pro-
cesses. There is a level of pre-reflective phenomenal experience of agency. 
On this pre-reflective conscious level we experience a sense of ownership 
(the ‘mineness’ of the experience) and a sense of agency (the sense that I 
am the one causing the experience) that is tied to bodily movement/mo-
tor control and intentional aspects (goals, tasks) of action. In the normal 
phenomenology of voluntary or willed action, the sense of agency and the 
sense of ownership coincide and are indistinguishable. In the case of in-
voluntary action, however, it is quite possible to distinguish between the 
two. E.g., when someone pushes me from behind I have a sense of owner-
ship for my bodily movement; in this case there is no sense of agency, a 
sense that one does have in the case of intentional action. Finally, there is 
a sense of agency based on reflective attribution. 
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to be taken as the self-experience of a world-immersed embodied 
agent. What is required for self-emergence to take place is an 
organism with a body that houses a certain kind of brain to live 
in the natural world with other similar ecologically embodied 
creatures. A single organism requires that there be one single 
self, if the job of maintaining life is to be accomplished success-
fully – more than one self per organism is not a good recipe for 
survival flourishing. For every person that we know, there is a 
human body. We never meet a person without a human body. 
Nor do we meet a person with multiple bodies. It just does not 
happen. And it cannot happen. One person, one human body – 
a first principle. 
The second and related lesson is that Damasio’s information 
seems to do a lot for Schechtman’s point that self-consciousness 
and emotion are intertwined. Although we couch our self-de-
scriptions in languages, our selves are not exhaustedly captured 
by what we can say about them. There are many things we feel 
about ourselves, that we cannot put easily into words. However, 
this is a point of hot debate in the narrativist camp and calls for 
a little more discussion. Before returning to this debate, let me 
make a brief digression into the philosophy of mind and add one 
last general and theoretical point about the role of the body in 
narrative continuity. The point touches upon Damasio’s claim 
that even on the level of the core self something like narrative 
self-constitution is involved.
 Even in the much discussed case of Dissociative Identity Disorder, the 
principle is not quite violated since, at any given time, only one among the 
‘alters’ can use the body to think and behave.
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2.5 Basic narratives
In The Diachronic Mind, the philosopher Marc Slors develops a 
conception of psychological continuity in actual persons that re-
quires bodily continuity (, chapter ). To refer to the kind of 
psychological continuity he is looking for, he uses the term ‘nar-
rative continuity’ (N-continuity). The connections he is after are 
such that psychological contents cannot really be considered self-
contained items. They are essentially part of series or sequences 
of contents. They are essentially part of a psychological process: 
‘Individual thoughts acquire their full meaning only as part of 
a process of deliberation, individual sense perceptions acquire 
their full sense only as part of a sequence of perceptions portray-
ing a body’s movements through space, individual feelings ac-
quire their full sense only in connection with what evoked them 
and what they produce, etc. It is the whole of such processes that 
endow their ‘parts’ with their full meaning. Narrativity refers to 
relations that hold between events in virtue of which these events 
can be considered particulars only by abstracting them from the 
whole of a diachronic process of which they are a part, a process 
that portrays a ‘story’, in the broadest sense of that term. (...) 
Narrative continuity between ‘particular’ psychological states is 
a relation between these states such that one or more preceding 
states are a necessary prerequisite for another state’s full content 
and the intelligibility or ‘logic’ of its occurrence’ (: 9).
While asserting that practically all of our psychological con-
tents are N-continuous, Slors does not mean to say that our 
psychological lives are completely logical, coherent, fluid, and
 Note that Slors uses the term narrativity at a sub-personal level here; 
narrativity applies to strings of consecutive mental states that are only 
parts of the total of a person’s stream of consciousness. 
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consistently structured wholes. He is aware of the fact that our 
mental lives often seem fragmentary, patchy like a quilt, and 
gappy. However, despite the fact that our psychological lives are 
sometimes gappy and patchy, they occur against a relatively stable 
background of an ongoing narrative. There is, as Slors is calling it, 
a basic narrative that is neither gappy nor patchy. This basic nar-
rative is presented – in the case of actual persons – by their con-
secutive perceptual contents. No doubt other types of contents 
also play a unifying role, but Slors concentrates on perceptual 
contents because their unifying role is a relatively transparent one.
To illustrate the point, let me take Harold Noonan’s simple 
example of two non-causally related, qualitatively dissimilar per-
ceptions: At present I have an impression of a desk top covered 
with sheets of writing paper. If I turn my head to the right, I have 
the impression of a book case filled with books. The impression 
of the desk top neither resembles nor is the cause of the impres-
sion of the book case (nor is the desk top itself a cause of the 
book case); yet I regard both impressions as mine. How come? 
The different impressions described belong to the mind of one 
person (me) because they acquire narrative coherence in virtue 
of the fact that I know them to be caused by a body’s movements 
through a stable (not static) physical world with whose charac-
ter and proceedings I am acquainted. A person’s mental life is 
set against the background of and is co-determined by a basic 
narrative which reflects the career of an objective continuant in 
and through physical and social reality – the body. Perceptual 
narratives are ‘basic’ in the sense that they provide a lifelong 
narrative. The fact that the one body upon which consecutive 
perceptual contents are dependent is a physical object whose
 This example obviously is just a tiny piece of what Slors labels some-
one’s ‘basic narrative’. 
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movements are subject to the regularities of the physical world 
guarantees the narrative coherence of these contents. This is not 
to say that a basic narrative in itself is sufficient for full-blown 
psychological continuity. It is not. A basic narrative needs to be 
supplemented with emotions, desires, thoughts, motives for ac-
tions, values, &c. for that. Conversely, however, a basic narrative 
secures a degree of diachronic coherence between one’s thoughts, 
emotions, desires, and so on, that is sufficient for these mental 
states to be narratively continuous in at least one elementary sense. 
As will be clear now, Slors ascribes a crucial role to the human 
body in the narrative coherence of successive perceptual contents 
of actual persons and I am of one mind with him. Despite the 
fact that many of our thoughts, deliberations, associations, and 
so on, frequently appear dissociated, most of the contents as-
sociated with one body contribute to an elementary narrative 
thread running through our ‘stream of consciousness’. In the 
case of real people, this is due to the fact that such processes 
occur against the stable and continuous background of a percep-
tual narrative, relating the story of a body’s movements through 
space-time. This basic narrative acquires its continuity from the 
intelligibility of objective physical reality and our bodies being 
part of it (: ). 
 Slors takes it as an empirical fact that the diachronic unity of mind of 
all actual persons is secured for a large part through bodily continuity. 
He does not take it as a conceptual truth. Slors sees no conceptual link 
between bodily continuity and the diachronic unifying role of the basic 
narrative. This becomes clear to him when he turns from actual psycho-
logical continuity to hypothetical cases like brain-transplantation (: 
-). I leave aside possible worlds where brain-transplants or ‘body 
swaps’ are a live possibility. Science-fiction cases aside, bodily continuity 
is a precondition for psychological continuity in the real world.
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What Slors means by ‘basic narrativity’ is a far cry from my 
narrative conception of practical identity. That does not alter 
the fact that common-or-garden narratives build on Slors’ basic 
narratives, as Damasio also tells us, and that Slors (partly) can 
explain how the human body plays a role in tying up a personal 
life story. With this theoretical point in place, let me return to 
the main theme and examine some difficulties within the narra-
tive self-constitution view.
 Narrativity is gaining momentum in the field of consciousness studies. 
According to Owen Flanagan narrative plays a role in the formation and 
function of consciousness and can be provided with a credible natural-
istic analysis. For growing empirical evidence of images of the function-
ing brain for a neurophysiological basis of personal narratives see e.g. J. 
Bickle, ‘Empirical evidence for a narrative concept of Self ’ in Flanagan 
O., G. D. Fireman & T. E. McVay, jr. (), Narrative and Consciousness. 
Literature, Psychology, and the Brain, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
9-. For a thought-provoking narrative approach to folk psychology 
see D. Hutto 7 and 9. Hutto’s Narrative Practice Hypothesis says 
that our capacity for a sophisticated, everyday understanding of inten-
tional actions as performed for reasons (i.e. our folk psychology) may 
itself best be characterised as a kind of an essentially narrative practice. 
And that acquiring the capacity for applying reasons might – at least 
normally – depend upon having received training with narratives. Chil-
dren acquire the relevant interpretative skills for achieving this through 
repeated encounters with specific kinds of narratives, when they are ap-
propriately supported by others. With his Narrative Practice Hypothesis 
Hutto presents a challenge to ‘theory theory’ and ‘simulation theory’ in 
the philosophy of cognitive science. A final example: David Herman in 
Storied Minds (9) underscores the relevance of narratives for the phi-
losophy of mind – and vice versa – by interpreting narrative as a system 
for building models of action.
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2.6 Trouble for narrativists
As Galen Strawson () and Peter Goldie () pointed out, 
narrativists like Jerome Bruner, Paul Ricoeur, Alisdair MacIn-
tyre, or Charles Taylor are pushing the idea of self-storying too 
hard. These authors believe that we just are the narratives we 
tell or could tell about ourselves. This might seem right for some 
reasons: self-constituting narratives are open-ended construc-
tions; they involve all manner of revisitation and reconstruction 
post facto; they are pinned on culturally relative themes; they ex-
press ideals of what one wishes to be but is not yet, &c. Even so, 
these philosophers over-emphasise the essentially constructed, 
linguistic nature of narratives. Narrative self-constitution is dif-
ferent from self-fictionalisation in that there must be a sense in 
which one’s self-storying should be accurate or realistic. Extreme 
fictionalist versions of the narrative self-constituting view are not 
open to criticism by comparison with reality. But realism about 
personhood matters. We want to think of ourselves and our lives 
as they really are. We want a ‘reality check’. Extreme fictionalists 
do mistake life for art. They tend to push what actually happens 
to the background. They forget that there are lots of facts about 
one’s character and history that do not depend on one’s creation.
For Galen Strawson this answer does not settle the point. 
Strawson is much more sceptical about the narrative view. In 
Against Narrativity he argues against the dual, i.e., psychologi-
cal and ethical claim that we are, and ought to be, constantly
 A. MacIntyre (9: -); C. Taylor (99: 7-); and P. Ricoeur (99: 
). Bruner has been putting forward the narrative view since the 9s 
and recently in J. Bruner (). Making Stories: Law, Literature, Life, 
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
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engaged in making a tale out of ourselves and our lives. The 
dominant view in the academy, Strawson tells us, is that the dual 
claim is true. Strawson regrets this current acceptance and ar-
gues that the claim is false.7 He explicitly makes Schechtman’s 
narrative self-constitution view as a good example of the objec-
tionable standard view his target. So let me elaborate his line of 
attack a bit more.
Strawson characterises the narrative view as a combination of 
four features: D, F, S, and R. He correctly classifies Schecht-
man’s account of narrativity as concerned with all four (). 
It assumes that we are all diachronic (D). It requires that we be 
form-finding (F) and story-tellling (S) and explicitly so. And it 
is important, in Schechtman’s view, that there be no significant 
revision (R), that one’s self-narrative be essentially accurate. 
To clarify the four features: the basic form of diachronic (D) 
self-experience is that as a Diachronic ‘one naturally figures one-
self, considered as a self, as something that was there in the (fur-
ther) past and will be there in the (further) future (...). If one is 
Episodic, by contrast, one does not figure oneself, considered as 
a self, as something that was there in the (further) past and will 
be there in the (further) future’ (). 
The paradigm of a narrative is a conventional story told in 
words. The term attributes a certain developmental and hence 
temporal unity or coherence to the (parts of) lives to which it 
is applied. The narrative attitude must ‘engage in some sort of 
construal of one’s life. One must have some sort of relatively 
large-scale coherence-seeking, unity-seeking, pattern seeking, or
7 For his defense of the claim that a non-narrative life can be a fully 
moral or human life see Galen Strawson’s paper Episodic Ethics in Hutto 
7: -.
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most generally [F] form-finding tendency when it comes to one’s 
apprehension of one’s life’ (). 
If one is genuinely narrative one must also ‘have some sort of 
distinctive [S] story-telling tendency when it comes to one’s ap-
prehension of one’s life (...). According to this view, one must be 
disposed to apprehend or think of oneself and one’s life as fitting 
the form of some recognised narrative genre’ (). 
Finally, if one is narrative one will also have ‘a tendency to 
engage unconsciously in invention, fiction of some sort – fal-
sification, confabulation, revisionism – when it comes to one’s 
apprehension of one’s own life. I will call this [R] revision’ (). 
Strawson has no doubt that almost all human narrativity is com-
promised by revision, but he does not think it must be. Although 
autobiographical memory is an essentially (re)constructive phe-
nomenon, humans are not without exception incorrigible self-
fabulists. ‘When Bernard Malamud claims that “all biography is 
ultimately fiction”, simply on the grounds that “there is no life 
that can be captured wholly as it was”, there is no implication 
that it must also be ultimately untrue’ (). 
Now, Strawson takes himself to be a non-form-finding, non-
story-telling, non-revising Episodic. On the strong form of 
Schechtman’s view, Strawson concludes, he is not really a per-
son. Strawson strikes back by criticising Schechtman’s articula-
tion constraint: ‘This seems to me to express an ideal of control 
and self-awareness in human life that is mistaken and potentially 
pernicious. The aspiration to explicit Narrative self-articulation 
is natural for some – for some, perhaps, it may even be helpful – 
but in others it is highly unnatural and ruinous. My guess is that 
it almost always does more harm than good – that the Narrative 
tendency to look for story or narrative coherence in one’s life is, 
in general, a gross hindrance to self-understanding: to a just, 
general, practically real sense, implicit or explicit, of one’s nature. 
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(...) The more you recall, retell, narrate yourself, the further you 
risk moving away from accurate self-understanding, from the 
truth of your being’ (7). So, for Galen Strawson narrativity is 
not a necessary part of ‘the examined life’. It is even unclear for 
him that the examined life is always a good thing: ‘People can 
develop and deepen in valuable ways without any sort of ex-
plicit, specifically Narrative reflection, just as musicians can im-
prove by practice sessions without recalling those sessions. The 
business of living well is, for many, a completely non-Narrative 
project. Granted that certain sorts of self-understanding are nec-
essary for a good human life, they need involve nothing more 
than form-finding, which can exist in the absence of narrativity; 
and they may be osmotic, systemic, not staged in consciousness’ 
(). Strawson reassures those who may now think that the Ep-
isodic life must be deprived in some way: ‘truly happy-go-lucky, 
see-what-comes-along lives are among the best there are, vivid, 
blessed, profound’ (9).
I think Strawson is on the right page, when he criticises over-
statements of the structure of actual lives and the articulation 
constraint in particular. Schechtman for her part modified her 
view in response to some of Strawson’s challenges (Schechtman 
7). Strawson’s argument is against narrative views in general 
and Schechtman now only wishes to defend a very particular 
narrative account that avoids Strawson’s objections. She distin-
guishes between weak narrative views, middle-range narrative 
views and strong narrative views. At one end of this spectrum 
the rather weak requirement is that a person’s narrative must 
somehow operate to impact his current experience. The person’s 
narrative need not be in any way accessible to consciousness. 
Having a narrative is necessary to function at all. In the middle 
range, having a narrative would require that a person be able, at 
least sometimes, to become conscious of his narrative and make 
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it explicit. Now, having a self-narrative is necessary for engaging 
in complex person-specific activities like prudential reasoning, 
autonomy, and moral agency. Someone needs a certain under-
standing of how the events in his history hang together. Such an 
understanding is mostly implicit but is locally accessible where 
appropriate, if the person is to be able to engage in the person-
specific activities on which he places great importance. Strong 
narrative views require that in order to have a narrative in the 
relevant sense a person must actively and consciously undertake 
to understand and live his life in narrative form with a unify-
ing theme or grand telos, and little or no extraneous material. 
Schechtman is only interested in the middle ranges (7: ). 
The extremes do not represent the refined narrative self-consti-
tution view Schechtman wants to defend. There is no debate 
about extremely ‘edited’ versions of the narrative self-constitu-
tion view: Schechtman is happy to concede to Strawson that the 
strong narrative views are too strong. And although she thinks 
the weak views are true and interesting, she is also willing to 
allow that some might find it a stretch to call such views narra-
tive views. Even if this point is granted, though, there remain 
puzzles and disagreements with Strawson’s anti-narrativist chal-
lenge. 
First, on the truthfulness of self-narratives. Persons normally 
care about truth and take reality into account, say the facts of the 
world and the interpretations of others. Strawson agrees, but at 
the same time he seems to think that the prospects for truth are 
not good for the narrators among us. I side with Strawson that 
story-telling can lead, even as a psychological and neurophysi-
ological inevitability, to alteration. But it is a bit of a mystery 
 I’m not one of those who find it a stretch.
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for me why the alteration business has to lead us to the sceptical 
conclusion that the less we narrate ourselves, the better. Maybe 
the more we narrate ourselves, the further we risk moving away 
from accurate self-understanding and from the truth of our be-
ing. But alterations also can go in the direction of better self-
understanding and coming closer to truth. Or so it seems to me.
Here is a second reply to Strawson. In fairness to Schechtman, 
it must be noticed that Strawson’s claim that Episodics cannot 
join the person’s club is untenable. It is true that Schechtman’s 
view implies that there are prima facie advantages for a person to 
be strongly connected with the whole of his narrative, a tightly 
woven self-narrative making for a stronger person than a weak-
er one. There is value in seeking to maintain connection to as 
much of a person’s life as possible. On the other hand, there is 
always disunity and incoherence.9 Life is not perfectly unified; 
it is contingent, chancy, incomplete, messy, unarticulated. And 
personhood is a matter of degree. In Schechtman’s basic picture 
of personhood there is also room for minimal, or punctual per-
sons like Galen Strawson. Admittedly, he is a borderline case. 
But I do not see why a picaresque, rhapsodic and disjointed life 
cannot be conceived as a narrative genre and lead to narrative 
self-understanding and personhood.
My last rejoinder is on the ‘deep division’ Strawson reveals in 
the human species. On one side, the narrators: those who are 
self-storying, ‘Homeric’, in their sense of life and self. On the
9 For a critical discussion of narrative unity as a condition of personhood 
see J. Christman .
 Also in his review of Jerome Bruner’s work in The Guardian of Janu-
ary , . 
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other side, the non-narrators: those who live life in a fundamen-
tally non story-telling, solely form-finding fashion. In divid-
ing the human species so dramatically Strawson exaggerates, I 
think, the importance narrativists attach to being articulate. A 
reminder is important here. Like Schechtman, I think so called 
‘weak’ narrative accounts of personhood – the claim that hav-
ing a self-narrative is necessary to function at all – are true and 
important. In the narrative account I advocate ‘weak’ narrativ-
ity and ‘middle range’ narrativity are made in one piece. Self-
narratives are not exclusively conceived as a linguistic-cognitive 
phenomenon; they are co-constituted by emotive and conative 
components as well. Self-narratives are constrained by and con-
sistent with developmental psychology and human neurobiol-
ogy as well as linguistic structures and narrative traditions. To 
put it simply: self-narratives are strongly influenced by the body. 
They depend on somatic input. Persons are embodied beings 
with rich bodily feelings and emotions that are incorporated into 
their self-narratives. So, my own view on the division between 
 A good place to look in the philosophical literature for a theory that 
emphasises the role of bodily feeling is the work of William James. Anto-
nio Damasio presents a modern-day version of some core ideas of William 
James’ project. Let me add here an interesting observation of David Velle-
man on emotion and narrative. In Narrative Explanation () Velleman 
makes an issue of the application of narrative in practical reasoning. His 
question is whether stories help us make sense of things because they con-
vey causal-psychological information or, alternatively, because they have 
an explanatory force of their own. His answer is that stories exert their 
own explanatory force that results in a radically different kind of under-
standing. A stretch of discourse qualifies as a story by reliably initiating 
and resolving an emotional sequence in us, by ‘completing an emotional 
cadence in the audience’. Stories have an emotional structure that enables 
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narrators and non-narrators is that it is rather shallow. The nar-
rative attitude includes much more than telling a life-story. It is 
as much a way of experiencing and organising a life as a way of 
storying it. It does not merely capture (aspects of) the person for 
description, communication, and examination; it constitutes the 
person. It is one thing to say that our lives cannot be fully articu-
late, or, as the short story writer V.S. Pritchett observed, ‘that we 
live beyond any tale that we happen to enact’. It is quite another 
to hold that narrativity is completely merged with articulation. I 
do not think it does. To my mind, narrativity is an inescapable 
structural requirement of human life. Narratives structure our 
conscious experience and are deeply rooted in the material real-
ity of the human body. Articulation is only part of it.
us to assimilate events to familiar patterns of how things feel. We have an 
experience of déja senti, because our emotional sensibility naturally fol-
lows the ups and downs of the story, and arrives at a stable attitude toward 
them overall. We understand what the narrated events mean in emotional 
terms. According to Velleman, we should not discount the importance of 
narrative understanding. The narrative intelligibility of episodes in our 
lives is what gives them meaning. Intellectual self-understanding (ratio-
nality) and emotional self-understanding (meaning) usually come hand 
in hand. In a telling footnote, Velleman borrows from Ronald de Sousa 
the idea that the earliest stories in our lives are about the vicissitudes of 
our emotions; and that the shape of those stories is determined, in the 
first instance, by the nature of human affect. The pattern is biologically 
programmed. We understand stories viscerally, with our bodies (De Sou-
sa himself famously analyses emotion in terms of narrative, hypothesis-
ing that each human emotion has a ‘paradigm scenario’). Velleman also 
stresses that emotions are essentially diachronic. Their nature consists in 
how they unfold over time and it ultimately must be defined in terms of 
the arousal and resolution of emotion.
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2.7 Interim conclusions 
What I am after in this dissertation is a theory of persons in 
terms of agency. In chapter one I scrutinised the Korsgaardian 
account of self-constitution. Christine Korsgaard showed us that 
becoming a person is bound up with reflective agency and so 
with practical reason. I partly rejected her reason view on per-
sons and proposed to think differently about the normative pow-
ers of reason. My proposal came in two parts. 
Firstly, we have to move to a less principled, instrumental role 
for reasons that are constitutive for personhood and the unifi-
cation of personhood. Believing we need unifying reasons in a 
strongly Korsgaardian, formal sense to be persons is a mistake, 
– we can be persons with far less. By implication, we have to 
weaken the unification requirement. We better take reasons as 
an incipient story about us, that is, as a ‘rationale’ that makes 
our actions intelligible as coherent developments in a life story. 
Therefore, and this was the second part of my proposal, I sug-
gested to transform the reason view on self-constitution into a 
narrative self-constitution view. The promise of narrative theo-
ries of personhood was that they can avoid empty formalism and 
work with substantive reasons; that they can accept coherence as 
a requirement for personhood and that coherence does better as a 
standard for self-narratives than unification; and that narratives 
can be better linked up with the embodiment of personhood. 
In the second chapter I tried to develop such a narrative view 
on persons in the wake of Marya Schechtman. A person’s iden-
tity is now to be found in narrative activity, in the capacity to 
keep a particular narrative going. Such a self-narrative organises 
and integrates disparate elements of human experience and ac-
tion synchronically and diachronically into a more-or-less coher-
ent storied whole and in this way constitutes a person. Internal 
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coherence, being in step with the facts of the world, and con-
sensus with interpretations of others are important standards for 
self-narratives. 
A Schechtmanian narrative self-constituting view has many 
advantages over the Korsgaardian picture. It avoids the Kors-
gaardian overestimation of the formal, unifying powers of rea-
son and settles for the more substantive, vernacular criterion of 
coherence of self-narrative. Coherence is meant here in a not too 
rigid and demanding way. In Schechtman’s view, unified selves 
or omnibus editions of the self are not in the foreground. 
A narrative self-constituting view is also a substantial improve-
ment of the Korsgaardian approach, because it clearly takes self-
constituting narratives as embodied and embedded structures. 
Persons are incarnated beings. Korsgaard’s account of the role 
of the body was not very informative and possibly mistaken. To 
put it in terms of political constitution (her favorite analogy): in 
Korsgaard’s view it seems to be perfectly possible to constitute 
different states within one and the same territory. However, such 
a picture underestimates the role of the territory, if we apply it to 
the realm of the constitution of selves. 
To unpack this idea of the embodiment of self-narratives, I 
have taken an empirical line. Antonio Damasio demonstrates 
that self-constituting narratives have a bodily, neuro-physiolog-
ical basis. They build, inter alia, on the presence of a core-self. 
Moreover, he clears the way for emotive constraints of self-nar-
rative that keep self-narrative on track. Damasio makes clear 
 This is an important result. The role of emotion in human agency has 
long been neglected in the philosophy of action. Neuroscientific research 
establishes that emotions significantly affect action generation, action 
control and action interpretation. See Jing Zhu & Paul Thagard ().
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that autobiographical narratives are intertwined with emotion 
and feeling. Persons are partly and importantly constituted by 
how they feel, by how it feels to be them. Their self-narratives 
are peppered with emotions. Schechtman for her part is aware 
of the significance of affect and the role empathic access plays in 
the making of self-narratives.
Antonio Damasio also is fully conscious – as is Marya Schecht-
man – of the embeddedness of persons. A full explanation of 
self-constitution needs to go not only beyond the brain to the 
rest of the body, but also into the world. Embodied persons are 
permanently interacting with their environments. How one feels 
about or thinks about one’s self is partly constituted by the (so-
cial) world. Persons are situated beings. As they are socialised 
into human culture, they are taught to operate with a back-
ground conception of themselves as continuing individuals lead-
ing the lives of persons. Moreover, self-narratives are confined by 
observational and interpretive facts. In a deep way they are co-
determined by the social world and constructed collaboratively. 
The individual person does not have the final say, so to speak. 
I think a Schechtmanian narrative self-constitution view can 
do serious work in our understanding of the constitution of per-
sons. All the same, Schechtman’s view has to be slightly adjusted 
and enlarged. First, the articulation constraint has to be nuanced. 
There is a suggestion in it that persons have to talk themselves 
into existence. This was also one of Galen Strawson’s worries. 
Schechtman replied: ‘The articulation constraint demands that 
self-narration be more than the subpersonal, background opera-
tion of knowledge about one’s past or projections of one’s future, 
but constructing a self-narrative is also not conceived as some-
thing that must be undertaken as a conscious and active project’ 
(7: ). So, the requirement is not that, in order to become 
a person, one must have a fully worked-out and explicit account 
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of why everything in his life is as it is, but rather that a person 
must recognise a certain kind of explanatory obligation, and be 
able to meet it for the most part. Another implication is that, 
although persons couch their self-descriptions in language, they 
are not exhaustively captured in what they can say about them-
selves. Self-conception and its operations are largely implicit and 
automatic. Self-narratives are bio-psychological constructs that 
are only partly expressible in verbal form. The narrative view I 
am defending in line with Schechtman’s has in view a middle 
group of people who do understand how their person-lives hang 
together, most of the time not in so many words. But on be-
ing asked they can explain their behavior and locally make their 
self-narrative more explicit. Those are people who can deploy 
typically personal complex activities like autonomous or moral 
behavior. 
And this brings me to a second task for a Schechtmanian nar-
rative self-constitution view. What we can learn from it so far is 
clearly apropos, but at the same time quite trivial. It offers us the 
basic cream, sugar, and eggs for becoming a person. Unlike for 
example Korsgaard’s view, the narrative self-constitution view 
says very little about deliberative action and reflective agency. 
Here a Schechtmanian narrative theory of personhood is in need 
of a supplement. We have to dig deeper into the subject. Persons 
do not want to be some arbitrary actors. They are able, if not 
compelled, to authorize their actions in their own name. Persons 
want to see their own signature in their actions. They want to be 
‘authentic’, ‘true’ or ‘real’ persons. So, a narrative theory of per-
sons in terms of agency has to make understandable how actions 
can be self-governed and authenticated actions of a particular 
person. It is to these problems of self-determining action and 




I can’t run my life according to whether or not you like what I do. 
Not any more. You behave as if everything I do is part of the story 
of your life. You are the main character, I am a minor character who 
doesn’t make an appearance until halfway through. Well, contrary 
to what you think, people are not divided into major and minor. 
I am not minor. I have a life of my own, just as important to me as 
yours is to you, and in my life I am the one who makes the deci-
sions.
J.M. Coetzee (999), Disgrace, New York: Viking Press, chapter 
3.1 Introduction
One might have observed that my Schechtmanian picture of 
narrative self-constitution has drifted apart from the Korsgaard-
ian reason view on self-constitution understanding persons as 
self-determinating agents. And one might say that the condi-
tions of narrativity, as construed in the preceding chapter, will 
be trivially met by all individuals and do not inform us of any 
understanding of persons as self-governing agents. I agree. 
Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution view addresses some 
commonplace features of people’s lives and persons. And an 
understanding of persons as autonomous agents is beyond the 
scope of the modest narrative identity view I proposed in chapter 
two, taking my lead from Schechtman. So, let me make an effort 
at development here.
Schechtman’s view thus far is this. In line with John Locke 
she insists that narrative identity must be defined in terms 
of ‘sameness of consciousness’, rather than sameness of 
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substance. Schechtman develops the Lockean view by adding 
to Locke’s recognition of the importance of memory and brute 
self-consciousness a recognition of the importance of being in-
telligible to ourselves. To have such a ‘self-understanding view’ 
one ‘must see her life as unfolding according to an intelligible 
trajectory, where present states follow meaningfully from past 
ones, and the future is anticipated to bear certain predictable 
relations to the present (...W)e are constantly self-monitoring, 
keeping track of how we are feeling, what we are doing, and 
what we are like. This self-monitoring is mostly implicit (...). 
(U)sually we are caught up in the activity of living (...). On the 
self-understanding view, it is this self-monitoring that gives us 
our sense of continuation and coherence as a self, and so pro-
vides the kind of self-conception (...) that constitutes personal 
identity. (...) One quite simple implication of having such a self-
conception is that a person can generally answer questions such 
as, “Why do I feel this way?” or “Why am I doing this?” should 
they arise. If she cannot answer them, she should be motivated 
to look for an answer’ (a: -9). Importantly, what Schecht-
man has in mind here is quite modest. As noted earlier, she does 
not expect a person always to answer questions like ‘Why am I 
doing this?’ in terms of an articulated self-conception. The dif-
ferent parts of a life do not need to cohere in the sense of being 
wrapped up in a package but rather in the sense that someone 
 Locke tells us that person is a ‘Forensick Term appropriating Actions 
and their Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of a 
Law, and Happiness and Misery’ (J. Locke 979: ). This sets out two 
features that Locke takes to be unique to personhood. First, persons are 
capable of a special sort of self-interested concern. Second, they are moral 
agents, capable of taking actions for which they can be held responsible.
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views oneself as having gotten from there to here somehow. And 
a person should not be totally blank when asked ‘Why did you 
do that?’, as if he did not understand the question. 
Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution view is able to define 
practical identity in such a way that it entails a unified and per-
sisting subject of experience. Practical identity, thus conceived, 
clearly is connected to agency. It is taken for granted that there 
is a link between agency and identity, between being a person 
and being an agent. The kind of psychological organisation that 
makes an individual a person on the narrative self-constitution 
view is the kind required for being an agent. Narrative identity 
primarily is about a series of connected actions and an acting 
human being.
This is, of course, a rather basic account of narrative self-con-
stitution. And for many of us it is clearly insufficient. As self-
reflective beings we want more. We do not just want to have a 
self-narrative and understand who we are. We want to direct our 
lives. We want our stories to go a certain way. And we want to 
be a certain way – to be a certain kind of person. This is pre-
cisely what psychiatric patients have in mind considering using 
advance directives. As I indicated earlier, the job of the last chap-
ter of my dissertation will be to demonstrate that the narrative 
view I have been arguing for can resolve some problems raised by 
 In The Constitution of Selves Schechtman connects narrative self-con-
stitution to practical implications, especially to four features that play a 
crucial role in the day-to-day lives of persons and that are linked with 
agency: self-interest, moral responsibility, compensatory fairness, and 
survival. In Experience, Agency, and Personal Identity (b) Schechtman 
briefly discusses Korsgaard’s view on agency.
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the use of both Ulysses contracts and advance directives in the 
case of Alzheimer’s disease. Both types of contracts are written 
by persons who are competent to consent to medical treatment, 
stating how they wish to be treated in the event of becoming un-
well. Such manipulative procedures of distal self-control have in 
common that they bear upon pre-commitment. They are cases 
of earlier selves exercising authority and imposing their will on 
later selves. This raises the question of (respect for) autonomy. 
So, before I can embark on the project of applying my view to 
psychiatric practice, I will have to say more on the problem of 
autonomy in relation to my theory of narrative identity. There-
fore, let me pursue the difference between being a person on the 
one hand and being an autonomous person on the other. 
Among the goings-on in a person’s body, some but not oth-
ers are due to the person in the sense that they are his doing. A 
person is not a helpless bystander of his doing: he can cause and 
enjoy control of it. He can be in the driver’s seat of his behavior. 
When a person distinguishes between those goings on which 
are his doing and those which are not, he appears to do so in 
terms of their causes, by regarding the former but not the latter 
as caused by himself. Persons are able to claim: I want or think 
or do that; this is me and not just the work of an alien mech-
anism within me. There is a second, related element. Persons 
do not only want to control and govern their actions, they also 
want to shape themselves consciously and deliberately. Being a 
 I don’t mean this in an absolute sense. I agree with Jonathan Glover 
who captures the interplay of self-directed shaping as well as its limits by 
comparing the person to wood that can be sculpted, respecting the con-
straints of natural shape and grain. J. Glover (9). I: The Philosophy and 
Psychology of Personal Identity. London: Penguin, .
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person of one’s own is being directed by considerations, desires, 
plans and the like that are part of what can be considered as one’s 
self. So, persons not only act and live self-governed, they also act 
and live self-governed. They are, in a word, autonomous. And 
we expect a theory of persons to provide for an account of self-
governance and self-shaping.
Now, what does it mean for a person to be autonomous from a 
narrative self-constitution view? Schechtman does not pay much 
attention to the problem of autonomy. The distinction between 
the person and the ‘real’ person is blurred. The search for auton-
omy and the search for coherence seem to be the same search for 
her. A person’s experience or action seems to be autonomous if it 
fits smoothly and coherently into his autobiographical narrative. 
The case of ‘self-blindness’ is very instructive here. Remember 
Schechtman asked us to think of a man – let us call him Vladi-
mir – who sincerely believes he loves his brother, but frequently 
acts towards him in ways that suggest hostility. Vladimir is un-
aware of this hostility. Other people are telling him that hostility 
plays a role. I think Schechtman’s discussion of the Vladimir case 
is conflating two different questions: the question ‘Is this protag-
onist a person?’ and the question ‘Is the protagonist in charge or 
governed by rigid and automatic influences?’ Vladimir certainly 
is a person. One could describe him as a weakened person because 
his self-conception and the conceptions other people have of 
him considerably diverge. Vladimir denies what other people are 
holding up. His own story and the story of others lack coherence, 
in my own rendering. Yet, Schechtman’s question ‘Is Vladimir 
 The focus in this chapter is on personal autonomy and – as far as pos-
sible – not on moral autonomy. Personal autonomy is conceived here as a 
basic, neutral trait that individuals can exhibit. 
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really in charge or is he governed by “implicit” forces?’ is a differ-
ent question. Now, the question is: ‘Is Vladimir an autonomous 
person?’ To be an intelligible, articulate, and coherent person is 
not, ipso facto, to be an autonomous person. Schechtman’s nar-
rative self-constituting view seems to imply that the (more) au-
tonomous person simply is the (more) coherent person, but that 
is, of course, not how we always experience it. Coherence cannot 
explain autonomy. Coherence sometimes even indicates a lack of 
autonomy. Imagine the following clichéd example.
A woman can try to overcome the fragmentation of her exis-
tence by the assumption of the rigidly laid-out social role of a 
housewife. This woman has a very coherent story to tell about 
herself that perfectly meshes with the views of her un-emanci-
pated environment. Yet we will hesitate to call this woman an 
autonomous person because of so much coherence. Autonomy 
is not the first qualification that springs to mind when being 
confronted with people doing as much as possible what they 
did before and what others expect them to do. So coherence is 
not a sufficient condition to attribute autonomy. What more is 
needed? A stamp of uniqueness? Is there an autonomy problem 
for the housewife, because there may be dozens of persons like 
her, and because her story has been told and lived many times 
before? I do not think autonomy is a matter of the uniqueness 
of the life story. In my view, autonomy is not even a matter of 
the type of content of the biographical narrative. Here is my 
proposal: autonomy raises the issue of authorship. Autonomy 
is bound up with the strength of one’s identification with one’s 
autobiographical narrative. In other words, it is bound up with 
the active authorial work on the agent’s part.7 The autonomy 
7 Autonomy is understood in terms of sovereignty (governing or manag-
ing oneself). It can also be understood in terms of authenticity. As the
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of persons is related to the degree of appropriation of their life 
stories. A person can only be called autonomous, when he close-
ly identifies with his actions and experiences. This ‘identifying 
act’ makes that the story becomes really his, that it becomes his 
particular life, and that it reveals who he really is. So, as far as 
the example of our housewife goes, the answer to the question 
of her autonomy still hangs in the balance. It depends on iden-
tification. Either she identifies wholeheartedly with the kitchen 
– and then we can call her an autonomous person, conventional 
as it may seem – or her identification is defective and then she 
loses autonomy.
In conclusion, although Schechtman does not raise the matter of 
autonomy explicitly, I think there is room in her narrative self-
constitution theory for a notion of autonomy. The conception 
Greek word ‘authentikos’ suggests, authenticity points at originality in 
the sense of ‘concerning the first cause’, ‘from first hand’, ‘made with one’s 
own hand’, self-made. An authentic Van Gogh is a painting or drawing 
made by Vincent van Gogh. I take the two manifestations of autonomy 
– sovereignty and authenticity – as slightly different and complementary. 
Autonomy as sovereignty is controlling oneself, autonomy as authenticity 
is shaping and structuring one’s life over time. See Van Willigenburg & 
Delaere ().
 In her 7 reply to Galen Strawson, Schechtman separates her nar-
rative self-constitution view into two distinct claims: a narrative account 
of persons and a narrative account of selves. In order to constitute oneself 
as a person, one must implicitly organise one’s experience according to 
a narrative. In order to constitute oneself as a self, one must have a nar-
rative in which one experiences the past and the future as one’s own as 
part of a stronger kind of narrative: one does need to identify with it
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I propose is that a person is autonomous when he endorses or 
encompasses (parts of) his narrative, i.e. when he identifies with 
(parts of) his narrative. This, of course, needs further develop-
ment and support. There is, however, little agreement among 
philosophers as to how to unpack the problem of autonomy in 
any detail. The best attempt at an explanation of adequate con-
ditions for self-determinating action and personal autonomy is 
contained in the work of Harry Frankfurt.9 I take his hierar-
chical view as a start of my search for narrative based personal 
autonomy.
[continuation of note 6] or care about it or take an interest in it (7: 7-
7). Schechtman’s distinction resembles my contrast between a narrative 
account of persons and a narrative account of autonomous persons. But 
Schechtman does not connect it to autonomy.
9 Frankfurt advanced his central intuition in his 97 ‘Freedom of the 
Will and the Concept of a Person’, reprinted in Frankfurt 9: -. Ger-
ald Dworkin was the second founding father of the hierarchical view of 
personal autonomy (in his 97 ‘Acting Freely’, Nous , 7-). For a re-
cent overview of the debate, see J. Anderson & J. Christman: - and J.S. 
Taylor: -9.
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3.2 Harry Frankfurt on caring and loving
According to Frankfurt, reflexive7 consciousness is the hall-
mark of human beings. By exercise of this faculty creatures like 
ourselves are capable of introducing a division within ourselves, 
which in a way separates us from our own conscious states and 
activities, and then of coming to acquire an attitude regarding 
those activities and states. Self-awareness makes us susceptible to 
an inner division in which we separate from and objectify our-
selves. This puts us in a position to assess the motivating forces 
by which we happen to be impelled, and to determine which of 
them to accept and which to resist. We want our actions to be 
motivated in certain ways, and not in others. We want our mo-
tives and choices, however we acquire them, to be the motives 
and choices that we really want and therefore in no way alien to 
us. Frankfurt’s idea is that agents will identify with an action, 
A, and will be able to own what they do, to the extent that they 
have a second-order volition to do A. They will have such a voli-
tion to do A, he says, so far as they want to be controlled by the 
desire to A; they want it to be the desire that moves them effec-
tively to act (9: ). So, Frankfurt deploys two distinct ideas 
here. The first is that agents are all capable of having, not just 
first-order desires to do this or that, but also second-order desires 
of one kind or another. The second idea is that among an agent’s 
7 ‘Reflexive’ means ‘self-conscious’. ‘Reflective’, conversely, comes to 
mean ‘thoughtful’. Human beings are able to take a stance on their own 
attitudes. And in a way they have to, as it is nicely put into words in 
Rilke’s Eightest Elegy, that fathoms the human condition: “Dieses heisst 
Schicksal: gegenüber sein und nichts als das und immer gegenüber.” 
R. M. Rilke (9), Duineser Elegien.
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second-order desires may be a desire that he or she be effectively 
moved by a certain first-order desire: that that first-order desire, 
as Frankfurt says, be his or her will. This distinguishes those 
second-order desires that count as second-order volitions from 
more idle second-order desires: from desires just to have and 
experience certain first-order desires, but not necessarily to be 
moved by them to action.
In his early writings Frankfurt thinks of volitional control on 
lines that parallel the notion of rational control. Rational control 
requires that the agent is disposed to form beliefs and desires 
in a rational pattern and is disposed to act as they rationally re-
quire. ‘It is only in virtue of his rational capacities that a person 
is capable of becoming critically aware of his own will and of 
forming volitions of the second order. The structure of a person’s 
will presupposes, accordingly, that he is a rational being’ (9: 
7). So, the early Frankfurt construes his theory as a theory of 
rational-cum-volitional control. And it is rational-cum-volition-
al control that constitutes an agent’s personhood. For the later 
Frankfurt, on the other hand, what the person really wants is 
what he ‘cares’ about. Things he cares about, or things he ‘loves’, 
are things with which the person identifies himself, and which 
he accepts as expressing what he really wants. It is this act of se-
lective appropriation or identification that occupies me here. At 
issue is the question of what it is to identify with one’s actions, 
– where identification is understood as a condition of autono-
mous agency and personhood, and not as a condition of freedom 
or moral responsibility. As we just saw, Harry Frankfurt’s work 
has different incarnations. I want to take Frankfurt’s current 
position on identification as a point of departure. Let me first 
summarize this view.
What are the things that should be important to me and that 
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I should care about? According to Frankfurt, all efforts to con-
duct a rational inquiry must fail here. The question of what one 
should care about must already be answered before a rationally 
conducted inquiry and deliberation aimed at answering it can 
even get under way. That question can sensibly be asked only 
on the basis of a prior answer to the factual question of what 
one actually does care about or love. Some cares are innate in 
us, e.g. care for the continuation of our lives or the care for the 
well-being of our children (a: 7-). To be sure, it is not 
only living things that we are capable of loving. The object of 
love can be almost anything – a way of life, a person, a group, a 
mother tongue, a quality of experience, ideals, a tradition, what-
ever. Now, what does Frankfurt exactly mean by love? This is his 
answer: ‘Love is a particular mode of caring. It is an involuntary, 
non-utilitarian, rigidly focused, and – as is any mode of caring 
– self-affirming concern for the existence and the good of what 
is loved.’ (: ).7 Love is rigidly focused in that there can be 
no equivalent substitute for its object, which is loved in its sheer 
particularity. Love is non-utilitarian in that it cares about the 
beloved for its own sake. Love is involuntary, in that it is not un-
der the immediate control of the will. We cannot love – or stop 
loving – at will, merely by deciding to do so. Neither is loving 
the rationally determined outcome of even an implicit delibera-
tive or evaluative process. It is not essentially a matter of judg-
ment or of reasoned choice. Love requires no reasons, and it can 
have anything as its cause.7 However, love is a powerful source 
of reasons: ‘Loving someone or something essentially means or
7 See also in a: -7 & 79-. To put it differently: love is a central 
case of volitionally necessary caring.
7 On the inconsiderableness of causal history see also 9: .
106  practical identity
consists in, among other things, taking its interests as reasons 
for acting to serve those interests’ (a: 7). In spite of this, it 
is not essential to love that it is accompanied by particular af-
fects or thoughts. The heart of the matter is neither affective nor 
cognitive. It is volitional. It has to do with contingent ‘volitional 
necessities’. It is in the nature of the lover’s self-affirming concern 
that he is deeply invested in his beloved. The beloved configures 
and limits the lover’s will. Another way of putting this is that the 
lover identifies himself with what he loves. Love defines what the 
lover most intimately is. It sets the boundaries of his practical life 
and thus fixes his shape as an active being. It profoundly shapes 
his personal identity and the ways in which he experiences his 
life.7 Let me proceed to explain the Frankfurtian idea of identi-
fication with a problem case. 
It may happen that a person truly loves something but that, 
at the same time, it is also true that he does not want to love 
it. There is a part of him that is opposed to his loving it. In a 
word, the person is ambivalent. To overcome ambivalence the 
person has to become finally and unequivocally clear as to which 
side of the conflict he is on. As soon as he has definitively estab-
lished just where he stands himself, his will is no longer divided 
and his ambivalence is therefore gone. He has placed himself 
wholeheartedly behind one of his conflicting impulses, and not 
at all behind the other. The tendency that the person opposes is 
in a sense extruded and rendered external to him. It is dissoci-
ated from his will and thereby becomes alien to it. Sometimes, 
however, the person is unable to make up his mind once and 
for all which side to be on. He cannot bring himself to identify 
7 Frankfurt clearly is breaking a lance here, contra Kant, for ‘self-love’ 
(a: -).
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decisively either with one or with the other. In such cases, the 
person is volitionally fragmented. His will is unstable and inco-
herent, moving him in contrary directions simultaneously or in a 
disorderly sequence. He suffers from a radically entrenched am-
bivalence, in which his will remains obstinately undefined and 
therefore lacks guiding authority. This person is at odds with 
himself. He is deficient – at least with respect to his volitional 
faculty – insofar as he is not wholehearted. Wholeheartedness 
turns out to be a key notion here for Frankfurt. Being whole-
hearted means: having a will that is undivided. The wholeheart-
ed person is fully settled as to what he wants, and what he cares 
about. With regard to any conflict of dispositions or inclinations 
within himself, he has no doubts or reservations as to where he 
stands. He lends himself to caring and loving unequivocally and 
without reserve.7 Thus wholehearted identification means that 
there is no ambivalence or any other sort of conflict, instability 
or confusion in his attitude toward himself, i.e., that there is 
volitional unanimity. What counts above all is the quality of the 
will – that is, its integrity – not, for example, the quantity of its 
objects. One has to be fully intact, one’s will has to be purely his 
own. What, then, one could ask, is so special, urgent, and won-
derful about integrity? 
One thing in favor of an undivided will, Frankfurt says, is that 
7 Frankfurt makes a difference between necessities of love and patho-
logical constraints upon the will, such as compulsions, obsessions, addic-
tions, and the like. They differ in that we only submit unwillingly to the 
latter. Their power over us is external, and merely coercive. The power 
of love, in contrast, is not like that. Frankfurt admits that it is very dif-
ficult to grasp people accurately in full depth and detail, so far as love is 
concerned (: -). 
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divided wills are inherently self-defeating. Division of the will is 
a counterpart in the realm of conduct to self-contradiction in the 
realm of thought. It leads to defective action. By the same token, 
enjoying the inner harmony of an undivided will is tantamount 
to possessing a fundamental kind of self-assurance. An undi-
vided will is also important for us, ‘because it is the same thing, 
more or less, as being satisfied with ourselves. (...) It is a condi-
tion in which we willingly accept and endorse our own volitional 
identity. We are content with the final goals and with the loving 
by which our will is most penetratingly defined’ (a: 97). So, 
what is central to identification is the agent’s satisfaction with 
the relevant attitudes. Satisfaction with an attitude is a struc-
tural feature of the psychic economy within which that attitude 
is embedded. One is satisfied with such an attitude when there is 
no relevant ‘tendency or inclination to alter’ it (999: ). Frank-
furt stresses that wholeheartedness (i. e. satisfaction) is only a 
structural characteristic, which has to do with volitional unity 
or integrity. It has no essential evaluational vector. The value of 
what a person loves is irrelevant to the question of whether he 
is wholehearted in loving it. Love is not necessarily a response 
grounded in awareness of the inherent value of its object. It may 
sometimes arise like that, but it need not do so. It is entirely pos-
sible for a person to be caused to love something without notic-
ing its value. This leaves open the possibility that someone may 
wholeheartedly love what is evaluationally non-descript, or what 
is evil. Being robustly wholehearted is quite compatible with be-
ing dreadfully and irredeemably wicked. The function of love is 
not to make people good. Its function is to make their lives ‘good 
for them to live’.
Let us take stock. What we can learn from Frankfurt on iden-
tification is that the defining characteristic of persons is that they 
are creatures who care about and love things. Echoing Hume, 
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Frankfurt insists that whatever we have reason to do or refrain 
from doing depends on what, in particular, we care about. The 
latest Frankfurtian model is consistent with his earlier thoughts 
on identification in at least two respects: the model is hierar-
chic – identification supposes reflexive consciousness – and it 
is conative. Furthermore, caring is linked up with self-consti-
tution. To care (wholeheartedly) is the key to self-integration. 
The things – the volitional necessities – we cannot help caring 
about and we put ourselves behind are constitutive of who we 
are. There is a close connection with self-governance too. Voli-
tional necessities also have agential authority. On the question 
of what is it that gives – to put it in Michael Bratman’s terms 
– ‘some particular wiggle in the psychic stew agential authority, 
and not others?’ Frankfurt’s answer is: that the agent is caring 
wholeheartedly about it and is satisfied with it, that is, that it is 
embedded in a psychic system in which there is no relevant ten-
dency to change.7 Self-government or making the government 
up to the self, in Frankfurt’s psychological account, is one and 
the same thing as being identified wholeheartedly. The notion 
of wholehearted identification provides the hierarchical theorist 
with the resources to account for autonomous agency. An au-
tonomous agent identifies himself fully and uninhibitedly with 
the configurations of the will that define his final ends. He ac-
cepts them as commandingly authoritative. There is no part of 
him with which he identifies that is opposed to or that resists 
his loving what he loves. The lover may be unable to resist the 
power his love exerts, but it is by his own will that he does what 
the necessities of love require.
7 Frankfurt refers to Baruch Spinoza’s ‘acquiescentia in se ipso’ (: 
7).
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Needless to say that Frankfurt’s view is not undisputable. Most 
of the comments7 on his interpretation of identification centre 
around the question of how it can make clear that identification 
is conceived as authoritative, that is, as normative and binding 
for what a person really wants. Frankfurtian identification seems 
to entail a moment of endorsement or reinforcement of a delib-
erative conclusion, of some conclusion about what is the best 
thing to do, what is most choice-worthy, or what is important. 
Frankfurt does not leave open the question of whether this is a 
matter of decision or, rather, a matter of evaluative judgment. 
Frankfurtian identification with volitional necessities must be 
understood in a non-cognitivistic and non-voluntaristic way. Let 
me expand a bit on these two characteristics. 
In recent replies to his critics Frankfurt clarifies the first one: 
‘In speaking of these matters, I have regrettably made use of 
terms – such as “endorse” – that naturally suggest a positive eval-
uation. However, what I have actually intended to convey by re-
ferring to “endorsement” is not that the agent approves of what he 
is said to endorse, or that he considers it to merit his support, but 
nothing more than that the agent accepts it as his own. The sense 
in which he accepts it as his own is quite rudimentary. It is free 
of any suggestion concerning his basis for accepting it and, in 
particular, it does not imply that he thinks well of it’ (Frankfurt 
in Buss & Overton: 7). Frankfurt cannot see that identifying 
with a desire always requires that the desire provides a reason for 
such a choice: ‘Our most elementary desires come to us as urges 
or impulses; we are moved by them, but they do not as such af-
fect our thinking at all. They are merely psychic raw material. 
7 E.g. the comments of G. Watson, R. Jay Wallace, M. E. Bratman and 
T. M. Scanlon in Buss & Overton .
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A desire provides us not with a reason but with a problem – the 
problem of how to respond to it. Impulses and urges have power, 
but in themselves they have no authority. They move us more 
or less strongly, but they make no claims on us. One problem 
of how to respond to it. Impulses and urges have power, but in 
themselves they have no authority. They move of the thematic 
preoccupations of my work in this area has been a concern with 
trying to understand just how to account for the authority – as 
distinct from the mere impulsive force – that certain desires ap-
pear to have. (…) A person’s elementary urges and impulses do 
not become authoritative for that person because he has favor-
able second-order attitudes toward them, or even because he has 
second-order volitions manifesting his desires that those desires 
and impulses move him effectively to act. What gives a desire 
authority is, rather, that the person identifies with it or com-
mits himself to it’ (Frankfurt in Buss & Overton: ). In other 
words, Frankfurt’s definition of identification points at brute 
psychological facts, psychic raw materials that a person may or 
may not accept for integration into himself. His assumption is 
that the desires important to identification are (non-judgmen-
tal) matters of inclination, attraction, or repulsion. To be sure, 
people are not love machines. In a way, it is up to us that this 
or that appeals to us; we make up our minds that we want it. 
A human being must determine, with respect to some desires, 
whether to identify himself with it or whether to reject it as an 
outlaw and hence as not a legitimate candidate for satisfaction. 
But the vocabulary of reasons comes on the scene only later. For 
someone to identify with a desire means merely that – for what-
ever reason, or for no reason whatever – he joins himself to the 
desire and accepts it as his own. A person may be led to accept 
something about himself in weary resignation, as well as in wel-
coming approval, or in recognition of its merit. The fact that he 
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accepts it, in other words, entails nothing about what he thinks 
of it. This leads to the second characteristic mentioned above: 
Frankfurt’s non-voluntarism.
Frankfurt clearly offers us a volitional account of practical 
normativity. Normative authority cannot be established by in-
voking rationality. There can be no rationally warranted criteria 
for establishing anything as inherently important. It is possible 
to ground judgments of importance, Frankfurt believes, only 
in judgments concerning what people de facto care about. The 
normative question of what people should care about can be an-
swered only on the basis of a prior answer to a question that is not 
normative, but straightforwardly factual: namely, the question 
of what people actually do care about. Does this mean that it is 
all simply up to us – that what is important to us depends just 
upon what goes on in our minds? Yes and (especially) no. Yes, 
because answers to normative questions are up to us in the sense 
that they depend upon what we care about. Frankfurt’s idea of 
second-order attitudes presupposes that it must be possible to in-
fluence at least some of our carings. However, what we care about 
is not always up to us. We cannot have whatever will we want, 
simply for the asking. There are some things we cannot help car-
ing about. Our volitional character does not change just because 
we wish it to change. It may change. But love is not a voluntary 
matter. We cannot bring ourselves to love at will – that is, merely 
by choosing or deciding to do so. When we decide77 or make up 
our minds, we are mainly reacting and neutrally accepting the 
persistence of our carings. And when we change our cares, we are 
moved by cares once more beyond our direct, immediate control. 
To decide, so construed, is more like to discover.
77 To ’decide’ – Frankfurt sometimes uses the word – is a debatable term 
in this context.
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3.3 Some teachings and tensions
Frankfurt is critical of the philosopher’s tendency to exaggerate 
the authority and control of reason over the person. In fact, his 
criticism makes him nearly silent on the relevance of reasoning. 
To illustrate this point he discusses Bernard Williams’s example 
of the man who sees two people on the verge of drowning – only 
one of whom can be saved – and who must decide which of 
the two he will try to save. One of them he does not know; the 
other is his wife. We do not expect this man to consider ques-
tions of impartiality or fairness and to add the thought that in 
situations like this it is permissible to save one’s wife. As Bernard 
Williams famously admonished: that would be ‘one thought too 
many’. Frankfurt is sympathetic to Williams’ line of thought 
but proposes two corrections: ‘For one thing, I cannot help won-
dering why the man should have even the one thought that it’s 
his wife. (…) In the circumstances that the example describes, 
any thought whatever is one thought too many. In addition, the 
example is seriously out of focus in a rather more fundamental 
respect as well. It actually can’t work in the way that Williams 
intends if we stipulate nothing more than that one of the people 
drowning is the man’s wife. After all, suppose that for quite good 
reasons he detests his wife. (…) Specifying merely a bare legal 
relationship between the man and the drowning woman appears 
really to miss the point. So let us put aside the matter of their 
civil status, and stipulate instead that the man in the example 
loves one (and not the other) of the two people who are drown-
ing. (…) The fact that he loves her, just in itself, entails that he 
already takes her distress as a more powerful reason for going to 
her aid than for going to the aid of someone about who he knows 
nothing. (…) Loving someone or something essentially means, 
among other things, taking its needs and interests as reasons for 
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acting to serve those interests and needs. Love is itself, in other 
words, a source of reasons. It creates the reasons by which acts of 
loving devotion are inspired. As a matter of fact, that’s precisely 
how it is that love makes the world go around’ (: -).
The point is well made.7 From the outset it has been clear 
for Frankfurt that reflexive consciousness, reasoning, and the abil-
ity to love are essential human faculties. But love strikes him as 
more fundamental and important than reason. Frankfurt’s idea 
is that making up our minds (e.g. to form intentions, to com-
mit ourselves to certain ideas or desires, to identify ourselves 
with an inclination) is primarily volitional activity. Identifica-
tion is not basically an ability to perceive formal relationships, 
or to fashion or grasp concepts. Nor does it aim at understand-
ing, or believing, or recognising, or at any prerogative of rea-
son. Reason is not even necessary. In Frankfurt’s judgment, 
identification is a volitional state that creates reasons, but that 
does not otherwise depend upon them. We can identify with 
various psychic elements, without having any reasons for doing 
so. Identification is a non-rational, partly unconscious activ-
ity, – and Frankfurt regrets not having acknowledged this more 
explicitly (in Buss & Overton: 97). Likewise, to act autono-
mously is being moved by the character of your own will, that 
is, being moved by love. I think this point has a good deal of 
force. Unchosen and non-reasoned contingencies play a role in 
determining whom and what we love, and are giving substance 
to our lives. We more or less ‘fall’ into our loves, in processes 
that elude complete deliberative planning. We are rather hostage 
to the contingencies of the empirical which we do not control, 
even in our most resolute declarations of will. And when we try
7 For a similar critique on Williams’ concept of ‘ground project’ see 
Frankfurt : -7. 
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to guide ourselves, there always remains the empirical question 
of whether we have indeed succeeded in making our will what 
we want it to be. On the other hand, these contingencies also 
profoundly affect deliberative reflection, providing us with rea-
sons for actions that we would not otherwise have, and appropri-
ately altering thereby our conceptions of who we are and what it 
would be best to do. I think all this is on the right, naturalistic 
lines. Volitional necessities are an essential condition for autono-
mous life-guidance and decision-making. We can be only what 
nature makes us. There is a natural mechanism or some sort of 
a pre-existing nature in place, that guides our attempts to iden-
tify and helps to find a resting place in such attempts. A good 
deal of our identity is already in place by the forces of heredity 
and environment, before we reach the stage of reflective endorse-
ment. These are forces which shape us in a strictly causal way, 
and although they have no claim as reasons, they are among 
the background conditions that allow us to form identifications 
and ultimately give us reasons. Frankfurt has a point here.79 
79 Many feminist philosophers stress this point. Corporality and emotion 
are co-determining self-understanding and personal autonomy. One of 
the merits of Frankfurt’s account of wholehearted identification is that 
it can be extended to identification with unconscious, visceral and affec-
tive items. But the fact that these conditions are not of our own choosing 
and that it is ‘unthinkable’ for us to give them up does not imply that 
there is nothing to know about it. Representative here is Diana Tietjens 
Meyers. In ‘Decentralising Autonomy: Five Faces of Selfhood’ she ar-
gues for the need to redress the overemphasis on rational oversight func-
tions and self-definition to the neglect of the role of self-discovery in au-
tonomy. Whereas self-definition is a matter of self-analysis and reflective 
endorsement, self-discovery is more a matter of sensitivity and openness
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However, his approach seems to take things too far and comes at 
a price. Here is a final observation of Frankfurt’s apparent non-
cognitivism, before I turn to a critical discussion of this point.
What Frankfurt thoroughly rejects is not rationality but the 
doctrine of ‘normative realism’. This doctrine holds that voli-
tional necessities are responses to an independent normative re-
ality. On this account, certain things are inherently important; 
and there are objective reasons for people to act in accordance 
with the normative reality, whether they know them, or care 
about them, or not. Frankfurt’s view is different. In his judg-
ment, normativity is not a feature of a reality that is independent 
of us. It is grounded in us. This is not to say that what we are 
to care about is a matter that can be settled arbitrarily, or that 
appears to rule out the possibility of providing any rational basis 
for deciding what we are to care about. Quite the reverse, the fi-
nal ends by which we govern ourselves require authentication by 
some decisive rational warrant. This is, for example, how Frank-
furt comments on a much-discussed passage in David Hume’s 
Treatise of Human Nature that ‘’Tis not contrary to reason to 
prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my 
[continuation of note 79] (in Christman & Anderson: 7-). For another 
exploration of the role of bodily emotion, see Robert Solomon () 
on ‘judgements of the body’ in Thinking about Feeling, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, -.
 In this case, autonomy is determined by the agent’s correct grasp of 
the truth and the good. Self-government requires not only that one acts 
in accordance with the reasons one believes to have, but in accordance 
with the right reasons there objectively are. Defenders of such a view are 
S. Wolf (Freedom within Reason, 99, Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
and B. Berofsky (Liberation from Self. A Theory of Personal Autonomy, 99, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
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finger. ’Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, 
to prevent the lest uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly 
unknown to me.’ Frankfurt: ‘(I)t is true that this preference 
involves no purely logical mistake. (...) In this purely formal 
sense of rationality, his choice is not at all irrational. But what 
would we say of someone who made that choice? We would say 
he must be crazy. In other words, despite the unassailability 
of his preference on logical grounds, we would consider both 
it and him to be wildly irrational. (...) His irrationality is not 
fundamentally a cognitive deficiency at all. He is volitionally ir-
rational. He has a defect of the will’ (: 9-). Being vo-
litionally rational is not just a matter of choices that a person 
actually makes. It involves being incapable of making certain 
choices and of crossing certain external borders. It requires that 
certain choices be utterly out of the question. A volitionally ra-
tional person may think that destroying the world is appropri-
ate; but, when the chips are down, he cannot bring himself to 
implement his judgment. In virtue of the necessities by which his 
will is constrained, his choice is not among his genuine options. 
It is precluded by volitional constraints that cannot be eluded. 
We cannot help caring about e.g. going on living, ‘about avoid-
ing crippling injury and illness, about maintaining at least some 
minimal contact with other human beings, and about being free 
from chronic suffering and endlessly stupefying boredom. We 
love being intact and healthy, being satisfied, and being in touch. 
We cannot bring ourselves to be wholly indifferent to these 
things (...T)hey are elementary constituents of volitional reason 
itself.’ (: ). Are these constraints ‘objective’? In one sense
 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge), Ox-
ford: Clarendon Pres, 97, . 
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they are obviously not. They are grounded nowhere but in the 
character of our own will. That means that they are subjective. 
On the other hand, they are outside our direct voluntary control. 
This warrants them as objective, despite their origin within us. 
The objectivity is relative in part to the common nature of hu-
man beings and in part to individual experience and character. 
Still, despite this relativity, there are plenty of ways that our lov-
ing can go absolutely wrong, Frankfurt acknowledges. We have 
to be alert to the possibility that we do not understand the things 
that we love well enough. We have to be wakeful to the possi-
bility that other people are required by what they care about to 
harm or to destroy what we love, and that the conflict between 
us, so far as reason goes, may be irreducible. This is just a fact of 
life. It is here, where the power of reason is under discussion, that 
we arrive at a difference between my view on self-governance 
and Frankfurt’s.
Frankfurt’s conception of identification is unsatisfactory, be-
cause it distorts the complexities of human agency and identi-
fication. My claim is not that Frankfurt’s theory is wrong, but 
that it is incomplete. Reason carries too little weight in it. To 
improve on it, we need to restore the balance and to move fur-
ther away from the non-cognitivism that is active in Frankfurt’s 
work. The fact that identification starts with the will does not 
mean that it has to end with it. From the fact that reason un-
derdetermines a person’s answer to the question of who he is, 
it does not follow that judgments have no roles to play in it. It 
does not follow that our autonomy as agents no longer can be 
identified with the point of view of evaluative reflection about 
what we have reason to do. Frankfurt seems to advocate that we 
care about what we can, and that it does not matter which cares 
we commit to, as long as we commit to some. But autonomous 
persons are not only fully contented human beings, creatures 
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just revealing their natures and ‘being in flow’. They are also 
givers and takers of reasons, mongers or traffickers in reasons, as 
Robert Brandom calls them. To be sure, as we saw earlier, Frank-
furt does not reject, but only de-emphasises the role of reason-
ing. According to Frankfurt, responsiveness to reasons is what 
identification and wholeheartedness inescapably impose. These 
‘provide us with a problem’ that has to be solved, in Frankfurt’s 
own striking formulation. Although he goes on to stress that 
our evaluations of what we care about are more often such a 
response to the caring than its source, our responses are related 
to reason. Volitional means: programmed to act in some way. 
There is rationality in it, as Frankfurt admits. (Instrumental) 
reason matters for Frankfurt. And this leads to the crucial ques-
tion: At what point is thinking desirable for autonomous agents? 
This is a question that is mistakenly neglected by Frankfurt. He 
downplays the requirement of actual reflection.
The critical issue was pressed with insight by Joel Anderson in 
his  Autonomy and the Authority of Personal Commitments. 
When we accept that the authority of our desires and commit-
ments ultimately stems from the reflexive involvement of the will 
rather than of the intellect, he asks, how then can we distinguish 
a change of heart from self-betrayal? Acting at odds with a core 
personal commitment in Frankfurt’s view seems always to end 
up being not a violation but simply evidence that one no longer 
cares. To solve this problem Anderson proposes, as a first step, an 
inferentialist understanding of wholeheartedness: ‘What makes 
a state a genuine desire – in the language I am using, what gives 
it authority – is the degree to which the desiring agent lives up 
to inferential commitments entailed by having such a desire. (...T)
he inferentialist point is that my having an authoritative desire 
is a function of being in a network of affective, behavioral, and 
cognitive commitments’ (: 97). This shift to an inferential-
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ist network can make more plausible the intrapersonal approach 
to explaining how a current desire or commitment can get grip 
on future behavior, but it cannot solve the problem regarding 
distinguishing self-betrayal from a change of heart or a previ-
ously neglected pattern. Anderson’s next step then is ‘to take the 
inferentialist point – about desires having authority (and thus 
being able to function as reasons) in virtue of their connections 
to other commitments, desires, dispositions, &c. – and combine 
this inferentialism with a recognition of the way in which what 
counts as an intelligible connection is constrained by the nor-
mative standards built into our shared social practices’ (: 
). The question of whether neglecting a particular project, 
relationship, or ideal that someone once cared about is to count 
as a welcome development or a change for the worse, has to be 
answered in part on the basis of whether the account the person 
could give (for why it is not self-betrayal) meets publicly shared 
standards of an acceptable answer. 
Many critics of Frankfurt’s conception of autonomy have 
raised the point of the intrapersonal and hyper individualistic 
approach. Communitarians have famously claimed that the 
emphasis on separated, atomistic decision has obscured the 
socially embedded nature of personal identity. Contextual ac-
counts of autonomy have been developed to respond to such 
critique. It is obvious – also for Harry Frankfurt, I am sure – 
 Recently by Meir Dan-Cohen in ‘Socializing Harry’ in H. Frankfurt 
(), Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting It Right (ed. D. Satz), Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 9-.
 See, for example, C. Mackenzie and N. Stoljar (eds.) (), Relational 
Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self, 
New York: Oxford University Press.
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that individuals cannot constitute themselves as persons ex nihilo 
and that personhood is parasitic on lasting emotional attach-
ments to others and on socialization and enculturation. In the 
present section, however, I largely put to one side Frankfurt’s 
a-social approach. More important, for my purposes, is that An-
derson and other critics make clear that persons in order to be 
autonomous persons need explanations to tackle self-betrayal, 
and that these explanations will be explanations in terms of 
reasons rather than a fit with volitional patterns. This takes us 
beyond the idea that a certain degree of integration and equilib-
rium within the volitional make-up can do the self-constitution 
job alone. The required stability is generated, at least in part, by 
non-volitional considerations.
With this understood, it will be clear that Frankfurt’s proposal 
does not accomplish what we need. On the latest Frankfurtian 
model, autonomy ultimately stems from the reflexive involve-
ment of the will rather than of reason. The autonomy of one’s 
actions comes from how they are connected to one’s volitional 
make-up. What makes actions autonomous is not that they have 
 John Christman makes a similar point criticising the static approach 
of the hierarchic model of autonomy (the ‘synchronism-objection’). He 
develops an explicitly historically based version of the hierarchical ap-
proach to analysing autonomy: Persons are autonomous with respect to 
a desire, emotion, character trait and the like, if they competently reflect 
on it and endorse it in light of the processes by which it developed. See e.g. J. 
Christman (). ‘Liberalism, Autonomy, and Selftransformation’ in So-
cial Theory and Practice 7 (), -. One of Christman’s concerns is the 
problem of manipulation that threatens split-level accounts of autonomy. 
The manipulation problem, like self-betrayal, cannot be solved without 
reasoning. We need a (his)story.
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been endorsed in critical reflection, but rather that they are sub-
ject to imperatives of the will, that is, to certain volitional neces-
sities. Such a non-cognitivistic interpretation of self-governance, 
in my view, is incomplete and ultimately unacceptable. Unless 
we can articulate what it is about the course of action that seems 
desirable, our leanings will appear essentially inscrutable, more 
like an itch or a sensation than a real desire. Just as much as 
volitions, the individual’s evaluative judgments are definitive of 
personal autonomy. Volitions are not the only kinds of entities 
through which to bring practical deliberation to a satisfactory 
solution. If we understand carings as practical identities, that 
is, the kinds of commitments and concerns that most funda-
mentally color our personality as agents and structure our or-
dinary deliberations, we cannot but reason about these patterns 
of concern (predilections, final ends, ground projects). They are 
the subject of our critical reflection and a matter of normative 
articulation. In short, they play a role in practical reasoning. 
Reason as much as love is crucial for personhood and personal 
autonomy. Reason is not an epiphenomenon. We inevitably want 
to argue about the importance of what we care about. Moreover, 
as we have seen, purely volitional accounts of autonomy run
 I can think here of Bernard Williams’ ground projects (e.g. personal 
relationships and significant work) or of Korsgaardian practical identities. 
Like M. Betzler I think this can be done in fairness to Korsgaard. I re-
alise that Korsgaard’s conception of practical identity is slightly different. 
In Korsgaard’s view practical identities are roles or principles generating 
constraints. The tenor of her argument is that it is our humanity, to wit 
our identity as reasonable beings, that makes us think that some ends are 
important to us. To value a practical identity goes back to valuing our 
humanity, in Korsgaard’s account.
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into serious difficulties. Frankfurt is realistic in stating that ra-
tional judgments better cannot be prioritised above thoughtless 
attitudes, as widespread practices of wishful thinking, rationali-
sation, delusion and akrasia demonstrate. But there is no more 
ground to prioritise volitions in our definition of autonomy 
because of our satisfaction with the establishment of a certain 
internal harmony and constancy of the volitional necessities 
(‘acceptance’). Volitions can also dazzle us. A volitional account 
cannot make clear, for example, how to demarcate volitional 
necessities from brainwashing. It cannot explain, let us say, the 
difference between (autonomous) identification as a child loving 
her father and (heteronomous) identification as a member of the 
sect of Sister Rosetta of the Heavenly Gate, brainwashed by her 
leader Do. This seems to be a serious deficit for an account of 
personal autonomy. So, we have to extend Frankfurt’s approach. 
My proposal is to develop Frankfurt’s view without losing sight 
of his key insights that the authority personal commitments have 
cannot be reduced to contentions about the importance of what 
one cares about, and that our embarking on the path of critical 
self-evaluation is itself an action grounded ultimately in cares. 
I also want to avoid a pan-rationalistic revision of Frankfurt’s 
position. My more modest claim is that a volitional approach 
alone cannot account for self-governance. Identification with 
volitional necessities is usually contaminated with evaluative
 M. Betzler, G. Watson, R. Jay Wallace, T. van Willigenburg, and 
J. Raz are making moves in that direction. Here is an illustrative quote: 
‘We are ourselves and we lead our own life so long as we see ourselves as 
rational agents, so long as we conduct our life under the semblance of 
rationality’, from J. Raz (999). Engaging Reason. On the Theory of Value 
and Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 9.
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judgment. In our daily lives acting autonomously will involve 
self-conceptions playing a decisive role, as the sorts of organising 
principles that serve to privilege some reasons rather than others. 
How one thinks of oneself becomes a principle for giving order 
to the pattern of one’s behavior, intentions, desires, emotions, 
and the like.
Let us return for a moment to the sect member. How does my 
proposal (a partial rehabilitation of reasonableness) work out in 
the case of a brainwashed person? After all, sectarians may be 
quite reasonable persons. My claim here is not that in order to be 
autonomous one must be able to reflect on his volitional neces-
sity and can only endorse it if it has a causal history of the right 
sort. My more moderate claim is that reasons have to play a role 
in the exercise of autonomy. It is not trivial for members of the 
sect of Sister Rosetta of the Heavenly Gate to be able to realise 
what causal path led them to their identification with leader Do. 
It may give them reasons to try to get rid of the sect’s influ-
ence. But there is a second route to avoid heteronomy for our 
sect member: he may be able to realise fully what causal path led 
him to his identification with leader Do and endorse it without 
giving him reasons to change his behavior. 
Section . concludes. The situation so far is as follows. The hall-
mark of personal autonomy is agentic reflexivity. What matters 
for autonomy is the ability to draw away mentally from our own 
mental states (i.e. what makes up our stream of consciousness: 
perceptions, desires, beliefs, emotions, recollections, daydreams, 
intentions...). We are able to ‘supervise’ our mental states, form-
ing attitudes that have as their intentional objects these mental 
states. As Keith Lehrer emphasises, we have meta-minds, minds 
capable of turning upon themselves. Desires, emotions, and be-
liefs present us with a problem of what to do with it: identify 
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with it, or reject it ‘as an outlaw’? This ability to step back and 
to reject or identify is crucial to control our behavior and the 
direction of our lives. Harry Frankfurt highlights identification 
with volitional necessities as a basic condition for self-mastery as 
well as for forming the boundaries of the self. Frankfurt points at 
identification with volitional necessities as a psychological fact, 
that is, as a depth investment in ourselves, rooted in our bodies 
(that are essentially related to the world). And it seems very im-
portant, indeed, to get ‘in touch with our volitional necessities’. 
It is about us, not about heteronomous forces. But we cannot 
stop here. Caring and loving are not the only aspects that are 
relevant and conditional for identification. Reasoning, interpret-
ing, and evaluating are also part of it. Identification turns out to 
be an aspectual psychological phenomenon. Frankfurt basically 
agrees but does not take great pains over the rational part of voli-
tion and the role of evaluative judgment. This flies in the face 
of the phenomena. People reason a lot about their patterns of 
concern, i.e., the kinds of commitments and activities that most 
fundamentally color their personality as agents. The phenom-
enon is quite familiar in hearing the shorter stories that people 
tell about themselves in the pub or over the dinner table. To 
identify is also, as Michael Bratman puts it (a bit cryptically), 
making reflective decisions to treat our desires as reason-giving 
(Bratman 999: -). So, we need a more complete story of 
identification. 
3.4 Identification and coherence
Let me insert first a quick scan of the actual debate on self-gover-
nance and then specify where exactly my own view comes in. In 
globo the running debate on self-governance is a debate between 
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‘hierarchical theories’ of self-government and ‘reasoning respon-
siveness theories’ of self-government. Harry Frankfurt and Ger-
ald Dworkin are defenders of the hierarchical or so-called ‘split 
level theory’ of autonomy. The reasoning responsiveness view is 
represented by, among others, G. Watson, A. Mele, and J. Raz. 
Their claim is that self-governing or autonomous action is: to 
act in accordance with what one takes to have most reason to do. 
Autonomy, in their view, is exercise of reason. From Frankfurt’s 
point of view, reasons are instrumental for being autonomous 
and autonomy supposes the formation of a desire. For reason-
ing responsiveness theorists autonomy supposes reflection, and 
reasons are essential for being autonomous.7
The narrative view on autonomy I am proposing plainly tries 
to claim middle ground between the two main theories of auton-
omy. It goes second-order and it gives reasoning responsiveness 
its due. Autonomy now stands for: identification with (parts of) 
a self-narrative. In the previous chapter I listed some important 
standards for self-narratives that do constitute personhood: self-
constituting narratives must be articulate and coherent. Narra-
tive conceptions of personhood arrange actual, past and planned 
7 One of the recurrent problems for reasoning responsiveness theories is: 
how does reason motivate us? Possible answers are: people have a disposi-
tion to act in accordance with their better or best judgment; they have 
a generic desire to act as they judge best (A. E. Mele in 99 Autonomous 
Agents. From Self-Control to Autonomy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
-). In a similar vein, J. Raz holds that almost all people have a desire 
to be rational (999: 7). In his radical view, it is not even a contingent fact 
that people strive for the good. The mental act of knowing the good and 
desiring the good are identical: Quidquid appetitur appetitur sub specie 
boni (quoted by Raz).
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actions in ways that cohere into an acceptable story, i.e., a story 
that can be made explicit, that is internally coherent, and that is 
in accordance with the facts of the world and the interpretations 
of others. Coherence is the constraining power of self-narratives. 
Suppose I am right about this. How, then, to bring identification 
in step with the standards of coherence? 
As I have indicated, my narrative view on personal autonomy 
leads to an account of identification different from the discussed 
views on autonomy of Christine Korsgaard and Harry Frankfurt 
presented earlier. All the same, in both their views coherence (in-
tegrity) was also at the centre stage. For Christine Korsgaard, a 
process of self-reflection amounts ultimately to autonomy. A re-
flective self that acts from above human commitments (ordered 
in practical identities) chooses commitments that make up the 
agent’s identity. Acting autonomously is allowing the part of the 
self that is above the commitments, reflecting on these commit-
ments from a universal point of view, to be in control and to give 
laws. Only by identifying with that reflective part of the self can 
an agent be autonomous. And it is this reflective capacity that 
allows him to maintain a coherent sense of identity and so of 
agency. Acting autonomously means acting on rational, univer-
salisable principles. The guiding rational principles one chooses 
and endorses ipso facto are unifying the person and provide him 
with a coherent set of reasons on which to act.
On the coherence account I advocate, reasonableness plays 
an important part. Yet, I reject the special, free-floating status 
of reasons in the Korsgaardian picture. Reasons, emotions and 
desires are firmly entwined in the same causal net. I am also 
less optimistic than Korsgaard about the unifying power of the 
human rational capacities. As regards my own account, coher-
ence settles for a less constraining power of reasons. A reason is 
authorised or has agential authority for an agent just in case his 
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other endorsed reasons can be used in its defense. That is, if they 
support his adopting or maintaining it; if his set of reasons, so 
to speak, form a loop: a coherent and interweaving structure of 
mutual support.
Harry Frankfurt sticks to an account of identification as accep-
tance or wholeheartedness (in Buss & Overton: -). For him, 
wholeheartedness is a way of avoiding conflict and progressing 
towards integration. This comes very close to my own coherence 
view. Frankfurt’s wholeheartedness requirement can be inter-
preted as coherence among all the significant items of the agent’s 
psychological complex. Unfortunately, Frankfurt concentrates 
on volitional necessities and argues that certain volitional neces-
sities are not only compatible with autonomy, but even essential 
to autonomy. He does not take much trouble to put the impor-
tance of reasoning on the screen. Matters are, however, more 
complicated. Not only volitional necessities establish a person’s 
autonomous take on the world. Also reflective endorsement and 
critical evaluation do. 
Identification, on my coherence account, now may be under-
stood as follows: a part of a self-narrative is personally autho-
rised – or sanctioned as one’s own – when it coheres with the 
other parts of one’s self-narrative. Incoherent elements of a self-
narrative are part of the peripheral self rather than of the real 
and central self. Does that mean that there is also an unreal self, 
then? Why is it appropriate to call some elements of a person 
more or less central and real? Why think that cohering elements 
are more real and central than non-coherent ones? Let me give 
three considerations for doing so:
 In L. W. Ekstrom : 9-. To be sure, my concept of autonomy 
leaves room for resistance, change and emancipation.
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i. Coherent elements are long-lasting. They are abiding, because 
they support each other. They hold together firmly, displaying 
consistency and mutual support and remain relatively immune 
to change; altering one such element requires change in others. 
This seems intuitively correct. The core of one’s character system 
should be relatively stable through time. We tend to view the 
more enduring aspects of a person’s psychology as central. 
ii. Coherent elements are fully defensible by the person in the 
face of external challenge and neurotic doubt. It is only the 
cohering elements of the character for which we can mount a 
wholehearted defense. They fit with – de facto constitute – the 
person’s ‘party-line’.
iii. Coherent elements are features that one is comfortably own-
ing. One tends not to have distress over attitudes that cohere 
with one’s other considered attitudes. One is not frustrated or in 
tumult. The lack of conflict generates a state of inner tranquility, 
a kind of liberating comfort with oneself. 
This may seem natural and persuasive enough, but here are 
a couple of skeptical remarks: maybe the craving for coher-
ence is unnecessary. Or maybe it is an outlandish concern with 
psychic tidiness. Alfred Mele e.g. claims that we can describe 
what self-directed action is, without positing the existence 
of any (real) self within the agent.9 A human agent is simply 
a human being who acts. Might not a single anomalous atti-
tude, Mele asks us, represent ‘who one really is’? David Velle-
man stresses a similar point calling an account of autonomy 
requiring wholeheartedness a ‘defensive fantasy’ (Velleman in 
Buss & Overton: 9). Why cannot we say in a certain sort of
9 In his  Motivation and Agency, New York: Oxford University Press, 
chapter .
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case of explosive conflict with another: ‘It was my resentment 
speaking, not I’?9 What tempts people to an integration con-
dition on psychological states is merely a perverse wish to be 
unconflicted. Moreover, Velleman continues, are not people all 
conflicted to a greater or lesser extent? People simply live with 
these conflicts and are able to act autonomously in spite of their 
inner turmoil. 
This skepticism has something to go for it. People are con-
flicted to some extent. There is indeed inner disorder. There 
are moments of serious disruption, breakdown, and regression. 
Granted, but within a coherentist picture of the autonomous self 
there will be room for conflicting attitudes, as long as these con-
flicts spur the person to restore the unity instead of keeping him 
in permanent frustration. Also notice that, on the coherentist 
conception, we need not view the self as a fixed entity. But even 
if our identities are in flux, and even though we are full of am-
bivalences and unresolved conflicts and sometimes overwhelmed 
by a strong feeling, we are autonomous only if we can claim that 
our decisions flow from us as the author of the ongoing struggle 
to negotiate those tensions, to reduce the frustration, and to (re)
establish some coherence. Time slice attitudes that fail to bear 
the proper relation to that ongoing personal project of charac-
ter development that reflective agents are all engaged in, do not 
manifest autonomy in a crucial way. The project of character de-
velopment and reflective self-constitution is a temporally extend-
ed process. So, it seems undeniable to me, as opposed to Alfred 
Mele, that actions or attitudes constitute what an agent is like, a 
character, along with the faculty for (re)forming that character. 
9 D. Velleman (99). ‘What Happens When Someone Acts?’ in Mind 
, -.
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And that a character has more constant, central features and 
more peripheral ones. Obviously, the agent can be mistaken con-
cerning the central status of his reasons. And other people, as 
well, may be mistaken concerning whether an attitude is part of 
that agent’s real self.9 But a person is something like a real char-
acter – not a single anomalous attitude – together with a power 
for fashioning and refashioning that character.
The point we have reached in this section is that for the practi-
cal, narrative based account of autonomy I am after, standards 
of coherence are crucial. Autonomous persons are not totally free 
to identify with whatever narrative elements they want. This is 
going too far. Although there is some elbow room, it is crucial 
to the exercise of autonomy that persons identify with memories, 
emotions, intentions and the like as their own in ways that co-
here into an acceptable self-narrative. Autonomy arises out of an 
ongoing narrative.
Let me now proceed by subjecting the Frankfurtian view on 
autonomy to some further refinement. Michael Bratman’s ideas 
on self-governance, generally known as his ‘planning theory’, 
will be guiding me. My hypothesis is that my account of au-
tonomy can benefit from Bratman’s discussion of the topic in 
two ways. First of all, his essentially Frankfurtian picture of self-
governance balances the role of volitional necessities and the role 
of reasoning. Furthermore, Bratman attaches great importance 
to the temporal dynamics of autonomy, in particular to the role 
of intentions, policies, and plans. 
9 One could think here, in line with Keith Lehrer on epistemic justifi-
cation (see J. S. Taylor : -), of a game or contest with a skeptical 
interlocutor who questions one’s reasons. Coherence, then, is a matter of 
mutual defense in the face of external challenge or internal doubt. 
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3.5 Bratman’s planning theory
According to Frankfurt, love provides reasons for action. Brat-
man’s proposal is slightly different. He can grant that what 
people care about ‘is the ultimate touchstone and basis of our 
practical reasoning’ (Frankfurt’s phrase in his : ). Our 
practical reasoning needs to be grounded in what we love or care 
about. Simply thinking something valuable is not a sufficient 
ground for practical reasoning, because we still may not care 
about it. Bratman can also grant that when we do care about or 
love something, this may not be explained by a judgment on our 
part that it is a good thing. (Value) judgments underdetermine a 
person’s sensible answer to the questions of how to live and what 
kind of person to be. But it does not follow from this that in 
figuring out how to live (value) judgments have no roles to play. 
Bratman tells us: ‘Put it this way: Two theses that are central 
to Frankfurt’s theory are, first, that the psychological function-
ing characteristic of inner harmony involves treating what one 
loves as a reason, and second, that there can be this harmony 
even if what one loves is bad or evil. A broadly Frankfurtian 
theory could hold both these views and still go on to say (though 
Frankfurt does not) that our talk of reasons – that is, our talk 
of normative reasons – has two faces: it tracks such function-
ing, and it tracks judgments of value. If we were to take such a 
view, we would then be in a position to say that, in certain cases, 
love for what is bad does not suffice for reasons.’ (: ).9 
9 This is not to push Frankfurt in the direction of normative realism. 
‘It is worth noting that an expressivist meta-ethics can also seek to make 
sense of this critical thought’, Bratman continues in a footnote (:  
note ). It is obvious that Frankfurt would balk at a realistic, ‘Platonic’
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Bratman does not say here that there are no volitional necessities 
in Frankfurt’s sense. He just wants to put them in their place. 
He finds it plausible that they provide background constraints, 
but they do not settle how to live any more than does value 
judgment. They significantly underdetermine our answers to 
this question (: ). 
The point will be clear now. The Frankfurtian model ‘highlights 
determination by higher-order attitudes that have agential au-
thority, and the relation of these higher-order attitudes to judg-
ments about the good is not central (… But t)he Frankfurtian 
model seems to understate the role of value judgment in self-
governance’ (7a: 9). Bratman wants to avoid this distortion 
in his own theory of self-governance9: ‘We acknowledge the 
potential relevance, within a psychic economy that exhibits self-
governance, of judgments of the good. Neverthelesss, we also, in 
a broadly Frankfurtian spirit, reject the idea that the connection 
to these value judgments is at the heart of agential authority’ 
(7a: 9). As a consequence, Bratman’s proposal does not, like 
Frankfurt’s, primarily appeal to satisfaction (wholeheartedness). 
He does think, though, that his proposal needs to be supple-
mented by something like Frankfurt’s idea of wholeheartedness: 
reasonable stability. Frankfurt has a strong form of stability in
approach. And so does Bratman: ‘The Platonic theory overstates the ex-
tent to which we can expect intersubjectively accountable value judgment 
to determine the shape of a person’s life’ (7: 9). Frankfurt and Brat-
man stand for a psychological approach. 
9 Bratman leaves open the possibility that there are different modes 
of psychological functioning that can constitute self-governing agency. 
There is no uniqueness-claim, only a realisation-claim.
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mind, Bratman continues, ‘one that involves an incapacity of 
the will. In contrast, I seek a model of reasonable stability in 
self-governance that does not require (though it does not pre-
clude) such an incapacity of the will’ (7a: ). Let me now, 
very roughly, give a sketch of Bratman’s theory of self-gover-
nance.
Bratman takes self-governance as a distinctive kind of non-
homuncular psychological functioning. The use of ‘self ’ in talk 
of ‘self-governance’ is not a way of referring to a special enti-
ty, the ‘self ’, but rather a way of alluding to forms of unified 
psychological functioning (9b: ). Agents have a practi-
cal standpoint, which consists of attitudes that constitute their 
stance with respect to relevant practical issues, and, as Harry 
Frankfurt would say, speak for the agent. When that practical 
standpoint appropriately guides, the agent governs. Now, ac-
cording to Bratman, what can constitute an agent’s practical 
standpoint? 
One idea is to appeal to the agent’s judgments about value or 
reasons. Bratman, as we have just learned, is skeptical about such 
a Platonic idea, because it faces at least a trio of related chal-
lenges. First, sometimes such judgments do not seem to be part 
of the agent’s relevant standpoint. Huck Finn’s judgment that 
it would be best to return the runaway slave Jim is a famous 
example. Second, some practical commitments are part of the 
agent’s standpoint but are not themselves judgments about value 
or reasons. Think here of the sort of cases that have been high-
lighted by Harry Frankfurt. A parent’s love for his child may not 
be itself a judgment about reason or value, though it may ground 
judgments about reasons and, Bratman adds, be constrained by 
some such judgments. Third, sometimes we see our choice as 
underdetermined by our prior judgments of reasons and value. 
This can happen in ‘Buridan’ cases, in which one sees one’s con-
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flicting grounds as equal in weight or as incomparable. A classic 
example is Sartre’s case of the young man who must choose be-
tween the Free French and staying with his ill mother. Bratman’s 
conclusion is that we cannot characterise the agent’s standpoint 
simply by appealing to his judgments about value or reasons. We 
need to appeal to attitudes that need not be tied to value judg-
ment in ways that would reintroduce the trio of problems. But 
how? Bratman thinks that a basic step here is to embed those 
attitudes in a wider role of knitting together the agent’s practical 
thought and action both at a time and over time, thereby help-
ing to constitute the agent for whom the attitudes speak. Let me 
explain.
Central to our understanding of human agency is that it is 
quite frequently temporally extended. Human agents are not 
simple goal-directed agents. Actions take time. And in many 
cases an agent’s present activity involves his grasp of how it is 
embedded in what he has been doing earlier and what he is 
on his way to doing. Agents play out their activities over time. 
And their grasp of the larger temporal arc of their activities is 
an important element in their guidance of those activities both 
at that time and over time. Part of Bratman’s project is to un-
derstand how past, present and future thought and action are 
tied together in temporally extended agency. And his conjec-
ture is that a fundamental ground for the human capacities for 
temporally extended agency are human capacities for planning 
agency. 
Planning agency, as Bratman sees it, is a distinctive kind 
of goal-directed agency, one that involves attitudes of inten-
tion, many of which are future-directed. Intentions settle rel-
evant practical matters and are normally embedded in policies 
– where a policy is an intention that is appropriately general 
– and in hierarchically structured larger plans. Intentions are 
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plan-states.9 They are guided by the agent’s (at least, implicit) 
acceptance of distinctive norms. Central among these norms 
are norms of intention consistency and means-end coherence. 
The former enjoin consistency among one’s intentions given 
one’s beliefs; they are responsive to pressures of consistency of 
the many different things one intends with each other and with 
what one believes. The latter require that one’s structure of in-
tentions be filled in with specifications of means as one sees this 
to be necessary in the pursuit of intended ends (9b: 7). 
These are norms of synchronic planning agency. There is also 
a norm of rational stability of intentions and plans over time. 
Although intentions, policies and plans are subject to revision, 
they nevertheless have a characteristic stability at a time and 
over time.
Bratman reminds us of the fact that the idea of cross-temporal-
ly more or less stable, inter-woven and referentially interlocking 
attitudes is familiar from the Lockean tradition of reflection on 
personal identity over time. A central idea of that tradition is 
that identity over time essentially involves overlapping strands of 
continuities of attitude. The standard functioning in planning 
agency of attitudes of intending involves such cross-temporal 
Lockean ties, Bratman says.
So far so good. But why does it matter whether we conform to 
the norms of stability, consistency and coherence of intention? 
9 Bratman clearly distinguishes intentions from ordinary desires and 
beliefs. Ordinary desires are not subject to the same rational pressures 
for consistency. Desiring things that are not co-possible is all too hu-
man. And a belief that one will be doing something later – in contrast 
with an intention to do it – need not require that one settle on the 
means to doing it. 
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Bratman rejects the proposal that these norms are, at bottom, 
theoretical norms of stability, consistency and coherence of be-
lief. He thinks we should see these norms as norms of practical 
rationality. At bottom is the thought that it is a complex of prac-
tical roles of intentions that lies behind these norms. A general 
disposition to conform to these norms is part and parcel of being 
a coordinating and planning agent. Conformity to these norms 
will make it more likely that, for example, one will not trip over 
oneself and will achieve one’s ends. Yet, the best way to make 
sense of the normativity of intention stability, intention consis-
tency, and means-ends coherence of intention is to regard these 
norms as stemming from reasons of self-management.
So, let me return to self-governance. Bratman’s thought was 
that self-governance is embedded in the attitudes of knitting to-
gether the agent’s practical thought and action both at a time 
and over time, that is, by way of kinds of Lockean continuities 
and connections. The idea is that a fundamental way in which 
planning agents like us take a stand – a stand that is involved 
in temporally extended self-governance – is to go beyond vari-
ous conflicting desires and concerns and settle on coherent and 
consistent intentions, policies, and plans. If an agent intends E 
inconsistently or fails to intend believed necessary means to E, 
there is no clear answer to the question of where he stands with 
respect to E. Bratman stresses that tying practical thought and 
action together in Lockean ways need not be what the agent 
himself does. It is primarily in playing this broadly Lockean role 
in organising practical thought and action over time, that an 
attitude gets a prima facie claim to speak for the agent it thereby 
helps constitute, and so to be such that its guidance can consti-
tute that agent’s self-governance.
If this is Bratman’s picture of self-governance, it will be plausible 
that central among the attitudes that constitute the agent’s practi-
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cal standpoint will be policy-like commitments to give weight9 
to certain considerations. Such policy-like commitments may be 
associated with value judgment; they may invoke various forms 
of affect. But at their core they involve plan-states; and they are 
embedded within the agent’s planning system. Moreover, it will 
also be plausible that for planning agents like us, self-governance 
requires consistent and coherent coordination of relevant plan-
states at a time. The same goes for the norm of diachronic rational 
stability of intentions. Cross-temporal (defeasible) constancy of 
intention will be a normal aspect of self-governance over time. 
Bratman lists several forms of support for stability over time. First, 
acting on an intention normally changes the world and there can 
be a snowball effect because in acting on an intention one gets 
closer to its target. Second, reconsidering a prior intention takes 
time and uses various mental resources. It implies costs and risks. 
Given our limited mental resources, we prefer to depend on gen-
eral habits and strategies about when to reconsider. Third, one’s 
prior intentions rationally have a default status in later practical 
thinking. I think it is safe to suppose that attitudes playing the 
roles that are central to self-governance at a time normally induce 
associated attitudes over time. Synchronic self-governance is tied 
to self-governance over time in Lockean ways. 
I foreshadowed an improvement of Frankfurt’s position and I 
think we can now see how Bratman’s picture of self-governance is 
a refinement of Frankfurt’s approach. To be sure, there is partial 
agreement between Bratman’s theory and a Frankfurtian hierar-
chical theory on self-governance. Both stress the importance of 
the conative dimension. Self-governance is volitionally infused.
9 Bratman during a discussion in Leiden : ‘I have no theory on the 
idea that something has weight.’
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Bratman’s intention-based theory is a modest theory of the will. 
Moreover, his intention-based theory of self-governance does 
share with the Frankfurtian theory an appeal to conative hierar-
chy, although the fundamental higher-order attitude is intention 
(instead of volition) and refers to justifying considerations. Nev-
ertheless, it still may be that the relevant self-governing policies 
that speak for the agent are higher-order attitudes. New and, 
in my view, a change for the better is Bratman’s move in the 
direction of reasoning responsiveness. Bratman emphasises that 
higher-order attitudes are shaped in part by rational pressures 
and by that he takes a course different from the Frankfurtian.
I mentioned a second reason to discuss Bratman’s work: the 
importance Bratman attaches to a specific role of intentions, 
policies and plans. The point of departure for his discussion 
of identity and self-governance may remind us of Korsgaard’s. 
Both authors take it that identity as well as self-governance 
depend on the fact that human beings are practical and ratio-
nal beings. Bratman’s planning theory also contains elements 
of Schechtman’s broadly Lockean narrative self-constitution 
view. As Bratman presents it, some intention-type attitudes 
have it as a central role to support cross-temporal organisation 
of the agent’s practical thought and action and they do this by 
constituting and supporting Lockean ties, – ties that are partly 
constitutive of the agent’s identity over time (7a: ). In 
other words, those Lockean ties help constitute the metaphysi-
cal backbone of the temporally extended practical thought and 
action of one and the same person.9 And in Bratman’s view, 
9 This is a claim about the metaphysics of a strong form of agency 
(what is it in the world that constitutes this form of agency?), not about 
normative ideal of integrity or the like (not about ‘agency-at-its-best’, 
with a quote from Gideon Yaffe). 
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the authority of self-governing policies also stems primarily 
from their broadly Lockean role in the cross-temporal organi-
zation of practical thought and action. Intentions, plans and 
policies supporting Lockean ties earn the authority to speak 
for the agent.97 And, last but not least, drawing on his plan-
ning theory, Bratman teaches that self-governing intentions, 
plans and policies engage norms of consistency, coherence and 
stability with distinctive rational force. He distinguishes a spe-
cial subset of psychological elements that closely cohere and are 
constitutive of the person’s character and self-governance. To 
act autonomously, in his view (and I agree), is to act for coher-
ent psychological elements that are characteristic of the person 
in question.9
With the proposals of the previous sections on the table, I now 
can open up an approach to a narrative-based account of au-
tonomy.
3.6 The overall picture: a narrative-based account of 
personal autonomy
My entry point is: we have to analyse autonomy in terms of iden-
tification. Identification is fundamental to autonomous agency 
and ‘real’ personhood. So, clarification of identification (or its 
contrary, alienation) should serve our understanding of personal 
autonomy.
97 As Den Hartogh (: -) emphasised, it is unclear how Bratman 
differentiates between policies and plans on the one hand and Lockean 
ties on the other. 
9 One may describe Bratman’s planning psychology correctly as a kind 
of practical conservatism. 
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Identification may be interpreted in a neo-Kantian way as iden-
tification with reasons, which subsequently are binding for us. 
That is Christine M. Korsgaard’s project (99: - and ). It 
connects with my own view in that it takes reasons as essential for 
practical identity and the exercise of autonomy. But I reject the 
Kantian ‘noumenalism’ of reason that says: being a person is being 
determined by practical reason, which places every agent under 
the same, universal laws. Moreover, Korsgaard’s approach comes 
at a high price, which is that there is little room for affectivity and 
embodiment in it. One may therefore opt for Harry Frankfurt’s 
hierarchical view as a starting point. Frankfurt is thinking along 
neo-Humean lines and is making a reasonable case for whole-
hearted identification with ‘volitional necessities’ (things we care 
about and love).99 These identifications are not always a matter of 
what a person explicitly wants his will to be. Rather, they form the 
background context against which any such wants are formed. In 
general, identification is a not well-reasoned mental activity. So, 
Frankfurt’s approach also comes at a high price, which is that the 
role of reasoning responsiveness remains underexposed. Identi-
fication in a Frankfurtian fashion is essentially staying willfully 
connected to the world and establishing and maintaining some 
volitional environment and unity. Subliminal though it is, we all 
know that when something goes wrong in the psycho-biological 
realm of the volitions, this may severely affect the self-govern-
ing capacities of the agent in question. Nevertheless, even if it is 
granted that identification is, for a large part, a process garner-
ing its authority for self-determination from one’s nexus of cares,
99 Identification conceived as ‘caring’ looks somewhat familiar with the 
Humean ‘violent passions’ which are hardly influenced by reason, but 
rather by ‘calm passions’. 
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this does not imply that reasoning responsiveness and identifica-
tion with reasons are not important for personal autonomy. Or 
so I argue. Frankfurt denies: love gets down to the very essence 
of personal autonomy; and affect and reason have a derived, in-
strumental role to play. Frankfurt’s solution amounts to a kind 
of essentialism of the will and I do not want to follow him that 
far. Let us now turn to the account I advocate.
The volitional model alone cannot plausibly account for the 
notion of identification. It has to be broadened. This is also what 
Michael Bratman, another neo-Humean thinker, is observing 
and objecting. According to Bratman, a broadly Frankfurtian 
theory has to say (though Frankfurt does not) that talk of iden-
tification has two faces: it tracks psychological functioning, and 
it tracks judgments of value. What is authoritative in identifica-
tion and self-determination, apart from investments in volitional 
necessities, are the reasons people reflectively endorse. Bratman 
proposes an amendment of the Frankfurtian framework in giv-
ing a substantial role to understanding and reasoning. Apart 
from volitions and reasons, there is another important under-
theorised aspect of identification: the role of emotions. Admit-
tedly, it is true that emotion is included in what Bratman means 
by psychological functioning, but I think emotion has its own 
special character.
Self-governance comes with emotional coloration and salience. 
Persons experience their emotions as profoundly indicative of, 
and determining a good part of, the kind of person they are.
 D. Velleman (: 7-) proposes a possible definition of identifi-
cation conceived as empathy and an exercise in imagination (referring to 
Richard Wollheim’s ‘Imagination and identification’ in his 97 On Art 
and the Mind; and to the third chapter of his 9 The Thread of Life).
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The measure of emotional experiences has much to do with the 
extent to which persons identify with their emotions, that is, 
with the degree to which they ‘take things personally’. Human 
emotions typically are Janus-faced. On the one hand, they are in 
touch with the volitional, let us say with the more or less sleeping 
part of the person. Emotions are anything like the perceptions 
of the loving and caring state of the person. One can plausibly 
claim that there is an entailment relation from cares to emo-
tions. It seems very natural to suppose, for example, that car-
ing amounts to an emotional investment in the cared-for object. 
As a loving parent – one of Frankfurt’s favorite models – I am 
vulnerable to gains and losses (sorrow and joy) when my cared-
for child is affected by various events. Caring leads to having 
certain dispositions to feel. It seems constitutive to emotional 
dispositions and states that there ought to be some care revealed 
or reflected thereby. On the other hand, emotions are in touch 
with the wide-awake (evaluative) judgments of the person. Rea-
son is never dispassionate, but always in league with at least some 
of the person’s emotions. Here, emotions often can function as 
a browser for the (evaluative) judgments of the person; and the 
person’s rational abilities can control, resist, challenge, and coun-
ter his emotions.
So, I end up with a multifaceted conception of identification, 
and hence of personal autonomy: it covers conative, emotive as
 See Tappolet (). Christine Tappolet develops an account of au-
tonomy inspired by H. Frankfurt and D. Shoemaker (), according to 
which an action is autonomous, c.q. an action of the real agent, when it 
is determined by the agent’s most central cares, where cares are defined in 
terms of emotional dispositions. I agree that cares and emotions can be 
related, but I stick to the Frankfurtian notion of care (love) as a certain 
motivational structure.
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well as cognitive psychological functioning and avoids the par-
tialities of the views Frankfurt on the one hand and Korsgaard 
on the other put forward. And the account I propose is a hier-
archical one: I take reflexive consciousness as a requirement for 
identification and autonomy. What is needed is an appropriate 
psychological structure: a hierarchy of attitudes about attitudes. 
Candidate psychological attitudes for the role of supporting the 
agent’s autonomy involve a higher-order concern. The focus is 
on the ability to step back from one’s first-order psychological 
attitudes and assess them in some way. The model of hierarchy 
here is the one given by self-management. And self-management 
is self-reflexive in the sense that it is directed to one’s own psy-
chology (beliefs, emotions, carings). 
Ultimately, I do not want to make too much heavy weather 
of this notion of hierarchy. E.g., I do not want to take hierar-
chy as a case in which certain mental states of a certain kind 
are applied to mental states of the same sort. Consider a self-
commitment example in which an agent anticipates that in the 
future he might fall for temptation and act contrary to what 
he now judges best. The agent might take steps now in order 
to avoid falling for temptation at future times. There is a dis-
crepancy of course between the current intentions and the fore-
seen future ones. However, there is no point here in having a 
second-order intention about a first-order one. One could rath-
er speak here of a hierarchy in which higher-level attitudes are 
constituted by large and complex networks of lower-level ones. 
Nor is there any need to leave the ground level. One might have 
thought there is an ascending ladder here. But the ladder is lying 
 The target of self-management is not a ‘deeper’ self. Self-management 
does not give us any deeper access to the self.
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on the ground, horizontally. It takes us nowhere. What is needed 
and what I mean by hierarchy is some distance, some openness, 
some latitude, the possibility to step back from one’s own mental 
states and to identify or reject. An autonomous person wants to 
escape being merely in the grip of his mental states. He wants to 
be able to reflect on why he treats a particular consideration as 
a reason and to endorse or reject this reason. He does not want 
to be ‘hijacked’ by rigid emotion; he wants to assess or reject 
his emotions. The same goes for willful mental states like inten-
tions, motivations and carings. Sometimes identification will
 Although I put into perspective the multitier account of autonomy, I 
do not side with Agnieszka Jaworska and Richard Moran who want to get 
rid of hierarchy. I think their projects founder.
Agnieszka Jaworska (, 9) defends a non-hierarchical view on 
minimal autonomy. She summarises: ‘Altogether, our minimal case of 
autonomous decision making comprises the following core elements. 
First, the agent cares about a particular object P; this ensures that the 
attitude that guides the decision making is internal—and thus ensures 
that it is the self to whom the government can be attributable. Second, 
the agent acts in light of seeing reason to pursue what he cares about; this 
introduces the element of governance itself. And, third, the selection of 
this reason for action takes place against the backdrop of the possibility 
of first-order reflection. This ensures that the agent is not merely in the 
grip of treating caring-based considerations as reasons. At no point in 
this picture does the need arise to appeal to evaluative judgments or to a 
hierarchy of attitudes about attitudes.’ (9: 9-9). This is not to deny 
that it would be better for agents to improve beyond the minimal level 
of autonomy, she adds. In earlier work Jaworska defined autonomy as 
the capacity to value and established that ‘(a) value would almost always 
involve a second-order volition – insofar as a person considers a way of
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take place in a very conscious, emphatic, and articulated way; 
sometimes it will take place more unconsciously, en passant, and 
dispositionally. 
So far, all this may not sound like a narrative account of self-
governance. But it is. We only have to take my approach one step 
further. I think my account of self-governance comes very close
to Michael Bratman’s planning theory, as, for my part, such a 
planning theory can be interpreted as a narrative theory. The 
following elaboration of Bratman’s analysis of human agency 
should bring this out.
According to Michael Bratman, any reasonably complete the-
ory of human action will need to advert to three core features:
[continuation of note 1] acting correct, she would want her desire to act 
in this way to effectively move her to action’ (999: , note ). 
Richard Moran (, ) advances a ‘transparency view’. Follow-
ing Moran, identification is not a process by which some psychic raw 
material is elevated into a higher status and inducted into a true self, as 
Frankfurt-style accounts would have it. He locates identification at the 
level of ordinary, first-order and transparent deliberation. His basic idea is 
that mental states and attitudes are genuinely our own, rather than mere 
occurrences in our psyche, if we take an active stance toward them: in 
the sense that they are responsive to our sense of the reasons in support 
of them.
It is a little hard for me to see how ‘reason selection’ (Jaworska) or 
‘transparent deliberation’ (Moran) can take place without stepping back 
and creating some order.
 This is not to say that it is always easy to distance oneself from one’s 
attitudes. In the case of carings, for example, it seems, to put it in a Frank-
furtian tone, that we often cannot but be identified with what we care 
about.
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to reflectiveness, planfulness and a conception of our agency as 
temporally extended (7a: -). The three come hand in 
hand. Let me start with the third one. Agents do not simply act 
from moment to moment. They are not dealing with a kaleido-
scopic flux of unrelated events. That would be like tearing out 
one page of a book and trying to fathom the words without any 
knowledge of the other pages. Such agents would give rise to 
the biblical comment that ‘they do not know what they are do-
ing’. The common view is that one and the same agent begins, 
develops and completes cross-temporally organised actions. Our 
agency is temporally extended. Human agency is diachronic 
agency. It transcends the present moment. People do not acci-
dentally act from moment to moment. They do not make their 
decisions on the spot each and every time they face a choice. 
They conceive of themselves as agents who persist over time and 
they commit themselves to future directed plans, which they in-
tend should structure and coordinate their actual decisions and 
activities. Human agency is constituted through mental time 
traveling. People exercise their capacity for mental time travel 
whenever they plan a holiday, or when they take up a study, 
or when they commit themselves to parenting. It includes the 
capacity to adopt plans which extend over time. That is to say, 
people remember what happened last time and use that informa-
tion to create and inhabit a future scenario. They imagine what 
would happen in the future based on their past experiences. In 
committing themselves they find reasons for themselves they will 
then buy into, they emotionally engage with their future and 
they care for their own future experiences. We can understand 
this truth with a broadly Lockean approach, Bratman states. 
The problem of where an agent stands at a time can be tackled 
by appealing to Lockean overlapping strands of psychological 
ties (memories, desires, intentions and the like) of the agent over 
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time. In my account of extended agency this capacity for mental 
time travel is narrative in structure. The agent’s choices are made 
in the context of an autobiographical narrative. Autobiographi-
cal narratives forge a network of cognitive, emotive and conative 
connections – Lockean overlapping strands of psychological ties, 
in Bratman’s words – that support the agent’s identity and cohe-
sion over time and keep the agent on track.
Bratman highlights the central role of intentions, policies and 
plans in human agency. That is the second core feature. Plans 
of action play basic coordinating, organising roles at a time and 
over time. They provide agents with a ‘background framework’ 
and are subject to distinctive rational pressures of consistency, 
coherence and stability (7a: ). Plans have certain stabil-
ity. They are steadying the mind (Bernard Williams’ phrase). 
There is, in normal cases, rational pressure not to reconsider or 
abandon a prior plan without a reason. Plans are also subject to 
rational demands of consistency and means-end coherence. Poli-
cies, for their part, are intentions that are appropriately general 
in their content. They support treating, over time, like cases in 
like ways, and doing this as a matter of policy. Plans and poli-
cies help constitute and support cross-temporal organisation of 
our temporally extended agency. Again, this is very close to a 
narrative self-constituting view and a narrative-based view on 
agency. Agents have intentions, and there is an intimate rela-
tion between their intentions and who they are. By fusing to-
gether their intentions into policies and plans and finally into 
a reasonable biographical narrative or ‘lifeplan’ agents become 
persons. To be sure, persons do not always act on a complete 
life plan or on a complete biographical narrative. Most of the 
time they act on sub-plans or sub-plots. But all reasons, plans, or 
stories are hermeneutically disciplined. In the end, making sense 
of someone’s present actions requires a narrative understanding 
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of a whole personal life(plan). There is another related worry 
over Bratman’s planning theory that a narrative account can put 
to rest. I think Bratman’s planning theory somewhat overem-
phasises the future-directedness of Lockean (casu quo narrative) 
ties and pays little attention to the past. I can imagine persons, 
especially older ones, who are no longer intending and planning 
much, and are mainly living well pleased ‘in the past’, enjoying 
the memories of their good old days. Let me now turn to Brat-
man’s last related core feature of agency: reflectiveness. 
Humans have the capacity not merely to be moved by desires 
and inclinations. They have the capacity to arrive at assessments 
of these desires and inclinations and to take them as reasons for 
action. Bratman calls this capacity to have pro and con attitudes 
concerning desires the capacity for ‘weak reflectiveness’. It goes 
beyond what is strictly necessary for purposive agency. Purpo-
siveness is a feature humans share with many other non-human 
agents – cats and dogs, perhaps – who are not even capable of 
weak reflectiveness. But there is also the capacity for ‘strong re-
flectiveness’. Bratman calls the capacity to take a stand as an 
agent – that is, to determine where I stand with respect to a given 
desire – the capacity for strong reflectiveness, leading to strong 
agency and full-blooded action, that is, autonomous agency. My 
proposal is to conceive of autonomous agency as identification 
with (parts of) one’s self-constituting narrative including rea-
sons, emotions, and carings. To act as an autonomous person is 
to identify with reasons, some of them more backward looking 
(e.g. self-knowledge, knowledge of the past), some others more 
forward looking (intentions, plans, policies). Taken together we 
can conceive of all those reasons as parts of one overall biograph-
ical narrative. Part of that narrative we do reflectively endorse. 
Yet, there is a lot that remains under the radar of reason. An-
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other part of the narrative is the result of willful identification 
with things we cannot but love or care about. Here I stick to the 
Frankfurtian idea that we identify with ‘volitional necessities’, 
that is, that apart from what we reflectively endorse we also are 
deeply invested in things we love. Personal autonomy in some re-
spects seems to be something like acceptance of what I really am. 
It is like a cheque that I can put my name on, a taking possession 
of. There is a third and underestimated realm of identification: 
the twilight zone of emotions that bridges the realms of willful 
and reflective identifications. 
I think we now have under discussion all the desiderata for a 
narrative based theory of personal autonomy. Bratman’s plan-
ning theory turns out to go perfectly together with my Schecht-
manian narrative theory of personhood. I end up with a Lock-
ean narrative theory of personhood strengthened with a picture 
of narrative based self-governance: personal autonomy can be 
conceived of as identification with (parts of) a person’s self-con-
stituting narrative. 
The section is nearing its end. Just to avert possible misunder-
standings and to prepare for the challenge of the next chapter, 
let me make three final clarificatory remarks on narrative based 
personal autonomy. The first is about coherence. What we can 
learn from the view I posited is that the autonomy of an action is 
increased by an action’s springing from an attitude that coheres 
with certain other attitudes of the person’s psychic economy. 
Persons normally try to avoid an incoherent psychological com-
plex. They have more coherent, central features and less coher-
ent, peripheral ones; and the more coherent features are the more 
constant, better defensible and more comfortably owned ones.
 On a given occasion, a mental state on the periphery can be motiva-
tionally stronger. Yet, motivational strength is not what determines if an
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The more an attitude is central, the more it will determine what 
the agent autonomously wants, thinks or feels. Bratman takes 
coherence as norms of practical rationality that apply to inten-
tions (intention consistency, means-end coherence of intentions, 
rational stability of intentions over time). I am completely on his 
side. Note that these norms of rationality have to be ‘wide-scope’ 
norms on sets of attitudes. They are norms that enjoin or reject 
certain combinations of attitudes. Autonomy is also grounded 
in (non-modifiable) volitional necessities, and in the ‘feel’ that 
this is where you now stand; that this is what is important for 
you and what feels settled and stable. A coherent system of self-
management needs to cover the whole mental imbroglio of the 
person.
Here is my second remark. Persons can only become autono-
mous persons in relation to others. Nevertheless, an autono-
mous person can only identify with a biographical narrative 
from a first-personal perspective, that is, on his own. Consider 
this example. Suppose I am convinced that I am the last living 
Romanov and that only I know who I really am. Appearances 
are against me, and Schechtman would call it a case of dimin-
ished personhood. And she may be right: in day-to-day living it 
will be difficult for me to cash my claim that I am a Romanov. 
But, this does not prevent me from being an autonomous 
person. I can identify myself seriously and wholeheartedly 
with my self-narrative as a Romanov. Others may be scepti-
cal, but they have to respect my autonomy and to treat me as 
a Belgian philosopher who is sincerely convinced that he is a 
Romanov. 
My last remark is about the distal binding powers of identi-
fication. I consider a person to be autonomous as long as he is 
action is autonomous. It is the one that is strongest in the sense of being 
most central to the agent’s psychology. 
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capable, or will be capable at some point in the future, to re-
new or to revoke his identification as a particular person. As a 
consequence, we have to consider patients suffering from severe 
Alzheimer’s disease as borderline cases; they sadly lost their ca-
pacity to exercise autonomy, and the loss is – to the best of our 
knowledge – irrecoverable. 
3.7 Final conclusions
Let me now return to the bottom line of the theoretical part 
of my dissertation and draw the final conclusions. At stake was 
a theory of persons in terms of agency. Korsgaard promisingly 
proposed to bind up self-constitution with reflective agency and 
practical reasoning. Nonetheless, in chapter one I also criticised 
her reason view and argued for a less principled and more in-
strumental role for reasons that constitute personhood. Neither 
did I buy lock, stock, and barrel Korsgaard’s ideal of the uni-
fied person. I suggested that coherence may do better as a stan-
dard for self-narratives than unification. My alternative to the
 
 Luca Ferrero takes this account to extremes. According to Ferrero 
(), autonomous decisions and commitments have no distal executive 
or binding power, causal or rational alike, on the agent’s future conduct. 
On the highly counter-intuitive Sartrean account Ferrero is defending, 
commitments determine the conduct of the agent only if renewed at the 
time of action based on the intrinsic merits of the case. The agent must 
take the original decision ex nihilo at the time of action. Following Fer-
rero’s theory, the agent’s past resolutions do not control her future con-
duct, except by their being renewed at the time of action. I disagree. Luca 
Ferrero is pushing autonomy too far. 
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reason view was a narrative view on persons. In chapter two 
I presented a candidate for such a theory: Schechtman’s narrative
self-constitution view. Echoing Locke, Schechtman grounds 
her narrative account of persons on ‘sameness of conscious-
ness’. She adds to the Lockean view that persons cannot emerge 
without being intelligible to themselves. Self-interpretation or 
self-understanding is required. This is made possible by nar-
ratio. Self-narratives are accounts of human action organised in 
time. Personhood is best achievable in and through narrative 
self-interpretation. Yet, self-constituting narratives have to meet 
several conditions, for example, internal coherence and being in 
step with the facts of the world and the interpretations of others. 
To be sure, Schechtman is thinking here of ordinary ongoing 
human lives. Ordinary persons are constituted by lived and told 
narratives, but not necessarily by worked-up narratives. Schecht-
man offers us a narrative theory of ‘baseline personhood’, of 
the familiar sense of personhood that people find germane in 
everyday life. 
We have seen that, although Schechtman’s self-constitution 
view is a very attractive and defensible version of the narrative 
approach on offer, it under-describes the embodiment of self-
narratives. I paid particular attention to the problems narrativ-
ist theorists of personhood run into, if they restrict ‘sameness 
of consciousness’ to storytelling. Narrative self-understanding, 
thus conceived, does not capture the whole person. Fortu-
nately, this is not the picture Schechtman has in mind. Being 
the same sentient or conscious being implies more than being 
an interpreting and verbalising creature. Schechtman stresses 
that sameness of consciousness also implies emotional and felt 
sameness. Sameness of consciousness, self-narrative and emo-
tion are closely interwoven, without yet invoking any theory 
of consciousness; that is also what we can learn from Antonio 
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Damasio’s neuroscientific research. Damasio’s empirical work 
demonstrates that autobiographical narratives are intertwined 
with emotion and feeling. Damasio’s work also shows that self-
constituting narratives have a bodily, neuro-physiological basis. 
They build, inter alia, on the presence of a core-self. Discuss-
ing self-consciousness and selfhood, Antonio Damasio distin-
guishes between an experiential core-self and an extended nar-
rative self. He makes clear that extended narrative personhood 
presupposes experiential ‘selfhood’, that is, that it presupposes 
the pre-reflective ‘self-givenness’ of our experiences. By contrast, 
the self as a subject of experiences does not presuppose nar-
rative personhood. Such a core-self is not an abstraction. It is 
confirmed by empirical science and it can be observed in ‘pure 
form’ in pathological cases. Damasio gives the example of an 
Alzheimer patient: his life-story is scattered, but the patient still 
enjoys first-personal access to his own experiences. Patients suf-
fering from severe Alzheimer’s disease and neonates are ‘core-
selves’; they do not join the Persons Club (and maybe adult an-
thropoid apes are initial persons then, if they have rudimental 
meta-minds and are capable to connect present, past and fu-
ture experiences). This is of course a departure from the Kör-
pervergessenheit of the original Lockean psychological view on 
personhood. It clears the ground for a more adequate ‘mixed’ 
psycho-biological view. It is a mistake, or so it seems to me, to 
sort psychology and biology in theories of persons and to dis-
cuss personhood only after having left the human body outside 
the front door. Human persons are co-constituted by human 
organisms. Body and mind are mixed up, as neuroscience in-
eluctably demonstrates. 
There is another, more inconvenient sense in which Schecht-
man’s narrativist theory of personhood was incomplete: reflec-
tive agency has not been given its philosophical due. There is 
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more to human personhood than baseline personhood. Persons 
want their actions on their side. They want to rule their actions 
and they want to be the ones, the persons, who are in charge. 
They want to be autonomous. Schechtman’s theory, other than 
Korsgaard’s, cannot explain what makes persons autonomous. 
So, her narrative self-constitution view needs a harder look and 
has to be enlarged on this point. This is the solution I pro-
pose: a person acts in a self-governing manner and is acting as a 
governing self, if he encompasses his autobiographical narrative, 
i.e., if he identifies with (parts of) his self-narrative. Identifica-
tion is fundamental to autonomous agency and selfhood. In my 
view, human self-consciousness is characterised by a hierarchy 
of attitudes about attitudes. This is not second-order magic. 
By hierarchy I mean that there is mental room for assessment 
and endorsement (or rejection) of a self-constituting narrative. 
Human beings are able to take a stance on their own attitudes. 
This can take place in different ways. Ongoing self-narratives 
incorporate strands of reasons, memories, intentions, emotions, 
carings and the like. These ‘Lockean ties’, to put the point in 
Bratman’s terms, resist hard and fast distinctions. Yet, we can 
discriminate between at least three aspects of identification. 
Identification partly is an act of reflective endorsement of reasons 
for action; this was Korsgaard’s line of approach. As we have 
learned from Harry Frankfurt, identification in part is also an 
act of acceptance of carings. Frankfurt has a keen interest in the 
conative side of autonomy and the limits of reasoned deliberate 
action. Autonomous persons are both: rider and horse. Often a 
rider, if he is not to be parted from his horse, is obliged to guide 
it where it wants to go. Finally, identification is also partially 
an act of emotional approval. Emotions function as relevance-
prompts. There is no general intellectual strategy for relevance 
search. We may notice a lot of what is relevant in our self-nar-
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rative by its ‘feel’. And we may approve of that feel. Autonomy 
has to do with felt intensity, with experiencing oneself (more) 
intensely.7
That we humans can live as autonomous, temporally extended 
agents – navigating through present, past and future – is made 
possible in part by narrative structure. Autobiographical narra-
tives play a coordinating and organising role in the diachronic 
practical thought and action of agents like us. Such ‘life-plans’ 
help constitute and support the organisation of our temporally 
extended agency that we value highly. A further point to stress 
here is that the autonomy of an agent is increased by an action’s 
springing from an attitude that coheres with certain other at-
titudes of the person’s psychic economy. In Schechtman’s narra-
tive self-constitution view internal coherence (intelligibility) and 
‘external’ coherence (with the facts of the world and the inter-
pretations of others) was already crucial for successful self-con-
stituting narratives. Yet, not only the person’s ongoing self-narra-
tion has to be relatively coherent. Also the ongoing autonomous 
endorsement of it has to be relatively stable and reflecting the 
person’s central, coherent values. Michael Bratman emphasises 
this point, and I agree. Self-governing narrative-based agency 
involves norms of practical rationality: pressures of consistency, 
of means-end coherence, and of reasonable stability over time.
7 As the following quote from William James teaches us: ‘I have often 
thought that the best way to define a man’s character would be to seek out 
the particular mental or moral attitude in which, when it came upon him, 
he felt (italics P.D.) himself most deeply and intensely active and alive. At 
such moments there is a voice inside which speaks and says: “This is the 
real me!”’, in H. James (ed.) (9). The Letters of William James. Vol. 1, 
Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 99. 
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Again, coherence turns out to be an important standard for be-
coming an autonomous person. Self-governing persons normally 
try to go beyond an incoherent stew of intentions, emotions and 
considerations. In the case of incoherent intentions, policies and 
plans, or in cases of an incoherent self-narrative (that is, plans 
writ large) the person does no longer know where he stands and 
how to govern his life as a person.
Now, one could ask: Why make a choice for the norms of prac-
tical rationality listed above? How can we justify these norms? 
Where do they take their normative authority from? I think my 
account of personal autonomy, like Bratman’s, basically is a pru-
dent one. The relevant reason for the coherence constraint seems 
to be our reason to govern our own lives. Coherence contributes 
to the effectiveness of our agency and to the richness of our (so-
cial) lives. We are more likely to pursue our ends and not trip 
over ourselves.
It is true that, as agents, we do not only wish to govern our-
selves autonomously, we also want to govern ourselves rightly 
(‘orthonomously’). We want to lead prudent lives, or beautiful 
lives, or meaningful lives, or moral lives. And we want to be hap-
py, beautiful, or moral persons. How autonomy and orthonomy 
can both be realised is a longer story and I will not labor all these 
complications here. In the picture of personal autonomy I offer, 
the person’s choices and own values are central and exclude noth-
ing. The person’s autobiographical narrative and his endorse-
ment of it are what count. The person is autonomous as long as 
he is competent to endorse or reject his own choices and values. 
And when it comes to the crunch, the person has to exercise 
his autonomy alone. Autonomy always carries the imprimatur 
 
 Vide Michael Bratman 9a: 7-9. 
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of a first-personal signature. The powers of autonomy cannot be 
exercised by other people. There can only be encouragement and 
the creation of opportunities by others.
From the outset it has been clear that my aim in this disserta-
tion was not to provide a final theory on personhood, if we could 
have one. My hope was to overcome persistent controversies in 
psychiatry between biological and hermeneutic psychiatrists. In 
my view, the two actually are partners, not rivals. And my main 
goal was to find common ground by focusing on the relevant 
unit of analysis in psychopathology, persons, and developing a 
philosophically convincing theory on personhood and personal 
autonomy in terms of agency. In my estimation, my slightly re-
formed and enlarged version of Schechtman’s narrative self-con-
stitution view is such a theory. To demonstrate its significance 
for psychiatry will be the task of the last chapter.
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4: THE FRAGILITY OF PERSONHOOD
At .
When sanity visits
For one hour and twelve minutes I am in my right mind.
When it has passed I shall be gone again, 
A fragmented puppet, a grotesque fool.
Now I am here I can see myself
but when I am charmed by vile delusions of happiness,
the foul magic of this engine of sorcery,
I cannot touch my essential self.
Why do you believe me then and not now?
S. Kane (), . Psychosis, London: Methuen, 7 
4.1 Introduction
This chapter will engage my accounts of personhood and au-
tonomy with specific practical issues. It finds its pretext in the 
increasing demand for advance directives in mental health care. 
Currently, the use of pre-commitment directives in psychiatry is 
the subject of political and public debate. Pre-commitment di-
rectives or Ulysses contracts enable psychiatric patients who be-
come episodically disordered (e.g. in cases of bipolar disorder or 
repeated schizophrenic psychosis) to anticipate future decisions 
concerning their treatment. Ulysses contracts allow patients 
to write down that and how they want to be admitted and/or 
treated, even under coercion, in foreseeable situations of crisis 
when they paradoxically ‘are not themselves’. Apart from the 
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evident need for Ulysses contracts for psychiatric patients, such 
directives raise many fundamental philosophical questions.9 
One problem is that Ulysses contracts presuppose some criteria 
to determine when persons are ‘themselves’ in a decisive way. 
They need a theory of persons to explain how in cases of radical 
changes a person can be designated on non-arbitrary grounds as 
the ‘real’ one that is best equipped to make long-term decisions 
on the person’s behalf. A theory of persons that is capable of 
distinguishing between full and less full personhood can make 
clear why a less full person, i.e., someone described as ‘not being 
himself ’, is bound by a directive that has been signed earlier by 
the full person. Another difficult issue that must be addressed 
here is how to understand (respect for) autonomy in making 
use of Ulysses contracts. Completing such a contract, we need a 
moral justification for overriding the actual will of an – in many 
respects – still relatively competent person on the strength of 
an earlier will. In what follows, I will argue that my narrative 
approach can clarify the identity problems of episodically dis-
ordered psychiatric patients. And that it offers an improvement 
on our understanding of autonomy. In the opening sections of 
this chapter, I will make some general remarks on psychosis and 
the idea of pre-commitment. Subsequently, I want to discuss the 
narrative ‘someone else problem’ and turn to the questions of 
diachronic autonomy. Finally, I will contrast the use of Ulysses 
contracts with the use of advance directives in cases of severe 
dementia and make clear that, again, a narrative approach has a 
lot to go for it. Nevertheless, the dementia case will also prove to 
be a borderline case. 
9 My concern here is not with legal, therapeutic, policy, and implemen-
tation problems.
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4.2 Recurrent psychosis
Psychosis is a classificatory and descriptive term, referring to 
a specific range of illnesses and symptoms, the illnesses be-
ing those in which the patient’s basic competence as a person 
is called in question, the symptoms being those which seem to 
indicate some gross disorder of perception and thought (such 
as hallucinations and delusions). The International Classifica-
tion of Diseases 1955, published by the World Health Organization, 
lists eight specific psychoses. Four of these, the so-called organic 
psychoses (senile, pre-senile, arteriosclerotic, and alcoholic), are 
generally agreed to be the result of degenerative changes in the 
brain. They excite relatively little interest. The other four, the 
so-called functional psychoses (schizophrenia, manic-depres-
sive psychosis, involutional melancholia, and paranoia) arouse 
considerable controversy within the psychiatric profession and 
great interest with the general public. This is partly because their 
symptoms are dramatic and partly because research has (as yet) 
failed to discover convincing causes for them. Let me give an 
example of functional, recurrent psychosis.
Alexandra is  years old, married and mother of two young 
children. She is running a successful family business. Three 
years ago she was admitted to a Dutch psychiatric hospital with 
so-called in bewaring stelling (place into care). At that time, her 
psychiatric past was blank. In the meantime, Alexandra has al-
ready had a third maniform psychosis. Doctors think she may 
be suffering from bipolar disease. But they also consider the 
 I borrow this information from Charles Rycroft in G. Underwood 
(ed.) (). Oxford Guide to the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
77-.
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possibility of schizo-affective problems. The first psychosis en-
tered her life more or less unnoticed. Alexandra was moving 
house at the time and regulating hundreds of practical things. 
She slept less and sometimes acted in strange ways. For example, 
she suddenly called her nephew at the other side of the country 
and bluntly asked him: ‘I know our aunt Ada still must have an 
old Authorised Version of the Bible. Can you pick it up for me, 
please?’ Or she unexpectedly invited an old girlfriend: ‘Please 
come to visit me, I need you.’ It was as if the whole world turned 
around her and only her. Family members and friends often talk-
ed to Alexandra and tried ‘to keep her in reality’. At the end her 
husband felt suspicious of his wife and called the family doctor 
who diagnosed a psychosis. Then, the situation got out of hand. 
Alexandra became more and more perseverant, confused, anx-
ious and paranoid. Sometimes she covered herself with a blanket 
in order to avert her fears. She began to see pictures. Finally, the 
police and a crisis team appeared and put her in irons after a long 
pursuit and a short battle. Alexandra was hospitalised and treated 
under coercion for three weeks. Later, she did not remember the 
arrest. According to her, she was out of this world for six or seven 
days. Back home, Alexandra became depressed after a few weeks 
despite all her medication. During months she got up reluctantly 
in the morning and was glad to go to bed in the evening after 
another gloomy day. But she had to go on for her family and for 
business reasons. Then, her mother died and Alexandra collapsed 
for the second time. This time, the psychosis was less severe. 
Two years later, Alexandra’s depression seemed conquered and 
she asked her psychiatrist to reduce her medication. The doctor 
agreed. The thought was that the depression would never return. 
But, half a year later, Alexandra showed more and more activi-
ties. She began to buy all kinds of gadgets. She reorganised the 
whole house (next to her full-time job). She slept shorter. And 
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she embraced everything. She was cheerful, sometimes euphoric, 
and more and more fanatic. She composed a series of remarkable 
letters, for example, for various newspapers. In those letters she 
revealed inimitable connections between various facts. For her it 
was totally coherent. She anticipated the answers of the newspa-
pers and wrote several rejoinders in advance. Her husband is wor-
ried, calls the doctor and makes an appointment. Unfortunately, 
Alexandra refuses to take the prescribed drugs at home. That 
night, she becomes more and more inaccessible and chaotic. She 
starts to clear out her study and works all night long. The next 
morning she throws the complete content of the shower cubicle 
out of the skylight. That day, Alexandra is admitted for the sec-
ond time under coercion. Back home later, she reports that she 
can remember what happened. It was as if she took a train and 
started riding. People told her to get out, but she did not want to. 
Later, the voices disappeared and the train gained speed. There 
was no fear. On the contrary, it was a fantastic and tempting 
experience. The train ‘shot through the universe’. Alexandra can 
remember how she was shackled and brought to the police of-
fice in a police car. That she was waiting in a police cell for the 
required documents, and how an ambulance brought her to ‘her’ 
hospital. There she got a drug injection and slept for  hours. 
When awake, she recognised the institution and some of the lo-
cal habits. She was contented and did not resist. This time the 
whole experience was free of anxiety and the quick intervention 
considerably reduced the disruption and the period of recovery.
 I adopted this case history from T. van Willigenburg (ed.) (). 
Zelfbinding in de psychiatrie. Een empirische, wijsgerige en juridische studie 
naar zelfbindingsverklaringen in de geestelijke gezondheidszorg, Den Haag/
Rotterdam: NWO/Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, .
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Although this is only one example, it can be helpful to under-
stand two main characteristics of psychosis that Wiel Kusters, 
a ‘hands-on’ expert reflecting upon psychotic experience, of-
fers us. Kusters diagnoses that to be psychotic is like wide-
eyed dreaming, without the protection of sleep. Unlike normal 
dreamers the psychotic sometimes collides with ‘the evidence to 
the contrary’. But just like in normal dreams the psychotic lives 
with a totally idiosyncratic calendar and compass, that, besides, 
are the subject of permanent re-adjustments. The partitions be-
tween past, present and future disappear in a psychosis. The past 
gives no longer hold. Past, present and future seem to be files 
that can be opened and adapted at one’s own discretion. The 
psychotic becomes totally absorbed in an intensified ‘now’. He is 
trapped in a stagnant present. 
A second characteristic of psychosis, according to Kusters, is 
loss of personhood. If we take our normal experience of time as 
a steady river that carries along the person, the psychotic experi-
ence of time, in contrast, is like a whirlpool and the person is 
drawn into that vortex. The psychotic is losing track and dis-
appearing as a person. He is unable to rise above earlier and 
later moments in time in order to make reasonable decisions that 
merge all past, present, and future ‘I’s’ into an integrated person, 
and that take a prudent turning for these different ‘I’s’. The 
 Kusters W. (). Pure waanzin. Een zoektocht naar de psychotische er-
varing, Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Nieuwezijds, esp. chapter . It is common 
knowledge that ordinary mortals are separated from psychosis merely by 
a thin partitioning wall (some sleepless nights or an appropriate drug).
 Apart from the ecstatic absorption in the here now and the loss of per-
sonhood Kusters mentions a third characteristic of psychosis in his book: 
language and thinking become headstrong. The psychotic de-symbolises
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capacities for thinking and deliberating are still in place during 
a manic or schizophrenic psychosis. And, in a way, the psychotic 
reasons for action are coherent. The point of it is: the psychotic 
reasons do not mesh with the reasons, intentions and plans be-
fore and after the psychotic intermezzo. They seem to be a mat-
ter of distortion or self-deception. Although the status praesens 
of the psychotic may look minimally reasonable and competent, 
after his psychosis the actor often (but not always) considers the 
psychotic ‘alter’ as a different, less stable, and impoverished per-
son. In any case, this is the way the psychotic person often (but 
not always) evaluates his earlier actions. 
Kusters’ characteristics of psychotic behavior plainly mesh 
with the way Schechtman may ‘derive’ pathologies from her nar-
rative self-constitution view. Schechtman says that to have an 
autobiographical narrative in the relevant sense is to have an un-
derstanding of one’s history as unfolding according to the logic 
of the story of a person’s life. Such a life story is missing in the 
psychosis case. The person loses track and disappears. Moreover, 
what the psychotic is telling us nine times out of ten will be 
incoherent. And if it comes to expressions that are internally co-
herent, they will be out of sync with the facts of the world or oth-
erwise with the interpretations of other people or the interpreta-
tions of his earlier self. As Schechtman remarks, intelligibility
and dissolves conventional symbolic representations. Symbols do not lon-
ger refer to, but begin to behave like objects that seek to enter into coali-
tions and battles with other objects.
 A patient who is psychotic  hours a day and 7 days a week is rather 
exceptional. In most cases, some significant other person is capable of get-
ting through to the ‘real’ reasons of the person now and then. But these 
moments break off very quickly.
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(internal coherence) and correspondence with the facts of the 
(social) world are ineluctable standards for successful, normal 
self-constitution. Let us now turn to the idea of self-binding and 
the so-called Ulysses contract.
4.3 Ulysses contracts
The idea of self-binding or precommitment is very old. It is a 
self-limiting act for the purpose of achieving a better outcome, 
as assessed by the agent’s preferences at the time of action, than 
what would have occurred had he retained his full freedom of 
action. Until the th century the idea of self-binding rarely re-
ceived systematic attention. It became prominent in the work 
of Jon Elster (Ulysses and the Sirens, 979 and Ulysses Unbound, 
). Let me therefore introduce the theme with his exposition 
of some rationales and techniques of the concept. 
This is Elster’s definition: ‘When precommitting himself, a 
person acts at one point in time in order to ensure that at some 
later time he will perform an act that he could but would not have 
performed without that prior act. As I define it, precommitment 
requires an observable action, not merely a mental resolution. 
Moreover, the action must be one that creates a change in the 
external world that can be undone only (if at all) with some cost 
or effort’ (: 7). And here is a historical example he gives: 
Charles de Gaulle wanted to quit smoking and announced his 
intention to his friends so that his amour-propre would keep him 
 See Jon Elster (). Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come To 
It: Some Ambiguities and Complexities of Precommitment, University of 
Texas Law Review , 7-.
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from backsliding (7). Different techniques are available: add-
ing costs, throwing away options, and delaying consequences. 
What is common to many cases of precommitment is that the 
individual can entrust his will at moment x to external forces, 
outside his control at moment y, that literally make it impos-
sible for him to change his mind at moment y. Here are two 
other real-life illustrations: i. In a cocaine addiction center for 
physicians in Denver, physicians with a drug habit can write a 
self-incriminatory letter to be mailed to the licensing authorities 
in case they test positive for the drug (77). ii. If I begin saving 
for Christmas but find myself taking money out of my savings 
account, I can force myself to save money by joining a so called 
Christmas Club, which will be deaf to any demands for with-
drawal of the funds before December  (79). So, I may gain 
a strategic advantage from creating an irreversible fait accompli, 
from burning my bridges, so to speak.
Elster distinguishes three categories of motivations for pre-
committing oneself: interest, passion, and reason. By interest 
he means the pursuit of advantage (money, power, status, or 
honor). Passion includes inter alia emotion, sexual desire, pain, 
craving for drugs, and madness. By reason he means any impar-
tial attitude motivated by concern for the common good or for
 Ulysses contracts are an example of so called external commitment. 
What makes external commitment external is that it is independent of 
the decision of the agent at the time of action. The salient explanation as 
to why Ulysses does not give in to the temptation of the Sirens is the fact 
that he is tied to the mast. Forms of internal commitment, on the contrary, 
imply that the agent decides to pursue a course of action and subsequently 
acts as intended, where the earlier decision plays a determining role in the 
justification of the later action. 
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individual rights and duties (7). For my purposes, I will focus 
on passion. In binding oneself ‘[t]here are two future-directed 
intentions: a Time prediction of the state in which he will find 
himself at Time, and a Time preference for what he should do 
at Time. If at Time he can perform an action that will ensure 
that he will do B and if the cost of performing that action is 
less than the value difference between A and B (as assessed at 
Time), he has an incentive to precommit himself. If he is ratio-
nal, he will’ (7).
The traditional view is that an act of precommitment is an act 
undertaken in a ‘cool’ moment of tranquility and calmness to 
prevent the agent from harming himself (or others) on future 
occasions, when he might be in a more turbulent ‘hot’ state. To 
put it metaphorically: precommitments are chains imposed by 
the agent when sober on the agent when drunk. This is also what 
Ulysses, the standard bearer of precommitment, did in order to 
enjoy the songs of the luring Sirens. Standard cases of precom-
mitment involve interest-based or reason-based precommitments 
against passion, in this case being enchanted by the Sirens’ music. 
In passing, Elster also warns his readers that, because of its rigid-
ity, precommitment may create problems as serious as those that 
it is supposed to solve. In practice, for example, we may not be 
able to draw the line between temptations and legitimate excep-
tions. Let us now turn to precommitment in medical practice.
Self-binding is a strategy considered to be widely used in med-
icine and health care. The following four uses of precommit-
ment are more or less accepted: the standard advance directive, 
the dementia case, the mental health directive (i.e. the Ulysses 
contract) and the surrogacy case. Standard advance directives, 
advance directives in cases of dementia and Ulysses contracts are 
instructional directives. They give instructions for what sorts of 
medical interventions to provide or withhold from the patient 
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while incompetent (resulting from a coma, severe dementia or 
mental disease). Surrogacy cases use proxy directives that desig-
nate a surrogate decision maker to stand in for the patient if he is 
incompetent. Since surrogates need a basis for making the deci-
sion that the patient would have preferred, surrogates can benefit 
from a clear instructional directive. I will now concentrate on 
the third application: the mental health directive. 
Ulysses contracts in psychiatry aim to ensure treatment in cas-
es of pathology which are characterised by alternating periods of 
good mental health and severe disorder. Ulysses contracts enable 
mentally well persons to commit themselves now to a particular 
course of treatment at a future time, if they suspect they will not 
be willing or able to follow that course of treatment at that future 
time. The terms of Ulysses contracts state that if certain symp-
toms of a relapse appear, the psychiatrist is to invoke the Ulysses 
contract, regardless of whether the patient consents to commit-
ment at that time, and before the patient meets the threshold 
of whatever legal criteria are in place in her country, e.g. in the 
Netherlands danger to self or others. Note that the intervention 
can be coercive and that, at that very moment, the patient is still 
legally competent to refuse civil commitment (unless the patient 
poses a threat to herself or others, in the Netherlands she is le-
gally competent to refuse treatment). As I said earlier, there are 
difficult issues here, so let me try to take some clarifying steps. 
As a first move I want to discuss the ‘someone else problem’. 
It is sometimes argued that in cases of radical changes – like 
psychosis – the person in question is becoming someone else.7 
7 A much-discussed example of the someone else problem is Derek 
Parfit’s character of the nineteenth century Russian nobleman, a lo-
cus classicus in the literature on self-binding: ‘In several years, a young
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Do we have to uphold that Alexandra becomes another person 
when her illness resurfaces?
4.4 Psychosis and the someone else problem
The someone else problem touches upon the distinction between 
narrative identity and numerical identity. Turning to the ques-
tion of numerical identity is calling for a criterion of numeri-
cal identity across time, that is, for a criterion of what makes 
something one and the same thing as itself at different times. 
[continuation of note 117] Russian will inherit vast estates. Because he has 
socialist ideals, he intends, now, to give the land to the peasants. But he 
knows that in time his ideals may fade. To guard against this possibility, 
he does two things. He first signs a legal document, which will automati-
cally give away the land, and which can be revoked only with his wife’s 
consent. He then says to his wife, “Promise me that, if I ever change my 
mind, and ask you to revoke this document, you will not consent.” He 
adds, “I regard my ideals as essential to me. If I lose these ideals, I want 
you to think that I cease to exist. I want you to regard your husband then, 
not as me, the man who asks you for this promise, but only as his cor-
rupted later self. Promise me that you would not do what he asks.”’ (Parfit 
9: 7). Parfit portrays the Russian as telling his wife that his younger 
self is his real self, and that if he loses his ideals she should regard him as 
effectively dead. Though a tantalizing case, it is fraught with problems 
and caused a lot of confusion in bio-ethical discussions. For now, let me 
remark that the case is significantly different from Ulysses or the psy-
chotic: the young Russian does not anticipate that he is going to become 
irrational or non compos mentis. For illuminating discussions of the Rus-
sian nobleman case, see Korsgaard 9:  et seq. and Laden 9.
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Turning to the numerical identity question is turning to meta-
physics (‘what is a person essentially?’), or to what Schechtman 
coined the reidentification question. My aim is not to discuss 
this ontological puzzle here, but to make a detour. It may be that 
narrative identity presupposes numerical identity, but my focus 
here is on practical, narrative identity: do episodically psychotic 
persons experience their psychotic characteristics and actions as 
attributable to one and the same person, to wit themselves, or to 
someone else? To answer this question let me sketch out some of 
the results of  interviews with patients, proxies, and psychia-
trists for a recent Dutch research program into the advisability 
of Ulysses contracts in mental health care. All the respondents 
have been questioned about their understanding of severe de-
regulation and personhood. Let us begin with the moments of 
florid psychosis. 
The research results make clear that a severely deregulated pa-
tient hardly can be called a person – in the sense of the narrativ-
ist theory of personhood I am defending – during an interval of 
manic or schizophrenic psychosis. The psychotic loses the re-
flexive temporal grasp on his life story. Psychosis often seems to 
be an experience of mere sequence, as in dreams or in moments 
of high fever, that is destroying the internal narrative coherence. 
Furthermore, the external coherence – i.e. the connection with 
reality – is also under pressure. The patient lives ‘in his own 
film’. The schizophrenic patient is very convinced that she is 
Maria Magdalena; and the manic patient imagines himself to be
 See T. van Willigenburg (ed.), S. Gevers, I. Varekamp & P. Delaere 
(). Zelfbinding in de psychiatrie. Een empirische, wijsgerige en juridi-
sche studie naar zelfbindingsverklaringen in de geestelijke gezondheidszorg, 
Den Haag/Rotterdam: NWO/Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam.
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the immensely rich president of a multinational. All the signs 
are that severe psychosis is a borderline case of personhood. Full-
fledged narrative self-constitution is no longer practicable then. 
In severe cases of psychosis the patient temporarily is a ‘no-more-
person’; the narrative ‘cage’ collapses, internal and external co-
herence disappear, and the person falls to pieces. In less severe 
cases psychosis remains a disruptive process that sometimes al-
ters the earlier person dramatically and diminishes the capacities 
to live the life of a person.
Now, how do patients cope with their psychoses in healthy 
episodes of life, when their temporal grasp on the narrative 
is restored? In the interviews of the Dutch research program 
three possible reactions to recurrent psychosis become appar-
ent: i. Some patients describe psychosis as a brain disease, i.e., 
a useless individual natural disaster that has to be overcome. ii. 
Patients, and especially psychiatrists sometimes picture psycho-
sis as a cognitive problem that has to be identified to restore 
the rational faculties as soon as possible. iii. Finally, psychosis 
is often perceived as a moment of purification and a step on 
the way to better self-understanding. For some patients psycho-
sis, besides being a disorder, also mounts a challenge to cope 
with that disorder. In all cases (perhaps it would be unfair to 
press this relation too hard for the first group), episodic mad-
ness becomes part of the self-constituting narrative. Patients by 
and large fit their experiences of madness into their narratives. 
Sometimes psychotic crisis is described as a ‘biographical cor-
rection’ (e.g. of being too well-adapted) or as a ‘struggle to find 
a guideline’. Some patients stand up for the meaningfulness of 
the psychotic experience that can turn into a reassessment of 
a person’s values and objectives in life. In fact, psychoses typi-
cally break out when a person is trying to take his life in his 
own hands, and very often interfere with life events like leaving 
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home, divorce, pregnancy, or the loss of a beloved. Psychosis 
then seems to be an ultimate attempt to process and integrate 
‘strange’ experiences that throw one’s narrative out of gear, and 
to keep the life story together; or, as one patient put it aptly, ‘to 
translate oneself with more coherence’. 
A further issue, and the one that occupies me here, is how 
patients and their psychiatrists interpret the psychological dis-
continuities and dramatic changes of the person. Do they see 
the patient in moments of psychosis as another person, that is, 
as a human being with a different identity? Seventeen inter-
viewed Dutch psychiatrists come to judgments like the follow-
ing: ‘Of course he is himself. What comes to the surface dur-
ing his psychosis is a part of himself. My concept of a person 
is a layered one. At the bottom there is a primitive, archaic, 
unconscious part. On top of this dark morass there is a cen-
tral control room that is structuring, steering and regulating. 
During a psychosis, the bottom layer comes up, because the 
protecting upper layer temporarily is eroded. A part of the per-
son is taking over and performing impulsive actions, without 
a sense of reality or something that functions as a brake. Such 
a person is going astray. He is not somebody else. He is giv-
ing the crazy part full scope. But he is still the same person.’ 
Psychiatrists are likely to describe psychosis as a loss of rational 
capacities and a relapse into primitive stadia of functioning. In 
their view, talk of someone else in cases of psychosis is going 
too far. The psychotic is the same person, but the person in a 
different way. This may sound sensible to us, but is it also the 
way patients see it? 
Here is how a patient describes herself in manic times: ‘When 
I’m deregulated, I look like a difficult child. I cannot sleep any-
more and I become coercive and annoying like a child that is 
overtired. I also have the innocence of a child: I am not aware 
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of the consequences of my actions. I am living very fast with-
out being considerate of others. It is getting on my nerves when 
they do not have my speed. I am working on big projects and I 
am enjoying it. Life is very intense in periods of madness. In a 
short space of time I am coping with lots of past experiences. I 
am re-experiencing past emotions. It reminds me of the stories 
of people who have had a near-death experience. These people 
tell us they overlooked their whole lives in one single moment. 
During my first manic phases, I was behaving like a pre-school 
child. In later episodes, it felt like a child of twelve years old. My 
madness has a processing function. It is a way of dealing with 
past experiences. Without madness I would become an icicle. 
Therefore, they have to keep hands off my madness and not to 
sweep it under the carpet as a symptom of something inconve-
nient. Am I myself, when I am mad? Yes, I’m simply myself. The 
child is part of me.’ What this answer and many others suggest 
is that patients, just like psychiatrists, do not attribute practical 
significance to the notion of a radically other person or a totally 
different identity in cases of psychosis. The stories they tell about 
the psychotic patient for the most part are stories of personal 
survival and continuation.
Patients, however, clearly do not always want to identify 
with their psychotic experiences. Consider another example of 
mania, about which the patient during a lucid period reports: 
‘When I’m manic, I’m going beyond myself. I’m doing hun-
dreds of things at once. They are spinning through my head. 
That is a quite chaotic experience. I’m constantly prompted to 
do something, as if I have to act out a story or so. Later on, 
when I’m discharged from the hospital and back home, most 
of the things that happened are forgotten. I can only remem-
ber fragments. My boyfriend then recalls how I behaved and 
talked. Sometimes it’s hard for me to believe him. Disorder is 
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something coming over me. It’s just embarrassing for me and 
my friend, and it does not have any function or significance at 
all. Absolutely not! At that very moment I’m just like a fallen 
cupboard with the drawers and the contents all over the floor.’ 
For this person psychosis for the most part has the character 
of a series of mental and physical happenings in her history, 
rather than a series of her own experiences and actions. Psy-
chosis seems to be an anomaly that has to be excluded. The 
personal change is experienced as alienating and the person is 
reluctant to endorse that element of her biographical narrative. 
She cuts it and denies it ‘personal character’. But other patients 
are doing the reverse. They identify wholeheartedly with ele-
ments of their psychotic experiences. As the last but one ex-
ample revealed, psychosis can be a way of coming to grips with 
earlier experiences (as a kind of dream work). It may even hap-
pen that psychosis for the main part is experienced as positive. 
Psychosis can be experienced as an attractive exceptional state 
of inner agility; one is more sensitive, porous, fulfilled, and cre-
ative then. Psychosis can even be made artistically productive. 
In such cases it seems counterintuitive to deny a psychotic epi-
sode ‘personal character’.
Let me proceed on the assumption that this handful of opin-
ions of psychiatrists and patients on recurrent psychosis and 
personhood are somewhat representative, and allow me to draw 
two important lessons from these cases. One is that the vexed 
claim that during a psychosis the mentally well person is gone, 
flies in the face of our common personal interactions. No one 
is dying and no new person is born during a serious psychosis. 
At least, this is how the environment experiences it. And sig-
nificantly, it is also how the patient suffering from recurrent 
psychosis experiences it. There seem to be no practical reasons 
for supposing a number of different persons in cases of recur-
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rent psychosis.9 The psychotic is still the same person, but 
the person in a different way. He is not literally someone else. 
Alexandra suffering from bipolar disease may find the prospect 
of disruptive psychosis ego-dystonic. But she believes and feels 
that she will in fact be that psychotic individual: ‘Whoever that 
deranged woman would be, after all, it would be me.’ Possibly 
it will prompt her to take measures. And this leads me to the 
second and related lesson to be drawn from the Dutch research 
results: persons suffering from recurrent psychosis seem able to 
bridge the narrative gap between their non-psychotic and psy-
chotic selves. Let us consider this in more detail.
During Alexandra’s psychotic surges, narrative identity clearly 
is disrupted. Psychosis usually means a massive infringement on 
the synchronic and diachronic coherence of the self-constituting 
narrative. This is a matter of degree. In extreme cases, when the 
illness resurfaces, Alexandra will no longer be capable of nar-
rative self-constitution. She will have no story at all then. Less
9 Recent findings in philosophical psychopathology seem to confirm 
that practical approaches to the question of personal identity clarify mat-
ters considerably. The concept of personal identity is central to the sub-
ject matter of psychopathology. Psychiatrists are puzzled by questions like 
‘what constitutes a person?’, ‘what does it take for a person to persist from 
one time to another?’ and ‘how does mental illness impact on identity?’. 
A lot has been written on disorders that pose problems for personal iden-
tity, especially on schizophrenia, Alzheimer’s disease, gender identity dis-
order and DID/multiple personality disorder. The outstanding  Ox-
ford Textbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry has a whole chapter on personal 
identity. The authors of this textbook advocate a Lockean ‘self-tracking 
capacity view’ (7-7). Becoming a person is a matter of know-how, of 
skills, i.e., of having the proper capacities.
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severe cases are different. During mild psychotic surges Alexan-
dra’s reasons, emotions, and carings may change. The psychotic 
Alexandra may seem to be more or less psychologically removed 
from her narrative-carrying past. Being in a manic state, she 
may identify with different, a-typical narrative elements. Nar-
ratively speaking, she may look like a different person. But in 
lucid periods, Alexandra will think of psychosis as an integral 
part of her life, though one she has outgrown most of the time. 
In other words, Alexandra’s moments of psychosis will have au-
tobiographical significance. She might try to look for a way to 
integrate those seemingly contradictory moments of her life into 
her life as a whole. How so?
Well, this is how persons usually deal with disunity. Persons 
have a temporally extended nature. They always have to balance 
different sets of (potentially conflicting) past and future com-
mitments, projects or plans ‘with an eye on the whole person’, 
turning them from a collection of disparate commitments, proj-
ects and plans into a kind of personal life and a coherent person. 
To be sure, the nature of the integrity produced can be rather 
loose. It is not acting in light of a grounding metaphysical fact 
of integrity, but an attempt to fashion integrity out of seemingly 
disparate elements. All that is needed is a person whose parts are, 
as it were, on speaking terms; in other words, whose parts are 
coherent. Coherence, as described in the sections ., . and ., 
is the practical norm of rationality at work here. So, we have to 
conceive the unity of the person as a practical achievement. It re-
quires ongoing work. Life is full of centrifugal pressure. Persons 
(and especially psychiatric patients) have to deal with disruptive, 
‘heteronomous’ (to echo Paul Ricoeur) experiences. And, in a 
very natural way, they strive for a practical guide forwards, for 
a picture to hold on to, to hold themselves together, to make of 
their various parts something whole, some one thing: ‘me’. 
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It is such a practical conception that will tell Alexandra what 
sorts of arrangements and compromises are consistent with her 
integrity, and thus will help her guide her choices. The various 
parts of her person can have their say, as it were, in Alexandra’s 
deliberations what to do. Maybe, at the moments when psycho-
sis tempts her, Alexandra’s sense of wholeness is precisely what 
she is lacking: why should she act in line with a standard whose 
ground does not have a firm hold on her? Or maybe psychosis is 
being single-minded in her pursuit of one of her aims and fail-
ing to take heed of other current aims. These could be reasons 
for Alexandra to banish the psychotic intruder from the life of 
her healthy person. But she may also identify with (parts of) her 
psychotic variant. She may also value the psychotic person stage 
as a way to restore the balance and the unity. Here we have to be 
careful not to identify automatically disorder with fractured life 
and scattered personhood. Which leads us, I think, to the hard 
problem for a narrative account of the use of Ulysses contracts: 
the problem of authority. Different stories are brought into play. 
The mentally well person has a story to tell. The prepsychotic 
also has a story to tell. The psychotic has a story to tell (except 
in the case of extreme surges). Why is one story better than the 
other? What is it that lends the better story its authority? On 
what grounds, to put it roughly, can we defend that a person’s 
self-narrative at T has authority over the person’s self-narrative 
at T? I will expand on this critical point in the next section of 
this chapter.
The upshot of the present section is twofold. We have learned, 
firstly, that the diverging experiences of psychotic episodes, how-
ever dissociated, by hook or by crook immediately and inevitably 
take part in the overall narrative self-constituting process of the 
person suffering from recurrent psychosis. And, secondly, that 
there is no practical reason for presupposing a practical, narra-
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tive ‘someone else problem’ in cases of episodically disordered 
persons suffering from recurrent psychosis. 
4.5 Taking coherence seriously
To clear up the problem of the authority of self-narratives in the 
event of recurrent psychosis, we have to return to the subject of 
diachronic autonomy. Ulysses contracts are often justified and 
recommended as instruments of self-control, that is, as a method 
to get control over one’s whole life, especially in moments of cri-
sis when one has lost one’s grip of the situation. In other words, 
as a way of enjoying autonomy ‘at a distance’ or as a way of 
‘extending’ autonomy. How to make sense of such a notion of 
‘remote’ autonomy? 
I think the case can be treated on the same lines as the re-
nowned case made by Ronald Dworkin in his Life’s Dominion 
for people suffering from dementia (I will indicate the differ-
ences with dementia later in this chapter). Here are the elements 
of his argument. Dworkin begins with the assumption that the 
competent person and the disordered person are one and the 
same person, that is, the same single object of inquiry. If only 
one person is involved, we have to decide what is in his overall 
best interests when he has different and competing interests at 
different stages of his life. The questions that have to be resolved 
are questions of intra-personal balance. They have to be resolved 
 I do not consider competence as a legal concept here, but as a norma-
tive concept. To be competent is to have sufficient mental capacities for 
a given task, i.c. for the exercise of autonomy. Competence is a matter of 
degree. And to credit a person with competence is a normative decision. 
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within the life of that single person. Only one person’s autono-
my and overall best interests are at stake. Dworkin further dis-
tinguishes between two kinds of interests people have – critical 
interests and experiential interests: ‘People’s experiential inter-
ests are their interests in enjoying or avoiding certain kinds of 
experience: their interests in having pleasure, for example, and 
avoiding pain. Their critical interests are their interests in hav-
ing a life that is a good one judged as a whole. Of course experi-
ences that occur in a person’s life after he has become seriously 
demented are not experienced by that person in a competent 
state. But it does not follow, and it is opposed to most people’s 
own judgment, that what happens to someone after he has be-
come demented cannot affect his critical interests’ (Dworkin 
in Burley: 7-). In Dworkin’s view, a person’s critical inter-
ests survive serious and permanent dementia or, as in our case 
at hand, recurrent severe psychosis. Alexandra does ‘live with’ 
impending psychosis; in some way or another psychosis affects 
what kind of life she will have had, that is, psychosis affects her 
critical interests. These critical interests, Dworkin claims, are 
the same at her different life stages. When Alexandra dreads 
living on in severe psychosis, she may dread that a stage of her 
life that she lives through will soil that life. And she may take 
this as a reason for trying to guard against it. Now, according to 
Dworkin, how do we best respect the person’s autonomy over-
all? Autonomy ultimately serves what Dworkin calls the ‘integ-
rity-value’ of a person. And Dworkin proposes to give powerful 
weight to an exercise of what he calls precedent autonomy, i.e., 
the future-oriented or prospective autonomy exercised by a per-
son when most competent to exercise it. Alexandra in a mentally 
well and competent state can decide what set of policies does 
best to protect her person’s autonomy overall. She can lay down 
this set of policies in a Ulysses contract. People might have other 
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good reasons for treating the psychotic Alexandra as she actu-
ally wishes, rather than as she once asked in her Ulysses con-
tract. But that would violate rather than respect her (precedent) 
autonomy, in Dworkin’s view.
I think the Dworkinian concept of precedent autonomy easily 
connects with the narrative view on personhood and identifi-
cation I set out earlier. A competent person is a self-narrator 
and (where circumstances permit) self-shaper who cares about 
continuing as such. Such a person wants to consciously, deliber-
ately shape his own personality and life direction. He prefers an 
inner story whose overall character and direction matter to him. 
He prefers to have and live such a story and he wholeheartedly 
identifies with it. He identifies with the things that really mat-
ter to him, in other words, with what is true to his self-concep-
tion (with his ‘critical interests’ or ‘integrity-value’ in Dworkin’s 
terms). Now, one could argue that, during a psychotic surge, 
the competence of the person is diminished and identification 
then results from influences that the person in question, on care-
ful reflection in competent times, would consider alienating. 
During a psychosis the person is not in the position to identify 
with his ‘integrity-value’, so to speak. Therefore, his precedent 
autonomous identification is weightier than the actual enjoyment
 Similar work is recently done by David DeGrazia in Human Identity 
and Bioethics, who is also taking his lead from Marya Schechtman’s work 
on narrative self-constitution. Other theorists who appeal to narrative in 
discussing advance directives are Howard Brody, Mark G. Kuczewski, 
Ben A. Rich, and Jeffrey Blustein. 
 Notice that, in this picture, identification is clearly evaluatively load-
ed. Critical interests are referring to some standards. In Dworkin’s analy-
sis, critical interests are interests in having ‘a good life’.
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of autonomy in his psychotic state. But how so? In finer focus, 
on what specific grounds can we decide that the (pre)psychotic 
story does not speak for the person in question, and the non-
psychotic story clearly does so? How to pick out the authorised 
spokesman more precisely? 
One could think of privileging stable and long-lasting decisions 
as more authoritative. Or one could think of privileging the deci-
sion that exhibits the greatest degree of rationality (this is what, 
e.g., M. Quante has in mind in : 7-9). My own proposal 
is to lend authority to identification with one’s self-narrative. So, 
the question now becomes: Why does identification in one case 
outclass identification in another? In the previous chapters I have 
argued that coherence turns out to be the standard of becoming 
an autonomous person in two ways. In chapter two, I defended 
that basic to be a person is to exercise narrative capacities for 
self-interpretation that brings about the integration of the per-
son over time. And that the constraints Schechtman proposed 
for successful narrative self-constitution are clearly apropos: in-
ternal coherence and coherence with the facts of the world and 
the interpretations of other people. In the third chapter, I used 
this notion of narrative identity as building block for my discus-
sion of autonomy. To be an autonomous person is to identify 
with one’s self-narrative: ‘This is the person I want to be and the 
person-life I want to lead.’ And I advocated that the autonomy 
of an agent is increased, again, by an action’s springing from an 
attitude that coheres with certain other attitudes of the person’s 
psychic economy. Not only the person’s ongoing self-narration 
has to be relatively coherent, but also the ongoing autonomous 
identification with it has to be relatively stable and reflecting 
the person’s central, coherent values and interests. So, coherence 
turns out to be the key. To see how this may work, let us consider 
again Alexandra suffering from bipolar disorder.
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Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that Alexandra suf-
fering from bipolar disorder  is issuing a Ulysses contract in 
order to prevent harm. The contract is intended to ensure that 
the once fully competent Alexandra retains her autonomy and 
right to consent to medical treatment in the event of becoming 
less competent to consent. Why respect her precedent autonomy 
in this case? The question is especially urgent while many people 
in a (pre)psychotic episode have sufficient mental capacity for a 
relatively competent refusal at the moment of intervention with 
coercive measures. That is also how the Dutch law system formu-
lates it. The law takes her departure from the idea that a person 
is competent as long as there is no serious danger for herself or 
others. So, what is in need of justification here is that we submit 
a legally sufficiently competent person to coercive measures in 
the name of her earlier competent decision. In many western ju-
risdictions, this looks like enslavement of a later self by an earlier 
self. There is no legal basis for imposing coercive measures on a 
person one is contracted with, if that person is legally competent 
and refuses. In such a case, she has simply changed her mind. 
Her wish to prevent serious harm has disappeared; it is gone and 
there is nothing left to discuss. Under Dutch law, a competent 
 Patients suffering from bipolar disease go through cycles of splintering 
mania and subsequent, inevitable flameout. Their minds first pelt out of 
bounds and then out of commission. Kay Redfield Jamison’s essay ‘This 
life, this death’ offers a penetrating description of the (dangers of the) 
manic-depressive condition (: -9). 
 Let me recall that two types of advance directives are common in 
medical practice: instructional directives and proxy directives. My main 
focus will be on written instructional directives planning advance treat-
ment for mental illness. 
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person is free to refuse the deal and walk away without coercion. 
It is precisely the ability to entertain second thoughts and to 
change direction that is deeply bound up with what makes a 
person an autonomous human being. So, an extra justification 
for imposing coercive measures is indicated here. Framing the 
problem in terms of autonomy one could say: there is a conflict 
arising within Alexandra’s autonomy. She wants to direct her 
own life autonomously and in her psychotic state refuses com-
pulsory treatment. But she had an earlier autonomous wish being 
‘truer’ or more deeply held that also commands respect. What 
must we take as Alexandra’s most authoritative will? During her 
psychosis, her rational and deliberative faculties possibly will 
be knocked out of action. This is of course a serious condition. 
But psychoses do not always lead to cacophonic disorder. Maybe 
some capacities for reasoning and identification will remain in 
place during her psychosis; maybe her psychotic reasons for ac-
tion will sound pretty coherent. Nevertheless, while executing 
a Ulysses contract, Alexandra knows that these reasons do not 
mesh with her plans, intentions and reasons before and after her 
psychotic state. She considers them as a matter of distortion or 
self-deceit. The psychotic Alexandra may think of herself as very 
reasonable and competent, but looking back when the psychotic 
episode is over she may evaluate her psychotic ‘predecessor’ as 
a cloudy person. In healthy times she knows that she cannot 
(completely) trust her psychotic reasons and that she may cause 
serious harm to herself and others in doing it nonetheless. She 
may say: ‘Well, of course, this manic person, that’s me. But it’s 
not fully me. I don’t want to be like that. I do not identify with 
that part of me. Please, protect me then from what I want.’ So, 
it seems very understandable that Alexandra in good times will 
look for some means in order to prevent such damage in mad 
times. That is, in order to control a little her reasons, utterances 
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and behavior and to preserve some unity in her person-life.
It is beyond serious question that self-narratives can be mis-
construed and pathological. Problems may arise in the same 
capacities that give people narrative competency. A self-narrative 
can be impoverished because it is fragmented or because it is too 
focused (i.e., a monomaniac and rigid narrative). It can become 
a flamboyant delusional narrative (e.g. a person who deeply be-
lieves that his entire mental life is controlled by the Intelligence 
Service). Pathological cases face us with the difficult task to find 
some threshold-value for self-narratives in order to determine 
where a self-narrative becomes defective. This is a big topic, so 
I can only try to sketch in a rough way how I think that story 
should go in case of bipolar disorder. In general, I would say that 
at the heart of narrative based autonomy are, as Bratman remarks, 
the person’s intentions, policies, and plans, all of them con-
strained by rational norms of consistency, means-end coherence
 This does not imply that a patient composing a Ulysses contract al-
ways urges that the wholeness or the unity of his person is his reason 
for self-commitment. Ulysses contracts (and personal autonomy) do not 
require mental gymnastics. 
 To the best of my knowledge, there is no natural, principled boundary 
between normal and abnormal conditions of suffering. It is not possible 
to disentangle the enmeshed relation between natural, social and person-
al facts that constitute mental health and psychopathologies. The point 
of greatest consensus on what can be called pathology is a harm-based ap-
proach. Patients putting themselves in harm are driven to the psychiatrist 
by the poor outcome of their condition and their inability to (socially) 
function as wished. For a thought-provoking discussion on psychiatric 
disorder see Derek Bolton (), What is Mental Disorder? An Essay in 
Philosophy, Science, and Values, New York: Oxford University Press.
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and reasonable stability in time. The case of bipolar disorder 
may illustrate the point.
To my mind mania and depression both are threatening the 
coherence of Alexandra’s self-narrative. As a depressed person 
Alexandra may lose her interest in many things that normally 
make life worth living for her. Depression diminishes the pull 
of the various concerns that give shape and color to her life. It 
is gradually losing herself: Why bother about having an occu-
pation? Why bother about the birthday of her children? Why 
bother about being a mother? Why dressing herself up neatly in 
the morning? Why go on? Such a growing disinterestedness may 
destroy her connectedness to the various self-conceptions under 
which she values herself. It may lead to inconsistent beliefs, emo-
tions and expressions of will. And it may lead to a very unsteady 
curriculum vitae. Alexandra being in a state of mania is a bit of 
the reverse. Now, she experiences an increase in the sharpness 
and focus of attention. Her general level of mental energy grows 
spectacularly. And she may engage in lots of new projects, some 
of them mutually inconsistent. This may lead to the same kind 
of alienation as depression does. New projects and grand ideas 
are adopted, new concerns fill her life and she seems to lead her 
life in the highest gear. But she becomes alienated from the con-
cerns and self-conceptions that are constitutive of the person she 
is. She may disvalue her old concerns as parochial, petty and 
trifle. Like in a depression she will experience a further loss of 
connection to the concerns and practical identities that are con-
stitutive of being Alexandra. And she will lead a life robbed of 
stability.
Note that, in my narrativist view, it is the first-person perspec-
tive that is authoritative for narrative self-constitution and au-
tonomy. Alexandra’s self-narrative has to be an inner story. As 
narrative identities involve self-conceptions and autonomy is self-
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legislation, the privileging of the first-person standpoint is the 
only reasonable option.7 Other people do not have as much 
authority in determining someone’s narrative identity as the pro-
tagonist herself does. Others can employ qualifications such as: 
this person is someone who deeply believes that his thoughts 
are controlled by the Intelligence Service. Nonetheless, others do 
have some assisting role to play. What role?
While living in a state of mania or depression, Alexandra’s self-
interpretation becomes largely unrealistic. She turns into a se-
verely deluded person and part of her condition is that she does 
not realise it. This is of course defective personhood, which can 
be corrected by what other people know about the world and 
about Alexandra. I stressed earlier that self-constituting narra-
tives by definition are co-constituted and kept in check by our 
fellow creatures. To some extent a self-narrative is a joint con-
struction. Personhood is socially embedded and can only survive 
in the broader community that supplies much of the content 
of self-narratives; in the ‘space of persons’ so to speak. Becom-
ing a person is impossible without bringing a social and cultural 
background into play, a network of personal relationships (rec-
ognition and critique) within a shared living environment. So, 
while knowing that in a state of mania or depression she will 
not be capable of correcting her self-narrative on her own, Al-
exandra has an option to organise it ‘with a little help from her 
friends’ and, in our case at hand, to consider a Ulysses contract 
7 Agreement with DeGrazia here (). Narrativist Mark G. Kuczewski 
argues that persons are objectively part of a larger group. Therefore, if the 
group survives, so does that person – or at least his or her interests (99: 
). I reject this view. Personhood requires the first-person perspective of 
a subject.
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that authorises other parties to interfere in her future actions. 
Alexandra has particular interests, values, cares and the like that 
confer her individuality and that matter to her. And expectations 
are that these interests, values, and cares are coherent and do 
confer and matter to her for her whole life, or at least for a longer 
episode. Alexandra prefers to live a truthful life, which is to live 
in the real world and not to be locked up in her own delusion. 
Other people can keep her in reality, taking their departure from 
the values, cares, interests and the like that shape Alexandra’s 
life as a whole. Talking to her doctor and her proxies Alexandra 
may conclude that, e.g., wearing long earrings and staying up all 
night are decisive indications for ‘passing the threshold’ and for 
coercive intervention, in order to stop the disintegration. And 
she may decide to admit it to her Ulysses contract.
My job here is not to provide a theory for all cases of pathology 
and pre-commitment. My aim was more to say something about 
the direction we need to take. In order to balance whichever of 
two personal stories – a psychotic and a non-psychotic one – 
has to prevail, coherence is of deciding importance. The person’s 
most coherent intentions, policies and plans – to use Bratman’s 
words – are decisive. At what moment the threshold of incoher-
ence precisely is reached is partly a matter of particularity, but 
the most coherent story is the authoritative one. In the case of 
florid psychosis, the psychotic story will lack internal coherence. 
And in the case of less severe psychosis the internal coherence of 
the story will be seriously flawed. In both cases, important parts 
of the non-psychotic story will disappear from sight in the psy-
chotic story, whereas the non-psychotic narrative is keen on the 
integration of the psychotic story into the self-constituting nar-
rative. Of great importance, moreover, is also that the psychotic 
story lacks external coherence. Up to a point it does not mesh 
with the stories of others and with the real world we all live in. 
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One last observation, before concluding. In medical practice 
Ulysses contracts are a very reasoned instrument. The condi-
tions for completing Ulysses contracts are very strict. The au-
thor has to be diagnosed as a person with an illness that has 
periodic features (in our case as suffering from bipolar disor-
der). She composes her Ulysses contract being competent and 
with her disease in remission. She knows that in the future she 
may go through episodes of psychosis and she knows what that 
means having experienced such psychotic intermezzi in the past. 
Moreover, she has discovered that treatment proved to be help-
ful and that timely treatment can prevent a lot of the negative 
effects. She also knows how compulsory intervention worked 
out in her special case, and that her future refusal of compul-
sory treatment, in spite of being relatively competent, plausibly 
will be a sign of her altering state that could escalate into a 
florid psychosis. Together with her psychiatrist (and a proxy), 
she describes in the Ulysses contract the particular harms to 
be prevented by coercive treatment and/or hospitalisation, the 
types of behavior that signal the outbreak of a psychotic epi-
sode (sleeplessness, wasting money, bizarre thinking, euphoria, 
sexual promiscuity…), and the particular interventions that are 
necessary in case these signals manifest themselves, even if she 
then refuses these interventions (clinical commitment, psycho-
active drugs, electro-convulsive therapy…). The agreed coercive 
measures are allowed for only a short time (for instance three 
weeks). And last but not least: Ulysses contracts sanctioning 
involuntary treatment and/or admission always have a limited 
period of validity (for instance a year) and are defeasible. After 
a psychotic relapse has passed away, there has to be room for 
evaluation, renegotiation, and revocation or refinement of the 
agreement. Let me now sum up.
I think it is safe to say that the use of Ulysses contracts can 
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be justified. The crux of my argument is that for our person 
suffering from bipolar disease executing a self-binding con-
tract is contributing more to her personal autonomy (integrity) 
than escalation into florid psychosis will do. Alexandra has a 
picture of who she wants to be. She wholeheartedly identifies 
with this self-narrative. Cyclic psychosis is part of her narra-
tive. Therefore, she is concerned with her future psychotic 
periods. Earlier outbreaks of psychosis were overcoming her 
more or less as a causal process, not as the result of delibera-
tion and choice. They produced massive psychological change 
and a lot of material, personal and social losses. Alexandra 
arrived at the conclusion that her (sometimes tempting) psy-
chotic behavior does not fit into her life, her values and her 
self-understanding. She feels alienated and takes her psychot-
ic condition as a Fremdkörper that has to be banished. In her 
view, psychosis is a perverting influence on her mental powers 
that skews her perspective and causes distorted and impover-
ished personhood. It is threatening her deepest identity confer-
ring concerns. It compromises and profoundly diminishes her 
person-life. So, this psychotic influence has to be minimised. 
Therefore, she makes the Ulysses contract part of her life-sto-
ry and life-project. There is good reason to respect her prior 
consent to coercive treatment at a later time and to let what 
is expressed in the Ulysses contract take priority over her ac-
tual wishes as a patient. The moral costs are low. It remains 
true that the actual autonomy of the hypomanic person will 
 This is sometimes called ‘self-paternalism’ (Dresser, 9: 79). The 
term ‘self-paternalism’ suggests that there are two distinct persons in-
volved. I reject this assumption. At the very most, the psychiatrist is act-
ing paternalistically in our case at hand. 
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be violated9, that is, overruled by the precedent autonomy of 
the composer of the Ulysses contract. But we have consent-in-
advance and one could reasonably expect that in most cases 
where the person refused treatment at an earlier point in time, 
this refusal will change later on. Retrospectively most patients 
will still consent to the compulsory interference. In such cas-
es we respect autonomy by respecting former and subsequent 
consent. In general, what lends authority to the former 
and subsequent exercise of autonomy is that the self-narrative 
the patient identifies with at that time is the more coherent 
one. It is the self-narrative that holds together the person’s 
more central values and interests, and that is better kept in 
check by the stories of others and by the facts of the world.
It goes without saying that Ulysses contracts are a joint en-
deavor. To begin with, Alexandra needs a minimal supporting 
network that recognises the symptoms of psychosis in time. She 
needs a doctor (on the assumption that her doctor will be more
9 There is a lower limit to how much autonomy a psychotic person 
can exercise. In some cases the person is incompetent and the exercise of 
autonomy not an issue.
 More or less related views are proposed by M. Quante: Ulysses con-
tracts lay down the most authentic manifestation of the patient’s will 
(: 7-9), R.L.P. Berghmans & G.A.M. Widdershoven: Ulysses 
contracts are expressions of joint narrative work and derive their moral 
significance from being an expression of the patient’s fundamental values 
(), R. Spellecy: with a proper understanding of the future-directed 
planning embodied in Ulysses contracts, the enforcement of some Ulyss-
es contracts may be justified (), and T. Van Willigenburg & P.J.J. 
Delaere: the proposal of an argument from authenticity based on ‘one’s 
deepest identity conferring concerns’ ().
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than a lever to achieve the patient’s aims). And, ideally, the con-
tract proposal also envisions a third party involvement, apart 
from the psychiatrist and the patient, to ensure that the patient’s 
best interests and crucial values are served. One could even say 
that in enforcing a Ulysses contract other people are keeping the 
psychotic person in personhood. They are scaffolding and con-
tinuing her life story, and making the story of what happens a 
chapter of her life story. In the same way other people are helping 
her in preserving her personal autonomy, when she is in distress 
and in need of help. This may remind us of the second type of 
advance directives: the proxy directive. Why exactly cannot we 
argue, then, that the proxy directive is a better way to ensure 
that Ulysses contracts accurately reflect the ‘value history’ of the 
now less competent person? After all, the proxy can be very inti-
mately connected with the patient – being, typically, her spouse, 
best friend or offspring. Why not give a proxy carte blanche to 
respond to all the subtleties of the situation? I think this road 
is heavy going for two reasons. First of all, and unfortunately, 
not everyone has someone in his circle of acquaintances who 
would make a proxy directive. Secondly, and more importantly, 
patients are very reluctant to declare that, during an early stage 
of psychosis, they are incompetent and the proxy is in charge. 
Experience teaches us that patients have a difficult time to part 
with ‘the last word’ about their future treatment by means of a 
Ulysses contract, even if they know that they possibly will bene-
fit from it. 
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4.6 Enter the naysayers 
The defence of advance directives is not uncontested. Rebecca 
S. Dresser and John A. Robertson are well-known opponents. 
This is how the sceptics try to clinch the case against Ulysses 
contracts. They argue that the trouble with this strategy leaves 
us with at least two problems: advance directives like Ulysses 
contracts are theoretically tenuous and they are morally dangerous. 
Let me unpack these worries.
Firstly, the threat of theoretical tenuousness. The current de-
fense of Ulysses contracts presupposes a clear distinction be-
tween long-standing unconditional identity-conferring com-
mitments (life plan, central character traits, integrity-value) and 
momentanuous defeasible commitments. Unfortunately, what is 
supposed to be a stable, whole life commitment, or ‘critical in-
terest’ (to put it in a Dworkinian term), or ‘categorical project’ 
(to borrow B. Williams’ phrase) often proves to be rather con-
tingent. Naturally, people form plans and sometimes life plans 
that are, as Bratman stated, to some extent robust and inert. 
Such plans should not come up for reconsideration arbitrarily; 
they have default stability. On the other hand, people can, and 
often do, change their plans. No plan is sacred. The same holds 
for central values and interests. These are supposed to be stable, 
but are they really such solid and overarching structures for life 
as narrative accounts like mine seem to suppose and want us to 
believe? Must not we say that people often revise their values 
and interests? Think of cases of conversion or the simple case 
of a young man who changes from a ‘Bruder Leichtfuss’ in a
 Dresser even objects in principle to the use of advance directives (9, 
99, and -).
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conscientious family man after the birth of his first child. The 
value histories of persons are seldom uninterrupted. The over-
all direction and themes of someone’s life narrative may change 
substantially. Our views of life are often brought to the bar of 
experience and may then alter. We can never be sure when this 
is going to happen, as we can learn from Ivan Ilyich who is tor-
mented by the inauthenticity of his entire life – in Leo Tolstoy’s 
story The Death of Ivan Ilyich. In one word, we cannot and should 
not exaggerate the degree to which we can anticipate outcomes 
and plan and value our futures and lives. 
The second attack on advance directives – the moral danger 
problem – connects with the first and is more about treatment. 
Advance directives can be morally dangerous. Given the signifi-
cant psychological discontinuity between the past and the present 
person, this discontinuity questions the supposed convergence 
between precedent interests and values and current interests and 
values. Being psychologically separated from the earlier person, 
the psychotic person may have changed his interests and values. 
He may then have new independent values and interests based 
on current needs. And these should take priority over the earlier 
ones and trump the required respect for the patient’s precedent 
autonomy. The less psychological continuity, the more important 
actual values and interests become, the skeptic argues. Psycho-
logical discontinuity makes the values and interests of the later 
person independent from and more important than the values
 I doubt the underlying ontological claim – put forward by R. Dresser 
among others – that psychosis can cause such a massive psychological 
change that the symptom-free person and the psychotic person are in 
fact different persons. But I do not want to dwell on these metaphysical 
matters. The outlook that I defend in my dissertation is a practical one.
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and interests of the earlier person. Refusal of treatment by the 
patient, from this point of view, is not per se a proof of decreased 
competence. To suppose that is paternalistic: why not think that 
the patient’s decision to revoke the Ulysses contract is as com-
petent and rational as the decision that is written down in the 
Ulysses contract? A person in a hypomanic condition is not fully 
incompetent. The person has changed his mind. Why then re-
spect precedent autonomy in these cases? It could even be dan-
gerous to prioritise the so-called precedent autonomy. Advancing 
the ‘coherent’ values and interests the psychotic person no longer 
cares about could harm her. Moreover, coercive intervention is a 
debatable practice. It leads to very emotional situations and may 
be experienced (by patients and professionals) as traumatic and as 
an attack on identity. Whether coercive intervention succeeds is 
unpredictable and partly a matter of luck. And very little is known 
with certainty about the therapeutic effects of coercive treatment. 
Do these two problems leave us at a loss? Do they pose a se-
vere threat to the authority of precedent autonomy? We must go 
carefully here. But the difficulties can be overcome in the case of 
Ulysses contracts. Or so I will argue. Begin with the charge of 
theoretical tenuousness: the assumed stability of coherent values 
and interests. To claim that an individual’s central interests and 
values are always to be understood from a longitudinal or whole-
lifetime perspective, rather than from a momentanuous perspec-
tive, is too rigid. Full-fledged personhood does not exclusively 
imply: to stick to certain values and interests. Full personhood 
also means: to be prepared to adapt to changing circumstances, 
 See G. Widdershoven & R. Berghmans (7). ‘Coercion and pres-
sure in psychiatry: lessons from Ulysses’ in Journal of Medical Ethics , 
-. 
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to learn from them, and to change your mind. On the other 
hand, drastic changes are rather exceptional. Most people do not 
permanently change their hearts at a great pace. The stabilility 
of their life plans and characters makes it possible that they are 
predictable, cooperative and trustworthy. Yet there is an obvi-
ous reply to doubts about the stability of integrity values figur-
ing in Ulysses contracts. Psychosis is a relatively short entr’acte 
of confusion, one could argue. Afterwards the person can pick 
up the pieces and continue her life plan. Eventual damage can 
be remedied. Occurring changes in the person’s value system or 
lifeplan, if any, can be incorporated in a refined Ulysses contract. 
What about the moral danger? The treatment problem is 
linked with a broadly accepted anti-paternalistic approach: for 
us Westerners the ethical principle ‘respect for autonomy’ takes 
priority over the ethical principle of beneficence. All people
 The importance of personal autonomy is a disputed topic. It seems 
to be a Western preoccupation. There are other cultures where families 
and social networks are valued more highly than individual autonomy. In 
Western philosophy care ethicists, among others, propose to deemphasize 
autonomy in relation to the importance of trust and responsibility. But 
they do not dispense with self-determination altogether, so I feel safe in 
holding on to respect a patient’s autonomy. Defenders of the principle of 
beneficence put forward that in the case of recurrent psychosis precedent 
autonomy is not the issue. The decline in competence of the patient is 
temporarily and the preferences and interests of the patient developing 
a psychosis are not what she truly wants, as in most cases becomes clear 
when she is no longer deranged. She would be appalled at what we have 
done, if we denied her Ulysses contract. Supposing that may amount to 
the claim that Ulysses contracts can be justified on ‘soft paternalistic’ 
grounds: the agent does not know what she is doing and ‘truly’ wants 
what others are imposing on her. 
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have a right of self-determination and a duty of respect for the 
autonomy of others (even if the exercise of autonomy eventu-
ally leads to a decrease in autonomy). Accepting the primacy of 
respect for autonomy as a starting point and taking autonomy 
as a diachronic matter, Ulysses contracts can be justified force-
fully. First of all, enforcing a Ulysses contract we do respect the 
former autonomous consent of the patient. In addition, in many 
cases it will be possible to respect the patient’s subsequent au-
tonomous consent too. Agreed, failures cannot be excluded and 
compulsory treatment is a controversial ultimum remedium. But 
expectations are that a short violation of autonomy plus a long 
period in desirable circumstances after the coercive intervention 
on balance will produce the best possible self-governance. 
In conclusion, in the last three sections I have argued that the 
narrative outlook on autonomy developed earlier in this disserta-
tion can make sense of the notion of precedent autonomy and 
underpin a moral justification of the use of Ulysses contracts. 
The gist of it was that to be an autonomous person comes down 
to identification with one’s self-narrative. We saw that autonomy 
thus conceived can resist a trio of skeptic arguments in the actual 
controversy on Ulysses contracts. 
The apparent narrative disruption of identity was the first 
 A related view is what J. K. Davis calls diachronic respect for autonomy: 
one should act so that there is the greatest overall consistency between 
what the patient wants and how his life goes over the longest total amount 
of time (: 97-9). Diachronic respect for autonomy is a clear-cut pro-
spective moral justification for enforcing Ulysses contracts, in Davis’ 
view, differing from retrospective justification, soft paternalism, and sub-
sequent consent.
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objection raised. Psychosis certainly is a disrupting experience, 
but the person can bridge the gap by making recurrent psycho-
sis part of her self-narrative and appropriating it as an aspect 
of herself first; and by prospectively identifying with her future 
psychotic state. One may object that foreseeing and identifying 
with future conditions of illness is reading tea-leaves, but the 
case may be that the patient can show experience with psychosis. 
This experience may be a negative one, which the patient wants 
to avoid. It can also be a valuable experience the patient wants 
to profit from. In the remaining cases, psychotic disorganisation 
may be an ambivalent experience. 
A more difficult second point was the supposed stability and 
persistence of a person’s interests and values. (Contra Dworkin) 
I do not want to put a lot of work in a whole-lifetime ‘obituarist’ 
perspective on self-narratives. What will be salient features, good 
and bad, for a person’s life is a matter of choice, within some 
limits at least. The criteria for evaluating what to count valuable 
and what trivial sometimes change within a human biography. 
Fortunately, in the Ulysses contract case the lifelong persistence 
of interests and values is of relatively minor importance. The 
period of validity of a Ulysses contract is limited and occurring 
changes in the person’s value system or life plan, if any, can be 
incorporated in a revised Ulysses contract.
Treatment and/or admission under coercion of a relatively com-
petent revolting person is obviously morally damaging, so went 
the last skeptic challenge. To that one may object with the prin-
ciple of respect for autonomy. Respect for the precedent autono-
mous consent of the patient composing a Ulysses contract in the 
first place; and in most cases respect for the subsequent autono-
mous approval by the patient after the compulsory treatment.
This is, of course, a welcome result for my approach and, more 
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importantly, for the actual debate on advance directives. Nev-
ertheless, there remain serious problems in the air, as another 
much discussed example, which leads to quandaries about self-
narrative and how to respect the precedent autonomy of persons, 
may make clear: advance directives in cases of severe dementia 
of the Alzheimer’s type. In the introduction of this chapter I 
foreshadowed that the dementia case will also prove to be a bor-
derline case. Here is why. One of the things I want to make clear 
in the following sections is that, in order to be applicable, a view 
on narrative based self-governance has to meet certain condi-
tions, one of these being that personal autonomy presupposes 
that owners of self-narratives remain autonomous as long as they 
are capable, or will be capable at some point in the future, of 
renewing or revoking their identification as a particular person. 
Unfortunately, severe Alzheimer’s disease puts an end to the ca-
pacities to recognise and endorse a self-narrative as your own 
once and for all. 
4.7 Advance directives and the severely demented
Severe dementia of the Alzheimer’s type strikes a lot of people 
as an illness about which there is only grim news. Decline into 
 I concentrate here on only one stage of he gradual nature of dementia: 
pre dementia, mild dementia, severe dementia, and end stage dementia. 
For a detailed description of Alzheimer’s disease, the most common form 
of dementia, see American Psychiatric Association (), Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, th rev. ed., Washington DC: 
APA, -7. Note that the gradual nature of dementia poses extra chal-
lenges to those who favor the use of advance directives. 
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‘infantilism’. No effective drug treatment. Advanced Alzheim-
er’s cannot be cured or reversed. To the best of our knowledge, 
it is a fatal disease. Symptoms include – among others – severe 
memory impairment and loss of control (apraxia and distur-
bance in executive functioning). It is humiliating and worse 
than cancer, H. Dupuis argues.7 The main reason Dupuis 
gives us for giving preference to cancer is that dementia affects 
the human mind (‘our humanity’). To grow demented (liter-
ally) means to lose your mind. The victim is locked up in a 
brain that is ravaged by ‘plaques and tangles’ and shrinking; 
one third of the brain matter gets lost. The demented patient 
does no longer know who she is and where and in what time 
she is living. She is 7 and she thinks that she is  years old. 
She does not recognise the house where she lived for decades, 
happily married, and is desperately looking for the – no longer 
existing – house of her childhood. She does not recognise her 
life partner. Her emotions are whimsical. Her thoughts inco-
herent. She cannot discuss plans and decide what to do. She 
lives between the remnants of the past and without the promise 
of a future. In the house of doctor Aloïs Alzheimer the lights go 
out one by one. The person is disappearing slowly, becoming a 
residue of who she was, and in a sense dying a mort sans corps 
(a living death). Advanced Alzheimer’s disease seems to destroy 
the glue that binds a person over time and to bring an end to 
the existence of its victim as a person.
Most people, I suppose, do agree with H. Dupuis and view 
the prospect of becoming incompetent by advanced Alzheimer’s 
7 H. Dupuis (). ‘Erger dan kanker? Een essay over dementie’ in I. 
de Beaufort a.o. (eds.), De Kwestie. Praktijkboek ethiek voor de gezond-
heidszorg, Den Haag: Lemma, -.
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disease with sadness and fear. It means the loss of so much in 
their present lives that gives them value and makes them their 
lives. There seems to be little value to a future life with severe de-
mentia. For this reason some people decide to write an advance 
directive determining that life-sustaining treatment be withheld 
if they were to become incompetent and enter a potentially fatal 
medical condition, even in the event that they appear contented 
while profoundly demented. And again, respecting the prece-
dent autonomy of such a patient is not without difficulties. Envi-
sion the following standard case as presented by Thomas Buller: 
Vera Stuart is a -year-old nursing home patient who suf-
fers from Alzheimer’s dementia. Although incompetent, Vera 
seems quite content and could be described as ‘pleasantly 
senile’. In particular, she appears to enjoy being read to (al-
though she does not understand what is being read), sitting in 
the sunshine, and having her hair combed. Prior to the onset 
of dementia, Vera was a historian. An extremely knowledge-
able person with a formidable memory, Vera loved the intel-
lectual life that she led. The thought of becoming demented 
horrified her, and several years ago Vera wrote an advance di-
rective requesting that she not receive life-sustaining treatment 
should she become incompetent. Vera has recently been diag-
nosed with pneumonia which is life-threatening if not treated 
immediately with antibiotics.
 Buller T. in Fulford K.W.M., D. L. Dickenson & T. H. Murray (eds.) 
(), . The case is based on a description in Allen E. Buchanan & 
Dan W. Brock (99), Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Deci-
sion-Making, New York: Cambridge University Press, .
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Note that at this point Vera is quite contented, cannot remem-
ber the advance directive, and, when asked, expresses a pref-
erence to stay alive. The case confronts us with a choice be-
tween two options: we could decide to respect Vera’s advance 
directive, or we could decide to override it. However, both of 
these decisions are problematic. The first sacrifices the life of a 
contented woman, though incompetent, expressing a desire to 
continue to live, on the basis of past interests and values that 
Vera might have forgotten. Is it right to allow a contented old 
woman to die when a simple intervention would save her? The 
second commits Vera to a type of life that she had expressly 
sought to avoid in her previously competent state. She con-
ceived such a mentally compromised state as incompatible with 
how she sees herself. What is in question here is: do we have 
to regard advance directives as carrying significant authority 
in decision making for incompetent patients? Most leading lit-
erature in biomedical ethics does. I am not that sure. To think 
this through, let me recapitulate the sceptic objections – the 
theoretical tenuousness and the lack of moral authority – and 
try to work out the answers for the severe dementia case. But 
before moving on I would like to have some background points 
in place.
For a start, what could an advocate of narrative identity 
say about Alzheimer’s disease? The dementia case may look 
more serious than the recurrent psychosis case. And in fact 
it is. Alzheimer’s disease causes huge, irreparable brain dam-
age. And the ‘deconstruction’ of the self-narrative also seems 
to run deeper. Broadly speaking, the incompetent patient suf-
fering from dementia lacks the capacity for narrative self-con-
stitution and a fortiori she is no longer capable of contributing 
to the coherence of the narrative or to make autonomous de-
cisions. Author and life-story are falling apart. Vera suffering 
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from severe dementia is no longer living as a person with an 
unfolding self-narrative. She is a severely diminished version 
of that person. To the narrativist, the victim of advanced de-
mentia ceases to exist as a person. Wanting to live but having 
no sense of a past or future as one’s own is insufficient for 
full-fledged personhood and personal persistence. What is left, 
to put it crudely, is a residue of a person. Some people may 
even think that Vera’s demented life is similar to a dog’s life. 
Vera lacks the complex forms of consciousness that constitute 
personhood, they say. She is definitively a sentient non-person. 
Needless to expect that such a no-more-person or post-person 
will be capable of self-determination and identification with 
her self-narrative. Autonomy is not even an option. Or so 
those thinkers argue. And they have a point. This is the basic 
story about Vera’s condition. Nevertheless, my view is to pro-
ceed with caution here. Different from animals, people suffer-
ing from severe dementia once were persons and occasionally 
they may be able to partly ‘re-appear’ for a moment. There 
is dim self-awareness. They may have relatively coherent likes 
and dislikes and some sense of self (they are not in a perma-
nent vegetative state). There may be some ability to complete 
actions (sometimes surprisingly primed by what Oliver Sacks 
calls the narrative power of music). There may be some recog-
nition of others left. A doctor reported to me of a severely de-
mented former management consultant who did not recognise 
his family. When a family member visited him, he whispered 
conspiratorially: ‘You’re a member of my team, aren’t you?’. 
And last but not least, there certainly are the possibilities of 
somatic communication and of sharing experiences with peo-
ple suffering from severe dementia in the immediate environ-
ment. Agnieszka Jaworska (999) helpfully noted that many 
demented patients are not yet so impaired that they have lost 
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all capacity to care and to value.9 This may remind us of the 
fact that being a person involves more than rumination and 
cognition. Persons are emotive and caring creatures. In fact, 
we do not know what exactly is going on in people suffering 
from a demential syndrom, apart from the datum that the ex-
perience of dementia may differ considerably among individu-
als. I think all those things speak against a simple equation of 
the demential state and the animal state (or even the state of 
an infant; dementia is sometimes described, in a rough way, 
as a mirror-image of the human early psychological develop-
ment). We do better to judge that people like Vera are still 
‘regular folks’, even if they are drastically different. And most 
of us do.
Further background issues are about the use of advance direc-
tives, especially about some asymmetries between the dementia 
case and the recurrent psychosis case. Alzheimer’s disease causes 
a permanent, substantial decline in competence. So, enforc-
ing an advance directive is different from enforcing a Ulysses 
contract. In the case of Ulysses contracts the agent’s earlier
9 Jaworska contends that the patient’s capacity to value or to care sur-
vives the ability to understand the narrative of one’s whole life. In her 
view, severely demented persons like Vera and Dworkin’s main case-
study, Margo, may well still be valuers, whose efforts to implement their 
values are directly and severely hampered by Alzheimer’s disease. Only 
end-stage patients lack the capacity to value (999: -). The same holds 
for caring. Patients in moderate to severe stages of Alzheimer’s disease 
may well still be caring creatures. Late-stage patients are capable only of 
appetitive desires and sensual pleasures (7b: ). As a consequence, 
advance directives for demented persons who are still valuing and caring 
would be more equivalent to Ulysses contracts.
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competence and the later competence may not be on the same 
level, and Ulysses contracts may enforce one competent expres-
sion of will over another (relatively) competent expression of will. 
In the described standard Alzheimer’s case there is great dispar-
ity between the earlier competence and later incompetence. The 
advance directive is enforced when the patient permanently lacks 
the ability to understand that treatment issues have arisen and 
that she once made choices bearing on these issues. Consequent-
ly, Alzheimer patients often seek control over future treatment 
completing the two types of advance treatment directives: in-
struction and proxy directives. They choose someone they trust 
to make decisions and instruct that proxy to make certain sorts 
of choices on behalf of the formerly competent person.
On the face of it, there is a case for the use of advance direc-
tives in the event of dementia. Narrative identity is a kind of 
unity, wherein various experiences occurring at different times 
are unified as part of the same self-narrative, such that the nar-
rative self can identify at any given time with all the experi-
ences. Episodes of dementia can be included in an individual’s 
self-narrative. Although dementia is disrupting narrative iden-
tity more seriously and permanently than psychosis, on closer 
inspection, what holds for cases of recurrent psychosis can also 
go for Alzheimer’s disease. According to Vera, the life-stage with 
Alzheimer’s is part of her self-narrative. It is a chapter of her life, 
not a codicil. She believed she could become demented, she felt 
that that individual would be she, and she was deeply caring 
for her future situation. While the disruption of narrative iden-
tity (‘I wouldn’t be myself ’) may invite a decision now to forgo 
life supports at a later time, narrative identity also bridges the 
gap between the normal and the demented person stage (‘After 
all, it would be me’). Drawing an advance directive is trying to 
make the last stage of Vera’s life a stage of her life. It is creating 
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narrative continuity and wholeness, one could claim. But, let 
me point at another asymmetry here. Vera’s ability to identify 
robustly with her possible future state is only the prospective 
half of the identification story. Retrospectively, Vera in her di-
minished condition cannot identify or connect herself with the 
earlier person. The basic psychological capacities, which enable 
her to construct a single narrative out of various sets of past, 
present and future experiences and to identify with it are be-
yond retrieval. So, there is a great deal of disunity between Vera 
during post-competency and Vera signing her advance directive. 
Recurrent psychosis, by contrast, leaves room for retrospective 
identification after the psychotic surge. To avoid this problem 
one could put forward that all that matters for narrative identity 
is that at some earlier stage Vera was capable of projecting her 
self-narrative into a future stage. Yet, this is of course a watered-
down version of narrative self-constitution. 
One might even widen the gap and also worry about the pro-
spective part of the identification. One could suggest that Vera’s 
supposed ‘robust’ prospective identification was in fact more a 
‘fantasised’ identification. How could Vera know, while com-
petent, what life will or may be like as an individual suffering 
from dementia whose mental life is very different from what it 
used to be? Given that Alzheimer’s disease will cause massive 
psychological changes, how could Vera be informed about a life 
with dementia? Definitely, she will know that there is a chance 
of suffering and loss of decorum. But people do a poor job of
 DeGrazia distinguishes between two senses of narrative identity: 
strong narrative identity if a person has persisting narrative capacity and 
weak narrative identity, if a person projects her self-narrative into a future 
in which she no longer has narrative capacity (: ).
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predicting their preferences in situations they have never expe-
rienced. Again, the case of the psychotic person was different. 
The psychotic person already gathered some experience of what 
the future psychotic state would be like. The person anticipating 
dementia has no own experience at all with a demented state. 
So, how can she grasp her future situation as a dementia patient? 
This sounds sensible. Vera does not envision the sort of circum-
stances she will be in later. She does not know what it is like 
to be an inhabitant ‘of that country’. Alan Jacques, a physician 
who spent many years caring for dementia patients came to the 
conclusion that 
(t)heir ideas of how they would react reflect more on their cur-
rent state than on what their actual experience of dementia 
will be years later. Just as a child may swear that she will never 
marry, yet  years later is married and happily settled, so we 
look forward to old age and see its horrors as if we would ex-
perience them as we are now, not as we will be then (Dresser, 
-: ).
Let me now recap the sceptical criticisms – the theoretical tenu-
ousness and the lack of moral authority – and see what can be 
said in favor of respect for advance directives in cases of severe 
dementia. 
The charge of theoretical tenuousness was the problem of the 
assumed stability of a coherent self-narrative. The concern was 
that an individual’s central interests and values cannot always be 
interests and values assessed from one stable standpoint of one’s 
life as a whole; that we have to allow for changes of heart. Think 
of the famous Saul-St. Paul case. After his Damascus-experience 
Saul of Tarsus had to give up his whole-life-encompassing in-
terests and values and make room for different whole-life-en-
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compassing interests and values. In other words, it makes sense 
to speak of life stages depending upon an individual’s changing 
system of interests and values. An individual’s self-narrative may 
change along with his nature, character, values, or interests. Ac-
cepting that, it becomes less evident to suppose persistent whole-
life interests and values surviving radical psychological changes. 
Remember that in the recurrent psychosis case there was a similar 
risk that the manic patient would change his mind when the ad-
vance directive was enforced. But after the psychotic intermezzo 
was over, it was possible to test the actual force of the patient’s 
central interests or concerns and to repair the Ulysses contract, if 
desired. The case of dementia is different. The likely temporary 
nature of the anticipated condition is out of the question. There 
is no opportunity for evaluation and revision. In this play there 
is, so to speak, no Second Act. So, my tentative conclusion here is 
that the narrativist reply to the charge of theoretical tenuousness 
in the justification of advance directives in the severe dementia 
case is flawed, but can still be upheld. What to make of the con-
cerns about the lack of moral authority and the moral dangers of 
advance directives in the case of severe dementia? 
The moral authority of advance directives as a vehicle of prec-
edent autonomy now faces significant problems. Two points 
are in order. The first problem is that strategies enforcing 
 Such a view is defended by Allen Buchanan, Dan Brock, Nancy Rho-
den, Ronald Dworkin, Jeff McMahan and David DeGrazia, among oth-
ers.
 What follows is essentially Rebecca Dresser’s sustained attack on ad-
vance directives (setting aside her metaphysical assumptions about per-
sonal identity). I concentrate on the ethical arguments, leaving out policy 
objections and empirical findings that expose problems with the advance 
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precommitment choices now may conflict with moral responsi-
bilities to protect incompetent vulnerable patients from harm. 
The second problem, that will be postponed to section .9,
is the mainstream patient-centered perspective that dominates 
the debate on advance directives in contemporary bioethics. Let 
us look at each point in extenso.
The first problem, an objection often raised by enemies of ad-
vance directives, is that, although a person’s statements about 
future care can be relevant, such statements should be given less 
weight than other considerations affecting patient care. They 
see two reasons for overriding the advance directive. The first 
reason is that the directive gives an unadequate account of its 
makers’ true preferences. It contains an uninformed choice (this 
is Alan Jacques’ point) or fails to communicate the individu-
al’s actual treatment preferences. Therefore it lacks the moral 
weight of an autonomous choice. And here is Rebecca Dresser’s 
rendition of the second reason (put in a Dworkinian register): 
‘When the capacity to appreciate critical interests is lost, experi-
ential interests should take priority. Competent persons are free 
to elevate their critical interests above experiential interests. But 
after they lose decisional capacity, they have a different set of 
concerns. Experiential interests become central to their lives. 
directive approach, although the practical problems revealed by empiri-
cal research are significant. The idea of precommitment turns out to be a 
seductive strategy, that is difficult to implement: ‘First, advance directives 
are rarely completed. Second, most of the directives that are completed 
fail to convey meaningful information. Third, people making directives 
often have a poor understanding of what they are deciding. In particular, 
they may not envision how they could experience their decisions in a 
future incapacitated state’ (Dresser: -: 9).
210  practical identity
Experiential interests should also be central to decisions about 
their life-sustaining treatment’ (Dresser, -: ). When 
patients become sufficiently and permanently incompetent, 
they lose their earlier preferences and interests. At first blush, 
it seems logical then to look at the patients’ earlier wishes when 
they were still in touch with the beliefs and values that shaped 
their lives. But why should previous autonomous preferences and 
interests be extendable into an incompetent future? The inter-
ests and values of demented patients might differ from those 
they had as competent persons. We cannot respect the for-
mer preferences and interests any more than we can vote in an 
election after the polls have closed (in John K. Davis’ words). 
Precedent autonomy is mythical in cases of severe dementia. 
To be authoritative, the autonomous decision has to continue 
to be reflective of the person’s character and interests. In the 
case of Vera the advance directive no longer promotes her in-
terests in her intellectual life. These old interests and values are 
 Dresser adds: Giving effect to a harmful directive, i.e. refusing an 
intervention that now offers clear benefit, would be inconsistent with the 
moral judgments underlying the parens patriae doctrine. The state has a 
traditional power and responsibility, under the doctrine of parens patriae, 
to care for and to protect the best interests of incompetent persons. ‘Fol-
lowing such a directive could require insensitive and even physically co-
ercive conduct by clinicians, which the law condemns in other contexts. 
To show respect for vulnerable persons, clinical practice and legal rules 
should protect patients from prior choices that would harm them in their 
current state’ (Dresser -: ). A constellation of values supports 
this approach, according to Dresser: compassion and empathy for depen-
dent persons, as well as the belief that people with mental disabilities can 
have lives of meaning and worth.
: the fragility of personhood  211
forgotten. Vera ceased to care about its objects. She most likely 
even lost the capacities to care about those objects. Her experi-
ences are vastly altered. Respecting her precedent autonomy is 
a fiction. Severely demented people cannot be autonomous, no 
more than ‘precedent’ autonomous.
The worst of it, opponents of advance directives continue, is 
that to make an appeal to precedent autonomy is not only ficti-
tious in cases of severe dementia, it is also morally troubling. En-
forcing precedent interests will possibly harm the patient suffer-
ing from a demential syndrom. The incompetent later Vera is cut 
off from the earlier competent Vera (this being the result of se-
vere brain damage). Such a massive psychological change makes 
it irresponsible to suppose convergence between the earlier in-
terests and the current best interests. Respecting the interests of 
the autonomous former person is abandoning and consequently 
harming the best interests of the present incompetent person. 
The demented person has independent current best interests 
based on her current needs and preferences. In cases of severe 
dementia the best interests standard becomes more important 
than respect for autonomy. Vera’s directive forbids a treatment 
that would effectively relieve her discomfort as an incompetent 
patient and that would allow her to continue a life that appears 
to have value to her. 
 R. Dworkin believes that critical interests can survive incompetence 
but he provides no argument for this claim (99: -7). One could ob-
ject that many of us believe that some interests survive death. This is 
of course a highly elliptical claim. After death surviving interests rather 
become normative considerations with a certain legitimacy for the near-
est and dearest instead of interests the deceased person has at that time. 
I shall return to this.
212  practical identity
Do these strictures pose a challenge to the narrativist ap-
proach? We have two perspectives now: do we have to under-
stand the best interests of our ‘pleasantly senile’ patient as a func-
tion of her current time-relative interests, or as a function of a 
whole-lifetime perspective, assessed from the standpoint of her 
life as a whole, in which case best interests are determined by the 
self-narrative and expressed through precedent autonomy? Vera 
completed her advance directive autonomously and, on the one 
hand, these autonomous decisions about her future have a role 
to play. On the other hand, why should the authority of her ear-
lier decision extend to her present autonomy-lacking condition? 
Why should Vera comply with a preference she no longer affirms 
or even understands? The considerations for the two opposing 
ways of construing Vera’s best interests seem about equally rea-
sonable and weighty, canceling each other out. Vera’s best in-
terests are ambiguous. Hence, showing that precedent autonomy 
has the force to trump the actual interests will require further 
moral argumentation. I think such a moral argument is exactly 
what a narrativist approach can afford.
On my narrativist account the further moral claim will be that 
identification with the whole of one’s life story, including the 
foreseeable parts of life when one will be severely demented and 
incapable of identifying, survives the loss of competence and 
dysnarrativia caused by Alzheimer’s disease. Vera is autonomous 
 This is also DeGrazia’s point (a man called Al standing in for Vera 
in his argument): ‘There is, I suggest, no uniquely correct answer to the 
question of whether continuing to live would be in Al’s best interests’ 
(9). But this indeterminacy concerns only best interests. In DeGrazia’s 
view precedent autonomy has independent moral importance that is de-
cisive. 
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when she identifies with her coherent self-narrative, that is, with 
her most coherent identity conferring concerns. When Vera is 
severely demented, autonomy is not an option. She only has 
‘experiential interests’ in those things that she finds pleasurable 
or exciting as experiences. So, there is no conflict within Vera’s 
autonomy. The best interest conflict can be resolved in favor of 
Vera’s earlier autonomous decisions. Autonomous advance treat-
ment choices carry greater moral significance than other consid-
erations, because they encompass authenticated interests and val-
ues expressing the person’s design for her life as a whole. Matters 
are, however, a bit more complicated. Therefore, let me engage 
in a short excursus on the distal binding powers of identification.
4.8 Autonomy at a distance: some second thoughts
Let us assume that a severely demented human cannot exercise 
autonomy and is not capable of narrative self-constitution. She 
is a post-person, so to speak. This assumption may seem to be in 
tension with the considerations that led me to propose to treat 
severely demented people as regular folks (and as more than 
human animals). But it is not. Although even in quite severe 
dementia there is often something left of the original person, 
the behavior is not distinctively the person’s own. None of it 
comes from any project of self-narration. Nor does it come about 
through identification. The lion’s share of what is left from the 
person survives in other people, and that is what gives these 
people good reason to treat a patient suffering from severe Al-
zheimer’s disease (also) as the person they knew. 
Assuming that, I see a problem here. Precedent autonomous 
decisions are supposed to add value and interest to the person’s 
life independently of whether it is intrinsically enjoyable. But, in 
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my view, interests and values, in order to be someone’s interests, 
have to be perceived and experienced as interests and values, and 
are, as it were, made complete by their own perception and expe-
rience. Interests and values can only be had by beings who ‘can’ 
be aware that they have them (what ‘can’ exactly means here 
will become clear in a moment). This is especially important 
for whole-life encompassing values and interests. These are not 
wholly impersonal or intrinsic. They are essentially relational. 
They can only exist as long as there are beings who have evalu-
ative attitudes towards their own condition. And maybe we are 
confronted here with a fatal flaw in a narrativist defense of ad-
vance directives for the severely demented in terms of identity 
conferring values and interests. These narrativists are pressed to 
the claim that the identity conferring interests and values are 
authoritative although they are no longer in touch with, c.q. per-
ceived and experienced by the demented person. Those identity 
conferring interests and values apparently are supposed to be re-
spected, no matter what. After becoming demented, the patient 
is flying on an autopilot, so to speak. Vera becomes the hostage 
of her advance directive, even in cases of life and death, that is, 
in cases of decisions about her still having interests and concerns 
at all. Why should we accept that? 
 J. K. Davis develops a variant on this view on the authority of precedent 
autonomy (7). In some cases, he argues, it is logically and nomologically 
possible that the person recovers from permanent incompetence. Interests 
survive if, assuming that it is nomologically possible, the holder would af-
firm the interest if he or she regained the capacity to do so. The holder does 
not lose concern, she loses the capacity to concern. An interest can survive 
a loss of capacity even though it cannot survive a loss of concern. I am not 
sure Davis’ proposal is a moral defense, but, in any case, it suffers from a 
similar difficulty as the narrativist approach: concerns are provided with a 
star ‘objectively valid’, even if no longer subjectively endorsed. 
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Now, one could reply that the Ulysses contract case has the 
same implication. When Alexandra was unwell, her actual au-
tonomy was trumped by the values and interests laid down ear-
lier in her advance directive. Values and interests obviously can 
be kept longer than the moment of identification. Dementia is 
not a matter of conversion. Vera never revoked her values and 
interests. She is no longer capable of bearing them in mind. The 
pattern of values and interests she embraced at the time of the 
drawing up of the advance directive still counts, even if she is 
no longer able to take part in it. Granted, Vera’s case is differ-
ent from Alexandra’s: the severely demented is beyond recovery. 
Vera can never reconsider her advance directive. But what is the 
big deal? Why is the difference between having an opportunity 
to reconsider the advance directive (in the psychosis case) and 
not having it (in the dementia case) so essential? 
The answer to this objection is implied in my conception of 
autonomy. In my view, the distal binding powers of identifica-
tion with a self-narrative are limited. I consider a person to be 
autonomous as long as he is capable, or will be capable at some 
point in the future, of renewing or revoking his identification 
as a particular person. I am adopting here a middle course be-
tween, on the one hand, thinkers like Luca Ferrero for whom 
autonomous commitments have no distal binding power on the 
agent’s future conduct. On Ferrero’s account, autonomous com-
mitments determine the conduct of the agent only if renewed at 
the time of action based on the intrinsic merits of the case. The 
other extreme I want to avoid is the Dworkinian account that 
says that autonomous commitments contribute to the ‘critical 
interests’ or the ‘integrity-value’ of the person and his life, even 
during post-competency as a living (or dead) person. Both ex-
tremes are pushing autonomy too far. 
I realise that such an avenue of reply, in particular the paral-
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lel between post-persons and dead persons, seems to fly in the 
face of widely accepted ideas about posthumous interests. So, 
this calls for some explanation. There are at least three subjects 
in respect of which the concerns of living men extend beyond 
the boundaries of their lives (in such sort that also the law takes 
notice of them): wishes in how their corpse is to be disposed of; 
wishes regarding the posthumous disposition of their properties; 
and wishes concerning their good name and reputation. We re-
gard it as a failure of respect for the (autonomy of the) person to 
disregard these wishes. My conception of autonomy mentioned 
above now seems to suggest that those wishes are unwarranted. 
And, I think, in a way they are, because the dead person exists 
only symbolically. Let me explain.
To begin with, there is a paradox: death is the moment at 
which the agent ceases to be, while events pursued after a per-
son’s death continue to relate to that agent as if he were alive. 
On close inspection, such events are incidents which cannot af-
fect the person subjected to them. Note that I do not deal with 
religious aspects here. I am assuming that death does not mean 
transition or transformation, but – in all probability – cessation 
of the capacity to experience and annihilation of the person. On 
this assumption, it becomes difficult to see how the dead can be 
harmed or rewarded. How can one be harmed or rewarded when 
one does not experience the evil of harm or the rewarding good? 
How can the posthumous results of someone’s actions change 
the value of those actions for him? Who is the subject of posthu-
mous harm or reward? The dead does not exist as a person, let 
alone as the same person he was before death. How, then, can a 
dead person’s interests be compelling? 
David Sperling proposes the following solution (). First 
of all, to make after-life interests binding he conceptualises in-
terests from an objective perspective: persons may have interests 
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even without their experiencing a specific outcome. For example, 
someone wants to be a famous performer. The idea is that the 
interests of this performer extend far beyond the period of his 
death. Let us suppose that Heath Ledger (979-) wanted to 
be famous. Following Sperling’s objectivist account of interests, 
the fact that Heath Ledger posthumously was nominated and 
won awards for his portrayal of the Joker in The Dark Knight, 
adds something to his interests as a performer. Sperling admits 
that the award-winning Ledger does no longer exist as a person. 
Therefore, he further claims that human existence can be con-
ceptualised in different ways: one can not only exist as a person, 
but also as a ‘Human Subject’. ’Human Subjects’ do not exist 
in a physical or material way. Instead, their existence is logical 
(: ). It is temporal and persistent. And ‘Human Subjects’ 
are holding four categories of interests: pre-birth interests, life 
interests, after-life interests, and far-lifelong interests (applying 
to one’s life but also to episodes after one’s death, for example 
the interest in being the object of affection or esteem of others). 
‘Human Subjects’ hold these interests for the person; their inter-
ests are the latter’s interests. Sperling believes that by dispensing 
with our habit of regarding and referring to ourselves exclusively 
as persons, the ‘Human Subject’-model can protect human inter-
ests surviving death. He also thinks that the model finds some 
support in our use of language: when Ledger-fans say ‘we love 
Heath Ledger’, they presume in a way that Heath Ledger still 
exists to be loved, viz., that the ‘Human Subject’ bearing the 
interests of ‘Heath Ledger’ (the person who died in ) still ex-
ists and holds an interest in being loved and admired after death.
I am not convinced that, in order to solve the posthumous in-
terest problem, we need to construct a new ‘Human Subject’ ex-
tending over the life of a person, whose interests they are. David 
Sperling’s move strikes me as explaining obscurum per obscurius. I 
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think we can better face up to the fact that death makes us prop-
erty of humanity. Take reputation as an example. During his 
lifetime Johann Sebastian Bach (-7) was known as a skilled 
organist and a moderate composer. Nowadays, people baptise 
him the greatest composer ever, or the Harp of the Lord, or the 
Fifth Evangelist. I cannot think of Bach’s present-day reputation 
as affecting literally the interests of the person Johann Sebastian 
Bach. This reputation management is ours. Here is another ex-
ample. The British mathematician, code breaker and founder 
of computer science Alan Turing (9-9) was prosecuted in 
9 for having a homosexual relation, – homosexual acts were 
illegal in the United Kingdom at that time. The scandal ruined 
his career and reputation. He died in 9, several weeks before 
his nd birthday, from an apparently self-administered cyanide 
poisoning. On  September 9, following an Internet cam-
paign, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown made an official 
public apology on behalf of the British government for the way 
in which Turing was treated after the second world war. In a 
petition, thousands of British citizens made posthumous excuses 
for the way Turing was treated after the war. Again, the actual 
excuses do not literally add something to the interests of the per-
son Alan Turing. They can be no more than a kind of symbolic 
repair. The subscribers of the petition make clear that they now 
find it horrifying that Turing was treated so inhumanely and 
that they now think differently about gay men. At most, they are 
acting as if they compensate Turing for his misery.
This is not to say that it is completely useless to care for peo-
ple’s symbolic existence. My sceptical point is that whatever the 
use of the recognition of posthumous symbolic existence, it can-
not be that something can be added to or subtracted from the 
interests of the deceased person. Most of us (say they) do respect 
last wishes and the reputation of the deceased. I think that for 
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surviving relatives to carry out the last wishes of a beloved person 
and to respect his memory can be a (ritual, symbolic) comfort-
ing way to come to terms with the dreadful loss of the beloved. 
Saying that they are doing it for the deceased or that it adds 
something to the interests of the deceased, in the final analysis, 
can be no more than a façon de parler. A last wish is not a trump. 
To be sure, this does not make the person’s last wishes or repu-
tation arbitrary or without moral importance.7 It is morally 
problematic to break a promise or to drag someone’s reputation 
through the mire. In the world most of us prefer to live in, we 
expect that, if people make a promise, they should keep it; and 
that what is said about (dead) people is not contrary to the truth. 
Let us leave the subject of posthumous interests here.
After this digression on the distal binding powers of identifica-
tion, I am not sure that my narrativist conception of autonomy, 
for all I have argued so far, can settle the moral question why 
interests and values prior to the onset of dementia do trump 
preferences and interests expressed by the severely demented in-
dividual. Maybe other approaches will do better. Let us move on 
to two other defenses of the moral authority of advance direc-
tives in the dementia case, one offered by Jeff McMahan and one 
by communautarian thinkers. 
McMahan’s practical conclusion – at the end of his The Ethics 
7 In The sources of normativity C. Korsgaard offers us the case of a law-
yer who discovers that a recently deceased client has changed his will. 
The client has eventually decided to leave all his money to his careless 
nephew and not – as originally intended – to medical research. From 
my perspective, I can agree that, since it would be far better to give the 
inheritance to medical research, the lawyer has a moral reason to violate 
the deceased client’s will. 
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of Killing. Problems at the Margins of Life – is to allow Vera to 
die without treatment. He rejects the claim that the present best 
interests of Vera are determined by what would be best for her 
life as a whole. Vera’s wish – in her state of severe dementia – to 
continue to live is only weakly affected by its lack of coherence 
with the rest of her life, because her phase of dementia is isolated 
from the rest of her life by dramatically weakened unity rela-
tions. McMahan finds it appropriate to regard Vera’s ‘unified life 
up to the onset of dementia as forming something as a whole, 
with the period of dementia being rather an excrescence dan-
gling at the end – a period alien to and sufficiently distinct from 
the earlier unified life to have its own independent good’ (: 
). According to McMahan, when the significant unity within 
a life is weak, the life, considered as a whole, has less significance, 
and the different periods that together constitute the life have 
greater importance, independently of their relation to the whole.
Now, roughly speaking, the life of demented people divides 
in two major parts: a dominant deeply unified part and a small 
dangling part outside the unified part. The later segment, con-
sidered independently of its relation to the whole, will be better 
if it is extended. What is best for Vera as she is in her demented 
state is to be treated and to continue to live. But the later seg-
ment, considered dependently of its relation to the whole, Mc-
Mahan continues, will mar the whole. The longer Vera contin-
ues to exist as a demented patient, the more the integrity of the 
whole is degraded. McMahan believes that ‘the meaning and 
value of a certain period within a life can be affected by the na-
ture of the life as a whole of which it is a part. So whether the 
Demented Patient continues to live can retroactively affect the 
meaning and value of her life prior to the onset of dementia’ 
(: ). For this reason McMahan concludes that physi-
cians ought to give priority to the earlier part of Vera’s life and 
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allow her to die. The good of the earlier, higher self is more 
significant than the good of the shallow demented self. The 
good of the dominant, longest unified part of the life coincides 
with what would be best for the life as a whole. The wishes of 
that longest unity have to count as being closest to the life as a 
whole and determining the good of the whole. ‘So the Dement-
ed Patient’s present good ought to be sacrificed for the greater 
good of her earlier self, which is also the greater good of her 
life as a whole’ (: ). There is little prospect of anything 
good for Vera as a patient. Her demented life is describable as 
a series of ‘discrete and mutually irrelevant episodes’ and as a 
life of ‘bovine contentment’: ‘Just as the prospect of this sort of 
life does not normally make a strong claim on us in the case 
of an animal, so it does not offer a strong reason for sustaining 
the Demented Patient’s life’ (: ). McMahan closes with 
a further observation that reinforces, he thinks, his conclusion: 
the reasons people have for composing an advance directive are 
only partly self-interested and very often strongly motivated by 
a desire not to become an emotional and financial burden on 
those they care about. 
I see reason to resist McMahan’s proposal. Amongst its prob-
lems are these. (In line with Derek Parfit) McMahan abandons 
identity as what matters in our practical concerns, but he does 
not explain why ‘life as a whole’ should continue to matter. And 
for whom? There is a second, related puzzle. Accepting that 
the later Vera is psychologically discontinuous with her earlier 
healthy self, how could Vera’s demented episode spoil the value 
of earlier stages? At the time it is heavily ‘snowing in Vera’s head’, 
Vera’s unified period of life is simply over. Her earlier wishes can 
no longer affect her life as a patient suffering from Alzheimer’s 
disease. And vice versa, I would say. How, then, could her life 
with dementia retroactively undermine and mar the value of that 
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earlier unified episode? How is such a reverse causality sup-
posed to change the facts? And who is supposed to suffer the 
damage, and when exactly? Finally, I also have difficulties with 
McMahan’s taxation of animal life, a point that I will flesh out 
in due course.
What this shows, I believe, is that McMahan does not add new 
refreshing arguments that can resolve the puzzle about the moral 
power of advance directives in the dementia case. Let me put 
a third proposal on the table. There also is a communautarian 
approach to the question of the moral authority of precedent au-
tonomy. It says that part of a person’s autonomy is co-constituted 
by others. Autonomy is something ascribed and contested; it is a 
socially situated status grounded in relations of inter-subjective 
recognition (J. Anderson, ). And indeed, to behave autono-
mously on a desert island will be a hard break. According to 
such a social account, in our case of demented personhood the 
most coherent values and interests of the person in question sur-
vive in the broader community, and proxies will try to reflect 
those life-spanning values and interests in the choices they make 
on the demented person’s behalf by making treatment decisions 
that cohere with the direction of the patient’s life story. Vera’s 
advance directive was a public act of self-determination, which 
 This is also David Shoemaker’s objection (9: ). McMahan tries 
to argue from an external standpoint of temporal neutrality. But that is 
science fiction. More true to life is that a person in an early stage of de-
mentia may look back on her abrupt life projects and sadly conclude: ‘It 
was no more than a run-up to nothing.’ Or that friends of a person suffer-
ing from dementia assess: ‘Look at her now. She once was one of our most 
brilliant intellectuals. What a tragedy.’ 
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authoritatively changed the normative situation of others with 
respect to her. She foresaw that her new life would be radically 
out of sync with how it used to be. And that there would be a 
gap between her competent and her incompetent self that could 
not be bridged from either side, but only by those who are wit-
nesses to both sides, i.e., those who knew Vera in better times 
and experience her now. Only those witnesses are able to keep 
the person together, so to speak, and giving them a say in what 
should happen to Vera can be a way of respecting her prece-
dent autonomy. This is sometimes called ‘relational autonomy’ 
(C. Mackenzie & N. Stoljar, ) or ‘assisted autonomy’ 
(T. Nys, unpublished manuscript).9 Should we accept such a 
dialogical view on autonomy?
It is to the credit of such a view that Vera’s precedent autonomy 
(and advance directive) can best be articulated and interpreted 
by significant others who are able to take a view over her whole 
life. Nevertheless, Vera’s case demonstrates a considerably de-
rived sense of respect for autonomy because it is far removed 
from Vera’s subjective endorsement. In dealing with dementia 
her capacities for identification evaporated. So, the proposed 
inter-subjective approach strips autonomy of the very self-gover-
nance that lies at the heart of the concept of autonomy. It leaves 
out the constitutive role of the subject. An implication of such an 
inter-subjective view could be that autonomy even survives the 
death of the subject. That sounds a little odd. In the communau-
tarian proposal interests or identity conferring concerns are in 
9 ‘Assisted’ autonomy is a misleading qualification in the severe Al-
zheimer’s case, where the autonomy in fact is delegated. It is not like 
visiting a doctor and being assisted by a dependable friend. Assistance 
suggests help on demand. 
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danger not to survive as interests or concerns in the usual literal 
sense of the word – in which such interests and concerns must 
have a subject. 
Like the McMahan proposal, the communautarian ap-
proach does not seem to be a passable route to underpin the 
moral authority of precedent autonomy better than my narrative 
approach. Back to the main line.
Where are we so far? This was the matter we need to resolve here: 
can my narrative view withstand the sceptical objections against 
the authority of advance directives in decision making for in-
competent dementia patients? Or do we have to conclude that 
we better give up our initial intuition that advance directives are 
authoritative in the case of Alzheimer, and demote advance di-
rectives from their position in the hierarchy of decision-making 
standards? The first objection raised was the charge of theoreti-
cal tenuousness. Different from the Ulysses contract case, in the 
event of Alzheimer’s disease it is less obvious that the interests 
and values discounted in the whole-life narrative of the person 
have not changed as the years went by. Alzheimer patients are 
irretrievably incompetent and not able to reassess their earlier 
views at some point in the future. Yet, I did not regard the charge 
of theoretical tenuousness as a decisive draw-back.
 I do not discuss one totally different route of thinking here : the pro-
posal of A. Jaworska and others to treat marginal agents like Alzheimer’s 
patients as rudimentary competent and autonomous persons. The idea is 
that just as long as basic capacities are in place like the ability to value (Ja-
worska 999), or the basic emotional capacity to care (Jaworska 7), or a 
basic ability to control one’s experiences (S.V. Shriffin in Burley :9-
7), we must treat Alzheimer’s patients with ‘full moral respect’. Such a 
claim renders advance directives in the end useless. 
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The second sceptical objection was about the lack of moral 
authority and the moral dangers of advance directives in the 
case of severe dementia, and it came in two parts. The second 
(postponed) point was the mainstream patient-centered perspec-
tive that dominates the debate on advance directives in bioethics 
orthodoxy, and I will come to it in a minute. The first point 
was the problem under discussion in the foregoing paragraphs 
and about the conflict between strategies enforcing precommit-
ment in the name of autonomy and the responsibilities to pro-
tect vulnerable patients from harm. I found out that attempts to 
solve the problem in terms of best interests were canceling each 
other out at first. Further independent moral arguments for the 
authority of advance directives were needed. And my own nar-
rativist account seemed to deliver such an argument: precedent 
autonomous identification with the whole of one’s life story, in-
cluding the foreseeable parts of life when one will be severely 
demented and incapable to identify, survives the incompetence 
and dysnarrativia caused by Alzheimer’s disease. Autonomous 
advance treatment choices carry greater moral significance than 
other moral considerations like beneficence or mercifulness, be-
cause they encompass authenticated interests and values express-
ing the person’s design for her life as a whole. However, closer in-
spection of the distal binding powers of identification with a self-
narrative raised doubts. Things are valuable or important to or 
for some sensate creature endorsing it. Things are not important 
to the universe, so to speak. I can only consider a person to be 
autonomous as long as he is capable, or will be capable at some 
point in the future, of renewing or revoking his identification as 
a particular person. For post-persons suffering from Alzheimer’s 
disease, this is not an option. So, I face up to a problem here that 
makes the prominence of anti-paternalistic respect for precedent 
autonomy highly debatable in the case of dementia.
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Suppose I am wrong about the distal binding powers of identi-
fication. How, then, to decide the question what to do with Vera’s 
advance directive? Let me follow, for the sake of argument, David 
DeGrazia’s conscientious advice. This is how he is reasoning. Let 
us assume that Vera was well informed about dementia and the 
implications of her advance directive. There is no reason to think 
that, had she known even more about dementia, she would have 
decided differently. She made her decision in the understanding 
that she might be contented in her state of dementia. Moreover, 
she had no change of heart before losing competence. Then, ‘(e)
ven if it were in (her) current best interests to continue to live, 
(her) precedent autonomy makes (her) life as a whole a very signif-
icant consideration (though not unambiguously a best-interests 
consideration) – and the best option from (her) whole-lifetime, 
autonomy-infused perspective, I submit, is to be allowed to die 
in circumstances like the present ones’ (9). So DeGrazia goes 
for a very careful: Yes, we have to make Vera comfortable, but 
when pneumonia – ‘an old man’s friend’ – comes, withhold an-
tibiotics and allow her to die. Suppose, we are persuaded. Then, 
there is one last sceptical counter-argument left: the problem of 
the mainstream patient-centered perspective that dominates the 
debate on advance directives in contemporary bioethics.
It is common decency to respect the autonomy of persons who 
decide to perform actions that are problematic because they re-
flect shallow values, or because they harm the chooser’s own 
interests or dignity; actions that are irrational, imprudent and 
not self-beneficial (smoking for example). That is fine with me. 
But such cases are different from our dementia example where 
respecting precedent autonomy implies: to inflict harm to some 
other person for reasons this non-autonomous person once found 
self-beneficial but no longer understands. This is an issue I will 
settle in the next section. Can this argument be the straw that 
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breaks the camel’s back in the moral debate on the authority of 
advances directives for the severely demented? I think it can.
4.9 The patient’s keeper
Most philosophical support for advanced directives is built on an 
analysis of the competent individual. Its major premise is that 
no other person bears the burden of the decision as much as the 
patient. Unfortunately, advocates of advance directives tend to 
take a partial view of the treatment situation emphasising indi-
vidual freedom of choice and discounting other important moral 
dilemmas. DeGrazia’s approach is a good example. DeGrazia 
frankly admits that he takes a patient-centered perspective and 
that staying close to the mainstream patient-centered ethic he 
morally oversimplifies the decision-making (). Unfortunately, 
pointing at such a biasedness does not take away the very seri-
ous flaw in such a position. Overlooked is the role of the others 
who have to enforce the advance directive that seeks to impose 
on care providers and proxies a responsibility to act according
 Legal arguments also place high value on individual control over fu-
ture care – in terms of rights of bodily integrity, personal liberty, privacy 
and self-determination. Principles of equality and respect for all individu-
als and the value of human dignity require that demented individuals 
be given the same freedom of choice as competent individuals. Advance 
directives ‘give a voice to people who can no longer speak for themselves’. 
In absence of an advance directive two other standards are playing a role: 
the substituted judgment standard and the best interests standard. The 
substituted judgment standard instructs to make the treatment decision 
the patient would make if miraculously lucid for an interval. Because
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to the patient’s individual instructions. This responsibility may 
conflict with another responsibility, to wit the duty to protect 
incompetent patients from harm (the principle of non-malef-
icence). The preferences expressed in the advance directive 
should be respected only if they fit within the accepted bounds 
of treatment. The duty to protect vulnerable patients from harm 
is such a convention. A directive should not bind physicians to 
practice ‘passive euthanasia’ (though it is not always called that), 
that is, the withholding or withdrawal of treatment that would 
otherwise prolong the life of a non-suffering patient. That would 
clearly harm incompetent patients. And it could also harm the 
physician. This is a delicate point. I am fully aware that not ev-
ery physician withholding treatment and thereby referring to an 
advance directive runs into qualms about his way of behaving. I 
am also aware of the fact that in some cases of dementia medical 
complications like pneumonia are welcomed as a relief by the 
people most concerned and the physician. So, one has to take 
my claim here very literally: that in Vera-like cases a directive 
should not bind physicians to practice ‘passive euthanasia’. This 
leaves open the possibility to act according to circumstances and 
to decide to withdraw or to withhold treatment. 
[continuation of note 151] there is no advance directive, the patient’s general 
values, beliefs and attitudes toward medical care form the basis for treat-
ment decision. At a certain point this standard begins to resemble the best 
interests standard: when evidence of the patient’s past values and prefer-
ences is ambiguous or non-existent. The best interests standard seeks the 
decision most consistent with the patient’s ‘real’ interests. It rests on com-
munity norms and embodies an objective, ‘reasonable person’ approach 
to treatment, in contrast to the subjective, more individualised approach 
embodied in advance directives and the substituted judgment. It endorses 
a standard of best care for the person.
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Yet, advance directives may go one step further and require 
callous and even physically compulsory conduct by clinicians. 
This is at least what the Belgian professor in ethics Etienne Ver-
meersch is expecting from his friend, a physician, who promised 
to help him, when it turns out that Vermeersch in a supposed 
future state of severe dementia does no longer recognise his fam-
ily for about two weeks. At that point, his medical friend will 
practice active euthanasia, following his earlier promise. Profes-
sor Vermeersch was asked in an interview what his friend would 
do in the event that the demented professor resists. He answered: 
‘This friend will carry it out. Euthanising a suffering animal 
one will continue, when the animal resists.’ Following Ver-
meersch, the suffering animal is a comparable case. His own fu-
ture suffering, as he sees it, is that he (possibly) will do things in 
a demented state he normally would be ashamed of. Vermeersch 
mentions his demented mother, always a prudish woman, who 
could not care less about her being half-naked at the end of her 
life. According to Vermeersch, to be satisfied with a wasting 
disease is not an option. It is essential for him ‘to remain him-
self ’, that is, to remain gifted with reason. Beyond reason, life 
has no longer meaning for him. Vermeersch refuses ‘the con-
tented life of a well-fed pig’. 
 P. de Koning, ‘Zonder de rede is het leven zinloos’ in NRC Handels-
blad 9--. Note that human suffering cannot simply be equated 
with being humanly disgraceful. 
 What Vermeersch is fearing are things he can now imagine but would 
most likely not then experience; it is even unclear whether there will be 
a self to whom those ‘terrible’ experiences will happen. In this sense, the 
fears of Vermeersch are unrealistic. If having a sense of self is a prerequisite 
for suffering, the potential for suffering decreases as the illness advances.
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I can imagine that such a planning may impress as an intensely 
personal act in the face of decay and shame, but it leaves out 
the impact of the killing act on others. The same holds for the 
Vera case of ‘passive euthanasia’: the impact of providing main-
tenance and support but not life-saving medical treatment, and 
so allowing Vera to die, when potentially fatal conditions arise. 
This is not about temporarily coercive measures, like in the case 
of preventing the harm of manic disturbance. It is about letting 
die or killing a human being in the name of an advance directive 
that in most cases is not recognised by the patient. Letting 
die or killing a non-suffering human being is not just another 
medical intervention that serves the interests of the patient. It 
turns out to be emotionally, morally and professionally burden-
ing and disrupting for a doctor. Physicians are not executioners. 
For them, it is a matter of sleepless nights. So, my point is that 
we have to show mercy not only for the patient but also for the 
vulnerability of the caregivers and health professionals. We can-
not expect doctors to expose themselves to such psychological 
and moral risks. The moral costs of letting die another person 
who feels happy and comfortable and does not suffer, and who 
 What is essentially lacking in severe dementia is, of course, the pos-
sibility of a shared understanding. Cees Hertogh (9) argues that, next 
to autonomy and beneficence, reciprocity is a conditio sine qua non for 
euthanasia. Such an ultimate form of help is possible only in the context 
of a relation of trust and mutual understanding up until the moment the 
assistance is given. An advance directive can never replace this.
 See e.g. De Boer, Hertogh, Droës, et al (7). ‘Suffering from demen-
tia – the patient’s perspective: a review of the literature’ in International 
Psychogeriatrics 9, -9. The authors conclude that despite the fact that 
dementia is accompanied by a lot of negative feelings, the literature on
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can easily (‘without heroic measures’) be saved are too high for 
care providers. The moral costs are even so high, in my view, 
that they put the command envisioned by advance directives be-
yond reach. I think this scruple is ultimately fatal for the whole 
enterprise of advance directives in cases of severe dementia, and 
that the conclusion we have to draw is that in the case of Al-
zheimer’s disease advance directives are an ineffective method 
of orchestrating one’s future care. The recorded wishes of the 
person whose death is at issue cannot be determinative. Future 
care instructions can only and should only play a partial role 
in decisions concerning patients suffering from Alzheimer’s dis-
ease. The idea that advance directives can do most of the hard 
work implies that those at the bedside can avoid hard choices 
(and conflicts) about which intervention their beloved should 
receive. But such difficult quality-of-life and end-of-life choices 
can rarely be avoided. Given the unforeseeable (!) complexities 
of illness and end-of-life decisions, only proxies and care provid-
ers are in a position to decide what is the best thing to do for 
the demented patient. This does not mean that future patients 
with Alzheimer’s disease are totally helpless to prevent what 
they fear, however. Accepting their future vulnerability instead 
leads to two strategies that stand as alternatives to advance di-
rectives. But before I turn to that, I want to say a few words 
about the supposed worthlessness of a life with severe dementia.
the perspective of the patient offers no solid support to the widespread 
assumption that dementia is necessarily a state of dreadful suffering. More-
over, there is reason to assume that even patients with severe dementia, as 
a consequence of psychological coping strategies and progressive neuro-
logically based unawareness, do not experience the suffering they formerly 
feared at the time they drew up their advance directive (Hertogh, 9).
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Envision once again the case of professor Etienne Vermeersch. 
He rejects a life of ‘bovine contentment’, because such a life is 
beyond reason and meaningless. Why continue a life that is 
meaningless? What would such a wretched epilogue of demen-
tia add to his life? This is, I grant, a precarious point. Taking 
a personal stance, it turns out that episodes of severe dementia 
add very little to a person’s life. At the time dementia rules, the 
person is gone. For reasons I have already touched on, we have 
to accept that a human being suffering from severe dementia is 
no longer a person. What is left from the person is settled on 
the body (dispositions, habits, signs of interest, responsiveness 
to others and resulting behavior) and scattered over the social 
environment. In fact, the demented patient is kept in person-
hood by others and surviving in those others. He can no longer 
put himself in a time structure. How then could he even want 
to continue his life? His behavior is largely automatised. His life 
is broken into separate events just like a sentence falling apart 
in single words. He is totally absorbed by the now here. His life 
only consists of a momentaneous bundle of experiences; often 
pleasant, positive experiences, as far as we know (disagreement 
here with Vermeersch’s parallel of the suffering animal). Is it a 
meaningful life? 
Taking Susan Wolf ’s proposal for what it is to live a meaning-
ful life – a meaningful life is one that is actively and at least 
somewhat successfully engaged in a project (or projects) of posi-
tive value (7: ) –, we have to admit that the life of a dement-
ed human being is pointless. Yet, from the perspective of the 
severely demented, just as from the perspective of a cat, meaning 
is not an issue. ‘Integrity value’ is not an issue. ‘Experiential in-
terests’ are the only things that matter to the severely demented. 
But here, I think, Vermeersch and I reach a fork in the road. The 
consideration I want to emphasize here, contra Vermeersch, is 
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that the meaninglessness of the life of a human being does not 
give us any positive reason to end it.
The equation with animal life is instructive now. We should 
not think that demented people like animals are less important 
to themselves as individuals because to us they seem to be less 
person or less rational than we are – for that is nothing from 
their point of view. Each of them has subjectivity that is still 
uniquely her own, however similar its contents are to that of 
others. Animals and Alzheimer’s patients are important to them-
selves by their own standards. What is important to them is to 
lead keen lives of appetite and sensation, to eat and drink, to be 
integrated with their bodies and to inhabit them joyfully, and to 
live in the moment. To be sure, the death of a person is tragic in 
a way different from the death of an animal or a demented post-
person. But it is important to remember that persons, human 
beings and non-human animals who lose their lives all lose any-
thing they have and that is important to them.7 Persons are not 
more important than demented human beings or other animals. 
Such cosmic rankings make no sense. There is something im-
ponderable about the comparison. They are just very different. 
To put the point in a more clear-thinking, Korsgaardian way: 
as rational animals human beings have rational and natural
 Admittedly, it is true that Vermeersch does not put the point as a 
general claim; his remark is meant for people who claim the right to see 
their own lives as pointless.
7 In a contra-intuitive, goading essay (Why I have no future, 9) Galen 
Strawson defends a No Ownership of the Future View. It says that from 
a first person perspective the only life people can lose is the one they are 
living now in the present. One cannot lose the future, for no one can take 
from one what one does not have.
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concerns. They place value on both parts of their nature. Many 
of their natural concerns – the desire to avoid pain is an obvious 
example – spring from their animal nature, not from their ratio-
nal nature. So, as rational animals human beings have to treat 
their animal part with respect and compassion for its own sake. 
And the same holds for the treatment of the animal life of oth-
ers, including the life of dementia patients. Like all animals, and 
more than animals, demented people are our fellow creatures, 
fellow travellers, and fellow sufferers. They make a strong moral 
claim on us. We expect civilised people not to kill their pet just 
like that or because the lives of pets are ‘without meaning’.
Not enough is said here, but even if one remains unconvinced 
and still wants to eliminate a non-suffering demented human 
being, one has to come up with positive reasons for doing that. 
Here is a much disputed candidate: we can admit that demented 
people have an interest in leading happy lives as long as they are 
living, but they do not have an interest in the prolongation of 
their happy lives. Only persons can have an interest in continu-
ing their lives, whereas demented post-persons are not able to 
entertain reasons to wish extra lifetime. Life ‘is no longer call-
ing them’. They have become indifferent to continuation. This 
is certainly true, although I do not think that this gives us a 
 I am fully aware that human moral attitudes and practices with re-
spect to the other animals exhibit a great instability. People often seem to 
accept without question that animals do not make a strong moral claim 
on us. This is, I think, a widespread moral shortcoming. Here I take a 
radical, revisionist stance on the heels of Christine Korsgaard. Recall that 
only two hundred years ago white Americans had no scruples about mu-
tilating or killing black people. They were wrong. Nowadays humans are 
not justified in casually destroying animal life. 
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good reason to end such a life untimely. To end it untimely is to 
deprive the patient from a valuable life (this line of reasoning is 
often called the deprivation argument). The life of a demented 
human being may be of no additional personal value, it certainly 
adds some value. It may have instrumental value insofar as it con-
tributes to the interests or well-being of others. And it has value 
to the extent that a demented life is often good and worth living 
for the human being who is experiencing it.
I can now turn, as promised, to the two strategies for future 
Alzheimer’s patients that stand as alternatives for drawing up 
an advance directive. One possibility for diagnosed Alzheimer’s 
patients is to forget about autonomy in their future incompetent 
state. Remarks about the future state of incompetence constitute 
a limited attempt to gain power over events that are often un-
manageable. In Dresser’s arresting phrase: ‘In anticipating our 
possible futures as incompetent patients, we should accept that 
we cannot exercise firm control over our later medical care – that 
we will, for the most part, be dependent on others to protect us 
from harm and indignities’ (-: ). Accepting that, we 
may write in advance a durable power of attorney and name a 
proxy as surrogate, believing that we have a trustworthy fam-
ily and a supportive circle of friends and preferring to endure 
the outcome if they err in predicting our preferences or if they 
choose to ignore our preferences, rather than to remove from 
them the opportunity and the burden of making the choices. Let 
our caregivers use their own judgment to reach their decisions on 
what will be in our best interests.9 We can draw up an advance 
9 Note that no cut-and-dried solutions are offered in this scenario. In 
some cases it will be difficult to find a devoted proxy. In most cases proxy 
and care providers will have to make difficult decisions, ‘passive euthana-
sia’ (though it is not always called that) being one of them. 
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directive ad libitum, but this is not a necessary means. It can be 
a bit of encouragement. To appoint a future surrogate decision-
maker is a matter of trust. Such a person is familiar with our life 
story. We value her judgment and the way she perceives and re-
spects us. And we even deeply care about how she will feel about 
our future situation. 
In this proposal, to give the last say to a surrogate decision-
maker is our last act of autonomy-at-its-best. When dementia 
is setting in, we are at the mercy of others. Others decide. Most 
doctors are not willing to let die a happily senile patient with 
pneumonia exclusively acting on information received from an 
advance directive. They will do what is possible to maintain and 
supply medical and supportive treatment until the end of the 
patient’s natural life. And most proxies will try to keep their 
happily senile beloved as long as possible in their midst. They 
will hold their beloved in personhood, maintaining her identity 
for her (as they did all along, by the way). H. Dupuis about 
her demented life partner in a recent interview: ‘I care for 
my husband. He is like a child now. My motive is the supposed 
reciprocity. He would have done the same for me. It remains to
 In Filosofie Magazine 7 (). Another well-known example is what 
Iris Murdoch’s husband tried to realise for his wife and described in John 
Bayley (99), Iris, A memoir of Iris Murdoch. London: Gerald Duckworth 
& Co. Ltd. Faced with the choice to decide how and when their dement-
ed loved one should die, proxies will be keen on signs that the patient 
himself initiates the train of events that leads to death. Advance directives 
cannot replace this action of the patient. Sometimes demented patients, 
who always rebelled against the loss of autonomy and control, die very 
soon and unexpectedly, as if they still ‘choose’ the time of their own death 
and put their signature on their lives. But, in general, nature imposes se-
vere limits on our ability to control how and when we die.
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be seen if it is possible to promote the well-being of other people. 
Anyhow, we must try not to harm them. Good care? That is 
paying as much attention as possible to the person one was and 
is. To pull one’s individuality its weight.’
It is my belief that this strategy is the one we have to prefer. As 
a player affirms in Bert Keizer’s brain-opera Alzheimer: ‘Demen-
tia can be seen as a disaster area that the patient has to traverse 
together with his loved ones. That there is someone at your side 
who knows the way through the jungle is invaluable, even with-
out any means to alter that jungle somehow or other.’ But my 
hunch is that the first strategy will not satisfy the advocates of 
respect for autonomy who may want to skip the whole sorrowful 
experience of severe dementia. 
Even then, there is a second alternative for advance directives 
in the case of Alzheimer’s disease. One can use his ‘right to die’ 
and commit suicide before becoming incompetent. This is very 
much a last resort position, but for people who want to avoid at 
all costs the dependence and humiliation of dementia and re-
main ‘in charge’, it offers a way out. No difficult decisions to be 
taken by doctors and friends. After Alzheimer’s disease has been 
diagnosed or in the comparatively early stages of the disease, 
when one is still able to form and act on plan and is likely to 
have access to means of suicide, one can autonomously decide: ‘I 
don’t want to go through this illness’, and take measures to die 
just before the illness sets in. Nature has provided us with the 
 Taken from Keizer B. (-). Alzheimer. Tragikomische Hersenopera 
in Twee Acten, Amsterdam,  (unpublished libretto).
 People considering suicide, just like people considering an advance 
directive, may misjudge the impact of the experience of severe dementia. 
Notice that stoic suicide is inconsistent with my preferred strategy in that 
it denies the deprivation argument. 
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key of the backdoor, as Montaigne sets it in Coustume de l’Isle de 
Cea. Escapist suicide puts us in hot water, of course. There are 
many questions. Why is the killing of another person morally
insuperable and self-termination a viable option? Is suicide a fail-
ure to treasure the gift of life? Is suicide a bad or mad thing to 
do? It is my belief that it is better to think it is not a bad thing. 
More precisely: not in all cases. The rest of my argument will be 
an attempt at clarifying this claim.
4.10 Pre-emptive suicide as the triumph of autonomy?
In the standard psychiatric view, persons who threaten or com-
mit suicide are seen as irrational or mentally ill. Thomas Szasz, 
an influential (anti)psychiatrist strongly holds the belief that 
there is no such connection between suicide and mental ill-
ness: ‘(T)here is neither philosophical nor empirical support for 
viewing suicide as different, in principle, from other acts such 
as getting married or divorced, working on the Sabbath, eating 
shrimp, or smoking tobacco. These and countless other things 
people do are the result of personal decisions…’ Although it is 
 Quoted in Jamison : . Kay Redfield Jamison herself empha-
sises in her book on suicide that suicide in most cases is a rare act of a 
troubled or depressed person. According to Szasz, suicide is a matter of 
personal choice, not of sin, crime or illness. Self-killing is not even medi-
cal matter and physicians have no place in it. Death control is a moral 
matter and should be under the control of the individual. And if the day 
comes when you need to be in control of how your life ends, and you 
cannot find a doctor who will help, Peter Singer advises Final Exit by 
Derek Humphrey as the book to get. In Dutch Boudewijn Chabot’s guide 
Uitweg () is an option.
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impossible to disregard the psychopathological causes of a lot of 
suicidal behavior, I think Szasz has a point. A person can com-
mit a so-called balance-suicide on rational grounds. Historical 
examples of self-inflicted death are legion. There is ‘altruistic’ 
self-sacrifice among the elderly and the sick in nomadic societies 
to save commonly held resources of food. In pre-Christian times 
suicide was a matter of honor, of action taken to avoid falling 
into the hands of a military enemy, of atonement for wrongdo-
ing, or a way to uphold a religious or philosophical principle. In 
ancient Greece the Stoics and the Epicureans defended the indi-
vidual’s right to choose the means and the time of his death. And 
at the end of his essay On Suicide David Hume wrote, convinc-
ingly, to my mind, that ‘prudence and courage should engage us 
to rid ourselves at once of existence when it becomes a burden’. 
I do not want to idealise self-delivery here ‘as the privilege of 
the human’ (J. Améry). But my intuitive belief is that there is a 
lot that speaks for balance-suicide within the context of severe 
dementia. What I have in mind with that is what Boudewijn 
Chabot named ‘self-euthanasia’. 
Yet, suicide is morally suspect. In a diary note Ludwig Witt-
genstein called suicide, without further argument, ‘the elemen-
tary sin’. Stronger arguments against escapist suicide can be 
 ‘Self-euthanasia’ in Chabot’s definition is ending one’s own life by 
taking a combination of drugs or by knowingly stopping taking food and 
drinks. He lists four constraints (: 9): it is not a solitary act; there is 
no pain and no mutilation; it is effective; and the agent is causing his own 
death (contrary to assisted suicide).
 ‘If suicide is allowed then everything is allowed. If anything is not al-
lowed then suicide is not allowed. This throws a light on the nature of eth-
ics, for suicide is, so to speak, the elementary sin’ in Notebooks 191-16 (eds. 
G.H. von Wright & G.E.M. Anscombe), Oxford: Blackwell, 9, 9e.
240  practical identity
found in the deontological camp. Kant, for example, argued that 
cutting our life short is immoral when committed for the pur-
pose of escaping from unhappiness. Suicide is opposed to the 
principle of humanity as an end in itself, to put it in a Kantian 
vernacular, because it throws away and degrades humanity in 
oneself. The issue is pressed with insight by David Velleman in 
his 999 A Right of Self-Termination?  Velleman offers a clear 
and subtle reconstruction of Kant’s argument by presenting a 
particular interpretation of Kant’s formula of humanity, which 
says that a human person has a value that makes him an end in 
himself. Let us take a closer look at Velleman’s account.
Defenders of escapist suicide claim that they have a moral right 
to live and die in the light of their own convictions about why 
their life is valuable and where its value lies. Following Velleman, 
this principle is based on two presumptions. The first is that a 
person has the right to make his own life shorter in order to 
make it better on the whole for him. The second is that we have 
to defer to the person’s judgment on the subject of his own good 
(7). Velleman can accept the second presumption. The person 
living a life is the best judge of the value that its continuation 
would afford him; we have to defer to his considered judgment 
even when we have reason to regard his judgment about whether 
it would be good for him to go on living is mistaken. But Velle-
man rejects the first presumption, the idea that a life sometimes 
is no longer worth living and that a person has the right to end 
 And reconsidered in his  ‘Beyond Price’, Ethics , 9-. In this 
paper Velleman supplements respect for persons with ‘love’ for persons. 
Note that the scope of the right to suicide is broader than the right to free-
dom from unwanted medical treatment or a right to ‘passive euthanasia’, 
as in the Vera case.
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his life solely on the grounds of the benefits he will thereby ob-
tain or the harms he will avoid. Velleman therefore invites us to 
think about the concept of interest-relative value. 
What is good for a person? The best answer, to Velleman’s 
knowledge, is Stephen Darwall’s proposal: what’s good for a per-
son is what’s rational to want for his sake, i.e., the person’s good 
is what would be rational to want out of concern for that person. 
By the same token, Darwall argues that also the person himself 
is rationally obliged to care about his good insofar as he cares 
about the person whose good it is – that is, himself: ‘What’s 
good for a purpose is worth caring about only out of concern 
for the purpose, and hence only insofar as the purpose is worth 
caring about. Similarly, what’s good for a person is worth car-
ing about only out of concern for the person, and hence only 
insofar as he is worth caring about. A person’s good has only 
hypothetical or conditional value, which depends on the value 
of the person himself (...). (E)very person already matters for his 
own sake, because of embodying an interest-independent value’ 
(). Kant’s term for this interest-independent value is ‘dignity’. 
Kant attributes dignity to all persons in virtue of their rational 
nature. And what morality requires of us, in Kant’s opinion, is 
that we respect the dignity (that is, the rational nature) of per-
sons. This value is not just the affair of the person in question. 
The dignity of a person is something larger. It is a value that a 
person possesses by virtue of being ‘one of us’. Dignity is a ‘self-
existent’ value, according to Kant. It exists already. It is to be 
valued as it is. And it commands respect. Dignity makes a claim 
on us. It is a value that we must ‘live up to’. Period. The value 
of a person is unconditional. The Kantian notion of dignity is 
that of valuing a person in a special way, not to a special degree 
– indeed in a way that does not admit of degrees. It cannot be 
balanced against the person’s interests. Dignity is not something 
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the person can accept or decline. It is a value in him – not for 
him – which he can only violate or respect. With that clear for 
the moment, let us consider how dignity functions within Velle-
man’s argument against escapist suicide. 
According to Velleman, committing suicide on the grounds 
that life is not worth living is trading one’s person in exchange 
for relief from harm. Such an act entails a practical irrational-
ity analogous to that of sacrificing an end for the sake of the 
means to it. This is immoral in Velleman’s view. His objection 
to suicide is not that it destroys something of value but that it 
denigrates the person’s value by trading the person for interest-
relative goods, namely escaping from decay. It weighs the person 
in the balance against interest-relative goods, thereby denigrat-
ing the person’s value as a person – and, by implication, the value 
of all persons. But Kantianism leaves open the possibility that a 
person’s dignity may justify suicide in other contexts, if suicide 
constitutes an appropriate expression of respect for the dignity 
of the person. Or so it seems to Velleman, controversially. But 
how so?
The idea is that a person’s chosen death can be morally accept-
able if the person can no longer live with dignity. Dignity can 
require the destruction of what is losing it, if the loss is irretriev-
able, like in cases of unbearable pain or terminal illness. Unbear-
able pain can tyrannise persons in a fashion that undermines 
their rational agency. Unbearable pain ‘is somehow to fall apart 
in the face of it, to disintegrate as a person’ (). The person 
is falling apart synchronically and diachronically. Alzheimer’s 
disease is another example of suffering that threatens person-
hood. Dementia is the distressing perception of actual or threat-
ened disintegration in the self. It does not necessarily accompany 
pain, but ‘it does necessarily touch one’s dignity – the value that 
one has by virtue of being a person and that is jeopardized when 
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one falls apart’ (7). This is not to say that Velleman defends 
a fundamental right to choose between life and death. There 
might be a moral justification for suicide in some cases, but it 
does not rest on a right of self-(de)termination. The moral jus-
tification is that it will spare the patient from degradation. Vel-
leman also points at the fact that to permit oneself the choice of 
suicide for the sake of one’s autonomy leads to a paradox. Suicide 
may be an exercise of autonomy and a violation of autonomy at 
the same time. It is ‘to treat a single exercise of that autonomy as 
worth the sacrifice of one’s autonomous self. It is to treat oneself 
like a stick of dynamite’ ().
I think this is an interesting result. Velleman’s approach fits 
very well into a narrative theory of self-constitution and autono-
my. And I take it that Velleman’s reconstruction of the Kantian 
argument gives us all we need to defend escapist suicide in the 
case of threatening dementia, even along Kantian lines. I for one 
find Velleman’s modification still unsatisfying for at least two 
reasons. My first worry is about the claim that human nature as 
a rational, autonomous person is of ‘incomparable worth’ and 
‘above all price’ and admits no equivalent. This seems an un-
founded assertion to me. It sounds like a secular version of reli-
gious talk about the sanctity of human life. Agreed, rationality 
is special but why should this faculty be inviolable and decisive? 
And what does it exactly mean that the value of personhood is 
‘self-existent’ other than that the speaker is putting forward an 
a priori argument? To postulate the value of personhood as ‘an 
end in itself ’ is to immunize it. It is a conversation stopper. To 
be sure, respect for persons and a ban on killing (other) persons 
are both wise and defensible moral guidelines. But we better take 
personhood (that is, our rational nature) as rooted in an ideal 
conception of human life, that is, as a construct we might equate 
with worthiness of respect. It is based on the ideal of the kind 
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of person we want to be and the kind of personal life we want 
to lead. Ideally it can be valued for its own sake. But it does 
not hold unconditionally and above all else. No more than that 
rejecting the ‘self-existent’ or noumenal, in Kant’s rendering, sta-
tus of personhood will reduce all other persons’ interest-relative 
goods to things that no longer really matter to them.7 
In line with David Velleman, Thomas Hill, another neo-Kan-
tian, argues that in three sorts of cases to end one’s life before 
its natural end implies not necessarily an insult to the dignity of 
life (99: 9-): Firstly, the case of suicide when human life is no 
longer possible (‘I prefer not to continue to live as a subhuman 
being’). Secondly, suicide to end gross irremediable pain (i.e., the 
Velleman cases). And thirdly, the case of suicide based on self-
regarding moral beliefs (‘I couldn’t live with myself if I did that, 
e.g. becoming a slave, a prostitute, or a cannibal, because it vio-
lates the deepest values concerning how one should live’). Hill 
stresses that suicide in these three cases may be dignity-of-life-
affirming and that one should treat dignity as a special value, 
independent of but not always overriding considerations of the 
person’s good. Moreover, according to Hill, in all three cases 
cutting short the time one could live as a rational, autonomous 
agent can be seen as a manifestation of autonomy, an ultimate 
7 When we bring up for discussion the sacrosanct, intrinsic dignity of 
personhood based on the reason-trafficking faculties of persons, it be-
comes less clear why persons exclusively deserve ‘full moral standing’ and 
sentient human beings or animals (maybe) less. 
 This leaves us with the worry what to make of the values that con-
stitute a person’s integrity. Any value that a person chooses to live by? 
Only values that contribute to the person’s good? How to define a person’s 
good? These are not matters we need to resolve here. 
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decision of the author of a biography to conclude with a power-
ful expression of values one chose to live by. This leads me to my 
second and for present purposes more important dissatisfaction 
with Velleman’s view.
David Velleman is reluctant to emphasise that asserting a ‘right 
of self-termination’ really is a matter of self-determination. 
I want to stress this relation. Taking my lead from Margaret 
Pabst Battin, I consider the right of suicide as a fundamental 
moral right, that is, a right ‘to do certain sorts of things just 
because doing those things tends to be constitutive of human 
dignity’ (99: ). And, like Battin and Hill, I consider pre-
emptive suicide in the face of deteriorative mental conditions 
such as Alzheimer’s disease as an autonomous act, based on an 
ideal self-conception, beneath which one is not willing to slip: ‘I 
am what I have been, but cannot be anymore’. The suicide is not 
acting ‘in the twilight of the patient’s autonomy’. Looking out 
onto severe dementia, surcease or cessation suicide is anticipated 
and planned. The decision to suicide is a composed, rational, 
‘self-dignifying’ affirmation of one’s self-narrative. The person 
strongly identifies with his true self-narrative and decides that 
dignity requires that he has to end his life. This is, of course, 
fatal exercise of autonomy and elimination of a valuer. But it is 
not to adopt an attitude that denies or denigrates the valuer in 
question. It takes the person as an end in itself. Recall that decid-
ing to give Alzheimer’s disease free play also implies the destruc-
tion of autonomy and personhood. Pre-emptive suicide seems to 
me an ultimate act of self-determination or what Germans call 
Freitod: a profoundly individual voluntary choice to bring about 
one’s own death. All in all, pre-emptive suicide – like all suicide 
– remains an act of aggression towards oneself and towards oth-
ers. There is always an element of ‘dynamite’ in it that is self-
246  practical identity
destructing and has damaging effects on life, loved-ones, care 
providers, and society as a whole. But pre-emptive suicide that 
is constituting human dignity and is anticipated and planned 
in a resigned and purposeful way will considerably temper the 
violence and collateral damage.9 Let me end my discussion of 
pre-emptive self-delivery with an intriguing thought-experiment 
offered by Margaret Pabst Battin that provides insight in what 
the desiderata of autonomous suicide in the face of Alzheimer’s 
disease are:
Suppose there were a simple medical device, based on triple 
technology of the time-release capsule, the subdermal con-
traceptive implant, and a painless, quick-acting euthanasia 
drug developed in the Netherlands. The device is called a 
“delayed-onset euthanatic implant”. Anybody newly diag-
nosed with Alzheimer’s disease (or any other long-term, de-
generative, ultimately fatal disease), while still lucid and com-
petent, can request one. Positioned painlessly and invisibly 
just below the surface of the skin inside the upper arm, the 
implant is designed to release its lethal drug instantaneously 
after a designated delay – say, two or three years, or whatever 
the patient requesting the implant stipulates. The implant can 
9 There is of course some tension between the two strategies proposed 
in the last two sections. The first holds that we have to upgrade and re-
spect our animal nature, especially the animal life of other people. The 
second allows the autonomous self-destruction of our animal-cum-per-
sonal nature as an exception. I am accepting some asymmetry here. I 
clearly consider pre-emptive suicide as a last resort strategy and submis-
sion as the preferable and most valid one. But I take it that both strategies 
are morally justifiable.
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be easily removed and there are full guarantees, rigorously ob-
served in practice, that a patient can have it removed at any 
time, for any reason, with no delay. If it is removed there are 
no after-effects. But if the implant is not removed, it will re-
lease the euthanaticum after the designated delay – without 
further warning, without pain or discomfort, and without re-
quiring activation of any sort. It will just go off, and like an 
instantly fatal but pain free heart attack, that will be the end 
(99: -).
I am not sure Battin’s device will be doomed to remain science 
fiction. Awaiting coming events, it will be clear that her thought-
experiment with ‘reversible euthanasia’ succeeds in doing three 
important things: firstly, it permits the autonomously choosing 
early Alzheimer’s patient who wishes to avoid late stage deterio-
ration to bring about her own death. Secondly, it avoids hav-
ing others kill the patient after she is no longer competent. And 
thirdly, it does not force the patient to waste ‘good’ life during 
the early phases of the disease, where there are still lucid inter-
vals. Above all, the fictional implant permits direct autonomous 
choice. Advance directives, in contrast, displace actual decision-
making onto persons other than the patient. They may masquer-
ade as instruments of the patient’s choice, but cannot fully serve 
this purpose. 
4.11 Taking stock
My aim in this fourth chapter was to engage my accounts of 
personhood and autonomy with specific practical issues, in par-
ticular Ulysses contracts in mental health care. I have tried to 
demonstrate that my narrative approach to personhood and 
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autonomy has some advantages. It can considerably clarify the 
qualms about practical identity problems of episodically disor-
dered psychiatric patients; and my account offers an improve-
ment on our understanding of those patients’ autonomy. I have 
argued for the following conclusions:
. My narrative self-constitution view illuminates reported ex-
periences of psychiatrists and patients with recurrent psychosis. 
Here, then, are the main results: in cases of severe psychosis the 
patient is temporarily a ‘no-more-person’. In less severe cases the 
personal changes are experienced as deviant. Yet, there seem to 
be no practical reasons for supposing that the psychotic patient 
is someone else. The patient’s psychotic experiences in some way 
or other take part in the life-spanning narrative self-constituting 
process. Nevertheless, frequent far-reaching changes of a person 
may raise the question of how a person’s story can be designated 
as the authoritative one. After all, the self-narrative of the non-
psychotic, the pre-psychotic and the psychotic will diverge con-
siderably. The answer I propose is that coherence is of decisive 
importance here. The most coherent story is the authoritative 
one. In (pre-)psychotic stories the internal coherence often is se-
riously flawed and important parts of the non-psychotic life sto-
ry sometimes disappear from sight, whereas the non-psychotic 
self-constituting narrative is sometimes more consistent but al-
ways keen on the integration of the (pre-)psychotic story into the 
self-constituting narrative. Of overriding importance, however, 
is that the (pre-)psychotic story as a rule lacks sense of reality 
(‘external’ coherence). To some extent it does not match with the 
facts of the world and with the way significant others interpret 
the (pre-)psychotic self-narrative.
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. My narrative outlook on autonomy can make sense of the no-
tion of precedent autonomy and underpin a moral justification 
of the use of Ulysses contracts. Although psychosis causes narra-
tive disruption of identity, persons are able to bridge the gap by 
making recurrent psychoses part of their self-narrative, and by 
prospectively identifying with their future psychotic state (pa-
tients composing a Ulysses contract experienced psychosis be-
fore). A core idea in my narrativist contribution to the discussion 
of advance directives is the person’s identification with a set of 
whole-life, persistent and coherent identity conferring concerns 
(values and interests, as I also called them). Such entities can 
survive severe psychosis. In my view, autonomy serves those per-
sistent and coherent values and interests and we best respect the 
person’s autonomy overall when we give priority to the auton-
omy exercised by a person when most competent to exercise it. 
This person can decide what set of policies do best to protect the 
person’s autonomy overall. I have my doubts, however, about the 
stability of what Ronald Dworkin coined the ‘integrity-value’ of 
a person’s life. Contra Dworkin I take into consideration that the 
criteria for evaluating what to count valuable and what trivial 
often change within a human biography. The good news is that 
in the Ulysses contract case the lifelong persistence of values and 
interests is not of overriding importance. Psychosis is an episodic 
phenomenon and misjudgments can be rectified afterwards. 
The upshot for the moral assessment of Ulysses contracts is 
this: accepting the primacy of respect for autonomy as a starting 
point and taking autonomy as a diachronic matter, the enforce-
ment of Ulysses contracts can be morally justified. First of all, 
enforcing a Ulysses contract we do respect the precedent autono-
mous consent of the patient. In addition, in many cases it will be 
possible to respect the patient’s subsequent autonomous consent 
too. Nevertheless, the moral costs are substantial. Advancing 
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identity conferring concerns the person no longer cares about 
and treating a relatively competent protesting person under co-
ercion may be harmful as it may be experienced by patients and 
professionals as traumatic and as an attack on their identity. 
Moreover, whether coercive therapy succeeds is unpredictable 
and partly a matter of luck. But expectations are that a short vio-
lation of autonomy plus a long period in desirable circumstances 
after the compulsory intervention will, on balance, produce op-
timal self-governance. 
. Although the idea of precommitment may impress as a seduc-
tive strategy, my thought is that the use of advance directives is 
limited. This becomes clear, when we consider advance directives 
in cases of severe dementia of the Alzheimer’s type. Again, my 
narrative account of personhood and personal autonomy turns 
out to be helpful to illuminate the highly problematic authority 
of advance directives in cases of severe dementia. Comparable 
with the recurrent psychosis case, the times at which there is no 
narrator can be bound up in a self-constituting narrative, and 
so those stages can be attributed to the person who narrates and 
identifies in advance. But the case of dementia is different, of 
course. Firstly, the narrative disruption of identity now is perma-
nent and runs deeper. The person disappears. Secondly, identi-
fication with the incompetent state of dementia is more difficult 
than identification with a period of recurrent psychosis, because 
the person cannot show own experience with dementia. Thirdly, 
allowing for possible changes of heart is not an option. 
The moral justification of advance directives as a vehicle of 
precedent autonomy also faces new problems in the Alzheimer’s 
case. I considered advance directives requesting that the severely 
demented patients not receive life-sustaining treatment should 
they become life-threatening ill. The first problem is that, in 
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my view, at this stage of dementia the distal binding powers of 
precedent autonomy have expired. I take a person to be exer-
cising autonomy as long as he is capable, or will be capable at 
some point in the future of identifying with his self-narrative. As 
a consequence, an advance directive enforcing precommitment 
choices now competes with the moral responsibilities to protect 
actual vulnerable incompetent patients from harm. My narrativ-
ist account of autonomy cannot deliver a decisive moral justifica-
tion for trumping the actual interests of the severely demented 
post-person with the interests of the person prior to the onset of 
dementia. This gave me reason to look elsewhere for an extra 
argument. To no avail. 
The second problem is that the moral debate on advance di-
rectives is dominated by the patient-centered perspective. This 
strikes me as a fatal flaw. We are in the business of life and death 
now, not of precarious compulsory treatment. Others have to 
enforce the directive, that is, to withhold treatment and to let the 
patient die. The moral costs of killing another person who feels 
happy and comfortable and does not suffer and who can easily 
be saved, are high and tip the scale. I argued that we have to 
show mercy not only for the incompetent patient but also for the 
vulnerability of the care providers. We cannot expect doctors to 
expose themselves to such moral risks. The moral costs are even 
so high, in my view, that they put the command envisioned by 
advance directives beyond reach. In the case of Alzheimer’s dis-
ease advance directives are an ineffective method of orchestrat-
ing one’s future care. They can be no more than a bit of support.
. This leaves persons diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease and 
confronted with a catalog of horrors with two strategies that 
stand as alternatives to advance directives. One possibility is that 
they accept that autonomy in their future incompetent state of 
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dementia is not an issue and that they will be dependent on oth-
ers to protect them from harm and indignities. Surely, they can 
draw up an advance directive, but this is not a necessary means. 
When severe dementia is setting in, others decide. The second 
possibility is that they commit pre-emptive suicide after Alz-
heimer’s disease has been diagnosed. This is not claiming that 
it is better to be dead than to be demented. But for some people 
autonomy, including autonomy over future treatment, is a trea-
sured value that cannot be abandoned and is more valuable than 
life itself. They want to remain in control and avoid what they 
see as a troubling, lost existence. For those patients Romana mors 
in the face of Alzheimer is a morally justifiable autonomous act.
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SUMMARY
This dissertation is a two-stage project. In the second part (chap-
ter four) I apply an account of personhood and autonomy to 
specific practical issues in mental health care. In the first part 
(the chapters one, two and three) I try to provide that account 
in terms of agency. Like other animals human beings act. But 
there is something distinctive about the nature of human action. 
In virtue of a certain type of self-consciousness humans are con-
scious of the grounds of their actions. They act for reasons and 
can make choices. This distinctive feature of human agency, rea-
son, brings with it two capacities. First, human agents can take 
control of their actions and have to work out how to do that. 
They have a capacity for normative self-government. Second, 
whenever human agents take control over their actions, they are 
making themselves the authors of their actions. They are faced 
with the task of deciding who to be. As rational agents, human 
beings also have a capacity for normative self-constitution, i.e., for 
constructing norm-governed or practical forms of identity. It is 
this practical form of identity that I am after in my dissertation. 
In the first chapter I take the ongoing debate on human agency 
as an entry point, especially the self-constitution view of Chris-
tine Korsgaard, who offers a picture of reflective agency and 
goes on to derive a very elaborate account of personal identity 
in terms of deliberative action. Humans are born for action, she 
states, and agents are moving through a ‘space of reasons’. They 
have the capacity to deliberate, that is, to choose for acting on 
reasons about what they would do if their reasons were to sur-
vive a process of reflective scrutiny. When an agent reflectively 
does choose which reasons he is to act on, and, when he acts on 
these reasons, he does act in ways that are constitutive of his self, 
254  practical identity
viz., of his identity. So, on the Korsgaardian account, identity is 
practical identity and is bound up with practical reasoning. The 
substantia nigra of self-constitution, according to Korsgaard, is 
the normative force of practical reason. It is the normative con-
sistency of reasons that is constitutive for personhood and for 
the unity of personhood. I agree, but I do however put some 
doubts on the table. I think Korsgaard overestimates the unify-
ing power of the human rational abilities. Her idea that human 
beings by nature have rational capacities that ought to achieve 
overall rational unity within themselves is unwarranted. All that 
can follow from Korsgaard’s account is that human beings can 
achieve overall rational unity. The rational capacities that hu-
man nature supplies do not by themselves dictate to what extent 
human beings have to reach rational unity and how to do it. It 
is true that Korsgaard, taking her lead from Aristotle, adds extra 
resources to support her unification argument. In spite of this, 
the unifying role of practical reason, c.q. the Korsgaardian prin-
ciple of autonomy (universalisability), turns out to be overblown. 
We have to move to a less principled, instrumental role for rea-
sons that are constitutive for personhood and the unification of 
personhood. Believing we need unifying reasons in a strongly 
Korsgaardian, formal sense to be persons is a mistake: we can be 
persons with far less. By implication, we have to weaken the uni-
fication requirement. Persons are constituted by a self-reweaving 
network of reasons, that is, a self-correcting enterprise which can 
put any claim in jeopardy, but not all at once. We can think here 
of Neurath’s famous boat. All personal reasons are experimental, 
fallible, and replaceable like the planks of Neurath’s ship. This is 
not to say that persons are not committed to unity. For the most 
part persons do not want to be like wrecked ships. But to lead the 
more or less unified lives of more or less unified persons, all these 
persons need is a Humean reading of instrumental reasoning 
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instead of Korsgaardian ‘principled reasoning’. And in addition 
to means-end reasoning they can adopt a Humean conception 
of ‘reflective rationality’, some steady and general point of view 
in order to correct their idiosyncrasies. In a word, I take it that 
Korsgaard’s self-constitution view is leaving us unsatisfied and 
only can be a reasonable start for a viable theory of persons in 
terms of agency. And my proposal is to develop the reason view 
of personhood into a narrative view of the person. We better 
take reasons as an incipient story about us, that is, as a ‘rationale’ 
that makes our actions intelligible as coherent developments in a 
life story. I have at least three arguments for such a move. First, 
stories in all probability are the easiest and most natural way to 
put in order our experiences and our knowledge. They seem to 
be a natural place to look for an adequate understanding of per-
sonhood. Second, a coherent self-constituting story will do more 
justice to the multiplexity, the discontinuities, and the changes 
of the person than unifying reasons can. In a narrative view on 
persons the unification constraint can be replaced by a demand 
for coherence, and reason can play a less normatively potent and 
more instrumental role. A third argument for developing the 
reason view on persons into a narrative view is that a narrative 
self-constitution view can be linked up better with the human 
body. It can repair a rather underexposed aspect of Korsgaard’s 
self-constitution view: the lack of an elaborated theory on the 
embodiment of persons. Reasons alone cannot be supposed to 
do the self-constituting and unifying work. Also emotions, de-
sires and the human body do their share. 
In chapter two I try to develop a narrative self-constitution 
view on persons following Marya Schechtman. A person’s iden-
tity now is to be found in narrative self-understanding, in the ca-
pacity to keep a particular narrative going. Such a self-narrative 
organises and integrates disparate elements of human experience 
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and action synchronically and diachronically into a more-or-less 
coherent storied whole and in this way constitutes a person. In-
ternal coherence, being articulated to some extent, being in step 
with the facts of the world, and consensus with interpretations 
of others are important standards for self-narratives. A Schech-
tmanian narrative self-constituting view avoids the Korsgaard-
ian overestimation of the formal, unifying powers of reason and 
settles for the more substantive, vernacular criterion of coherence 
of self-narrative. My narrative self-constituting view also takes 
self-constituting narratives as embodied and embedded struc-
tures (Schechtman under-describes the embodiment of self-nar-
ratives). Persons are incarnated and situated beings. To unpack 
the idea of the embodiment of self-narratives, I take an empiri-
cal line. Antonio Damasio demonstrates that self-constituting 
narratives have a bodily, neuro-physiological basis. They build, 
inter alia, on the presence of a core-self. Moreover, Damasio’s 
picture clears the way for emotive constraints of self-narrative 
that keep self-narrative on track. Damasio makes plausible that 
autobiographical narratives are intertwined with emotion and 
feeling. Persons are partly and importantly constituted by how 
they feel, by how it feels to be them. Schechtman for her part is 
aware of the significance of affect and the role empathic access 
plays in the making of self-narratives. Antonio Damasio also is 
fully conscious – as is Marya Schechtman – of the embedded-
ness of persons. A full explanation of self-constitution needs to 
go not only beyond the brain to the rest of the body, but also 
into the world. Persons are permanently interacting with their 
environments. And how one feels about or thinks about one’s 
self is partly constituted by the (social) world. As they are so-
cialised into human culture, human beings are taught to oper-
ate with a background conception of themselves as continuing 
individuals leading the lives of persons. Moreover, self-narratives 
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are confined by observational and interpretive facts. In a deep 
way they are co-determined by the social world and constructed 
collaboratively. The individual person does not have the final 
say, so to speak. 
I think a Schechtmanian narrative self-constitution view can 
do serious work in our understanding of the constitution of per-
sons. All the same, Schechtman’s view has to be slightly adjust-
ed. Schechtman pays too little attention to the embodiment of 
narratives. And the articulation constraint has to be nuanced. 
There is a suggestion in it that persons have to talk themselves 
into existence. This is also one of Galen Strawson’s worries. Yet, 
the articulation requirement is not that, in order to become a 
person, one must have a fully worked-out and explicit account 
of why everything in one’s life is as it is, but rather that a per-
son must recognise a certain kind of explanatory obligation, and 
be able to meet it for the most part. What is more, although 
persons couch their self-descriptions in language, they are not 
exhaustively captured in what they can say about themselves. 
Self-conception and its operations are largely implicit and auto-
matic. Self-narratives are bio-psychological constructs that are 
only partly expressible in verbal form. 
As mentioned earlier, one of my concerns is with applying my 
view on practical identity to specific practical issues. I want to 
concentrate on the use of advance directives in mental health 
care. Considerable attention will be drawn to Ulysses contracts. 
These are written by an author who is competent to consent to 
medical treatment, stating how he wishes to be treated under 
coercion in the event of becoming episodically a psychiatric pa-
tient (think of manic or schizophrenic psychosis). Also a related 
biomedical procedure will be considered: advance directives in 
the case of Alzheimer’s disease. Both procedures have in com-
mon that they bear upon pre-commitment. Both are cases of 
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an ‘earlier self ’ being in command of a ‘later self ’, that is, of an 
earlier self exercising authority and imposing his or her will on a 
later self. This raises the question of (respect for) autonomy. So, 
before I embark on the project of applying my view to psychiat-
ric practice, I have to make room for the problems of self-gov-
ernment of the person. Developing a theory of autonomy that is 
related very closely to my theory of narrative identity is the task 
of the third chapter of my dissertation. 
Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution view says very little 
about autonomy but certainly can take on board some account 
of it. Building on the work of Harry Frankfurt and Michael 
Bratman on autonomy, this is the solution I propose: a person 
acts in a self-governing manner and is acting as a governing self, if 
he encompasses his autobiographical narrative, i.e., if he identi-
fies with (parts of) his self-narrative. Identification is fundamen-
tal to autonomous agency and selfhood. In my view, human self-
consciousness is characterised by a hierarchy of attitudes about 
attitudes. By hierarchy I mean that there is mental room for as-
sessment and endorsement (or rejection) of a self-constituting 
narrative. Human beings are able to take a stance on their own 
attitudes. This can take place in different ways. Ongoing self-
narratives incorporate strands of reasons, memories, intentions, 
emotions, carings and the like. These ‘Lockean ties’, to put the 
point in Bratman’s terms, resist hard and fast distinctions. Yet, 
we can discriminate between at least three aspects of identifica-
tion. Identification partly is an act of reflective endorsement of 
reasons for action; this was Korsgaard’s line of approach. As we 
can learn from Harry Frankfurt, identification in part is also an 
act of acceptance of carings. Frankfurt has a keen interest in the 
conative side of autonomy and the limits of reasoned deliberate 
action. Autonomous persons are both rider and horse. Often a 
rider, if he is not to be parted from his horse, is obliged to guide it 
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where it wants to go. Finally, identification is also partially an act 
of emotional approval. Emotions function as relevance-prompts. 
There is no general intellectual strategy for relevance search. We 
may notice a lot of what is relevant in our self-narrative by its 
‘feel’. And we may approve of that feel. Autonomy has to do with 
felt intensity, with experiencing oneself (more) intensely.
A further point I argue for is that the autonomy of an agent is 
increased by an action’s springing from an attitude that coheres 
with certain other attitudes of the person’s psychic economy. In 
Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution view internal coherence 
(intelligibility) and ‘external’ coherence (with the facts of the 
world and the interpretations of others) were already crucial for 
successful self-constituting narratives. Yet, not only the person’s 
ongoing self-narration has to be relatively coherent. Also the on-
going autonomous endorsement of it has to be relatively stable 
and reflecting the person’s central, coherent values. Michael Brat-
man emphasises this point, and I am of his mind. Self-governing 
narrative-based agency involves norms of practical rationality: 
pressures of consistency, of means-end coherence, and of rea-
sonable stability over time. Again, coherence turns out to be an 
important standard. Self-governing persons normally try to go 
beyond an incoherent stew of intentions, emotions and consider-
ations. In the case of incoherent intentions, policies and plans, or 
in cases of an incoherent self-narrative (that is, plans writ large) 
the person does no longer know where he stands and how to 
govern his life as a person. Now, one could ask: Why make a 
choice for the norms of practical rationality listed above? I think 
the relevant reason for the coherence constraint is our reason to 
govern our own lives. My account of personal autonomy, like 
Bratman’s, basically is a prudent one. Coherence contributes to 
the effectiveness of our agency and to the richness of our (so-
cial) lives. We are more likely to pursue our ends and not trip 
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over ourselves. In the picture of personal autonomy I offer, the 
person’s choices and own values are central and exclude nothing. 
The person’s autobiographical narrative and his endorsement of 
it are what count. I take a person to be exercising autonomy as 
long as he is capable, or will be capable at some point in the 
future, to endorse or reject his own choices and values, in one 
word, to identify with his self-narrative. 
In the fourth chapter, I engage my narrative accounts of per-
sonhood and autonomy with pre-commitment cases in psychi-
atry, in particular Ulysses contracts and advance directives of 
persons suffering from Alzheimer’s disease. The chapter dem-
onstrates that a narrative theory on personhood and personal 
autonomy in terms of agency can make important contributions 
in the field of psychiatry. Here are the main results:
(i) My narrative self-constitution view can illuminate reported 
experiences of psychiatrists and patients with recurrent psy-
chosis. In cases of severe psychosis the patient temporarily is a 
‘no-more-person’. In less severe cases the personal changes are 
experienced as deviant. Yet, there seem to be no practical reasons 
for supposing that the psychotic patient is someone else. The 
patient’s psychotic experiences in some way or other take part 
in the life-spanning narrative self-constituting process. Never-
theless, frequent far-reaching changes of a person may raise the 
question of how a person’s story can be designated as the authori-
tative one. After all, the self-narrative of the non-psychotic, the 
pre-psychotic and the psychotic will diverge considerably. The 
answer I propose is that coherence is of decisive importance here. 
The most coherent story is the authoritative one. In (pre-) psy-
chotic stories the internal coherence often is seriously flawed and 
important parts of the non-psychotic life story sometimes dis-
appear from sight, whereas the non-psychotic self-constituting 
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narrative is sometimes more consistent but always keen on the 
integration of the (pre)psychotic story into the self-constituting 
narrative. Of overriding importance, however, is that the (pre-)
psychotic story as a rule lacks sense of reality (‘external’ coher-
ence). To some extent it does not match with the facts of the 
world and with the way significant others interpret the (pre-)
psychotic self-narrative.
(ii) My narrative outlook on autonomy can make sense of the 
notion of precedent autonomy and underpin a moral justifica-
tion of the use of Ulysses contracts. Although psychosis causes 
narrative disruption of identity, persons are able to bridge the 
gap by making recurrent psychoses part of their self-narrative, 
and by prospectively identifying with their future psychotic state 
(patients composing a Ulysses contract can show experience with 
psychosis). A core idea in my narrativist contribution to the dis-
cussion of advance directives is the person’s identification with a 
set of whole-life, persistent and coherent identity conferring con-
cerns (values and interests, as I also called them). Such entities 
can survive severe psychosis. In my view, autonomy serves those 
persistent and coherent values and interests and we best respect 
the person’s autonomy overall when we give priority to the au-
tonomy exercised by a person when most competent to exercise 
it. This person can decide what set of policies do best to protect 
the person’s autonomy overall. I have my doubts, however, about 
the stability of what Ronald Dworkin coined the ‘integrity-value’ 
of a person’s life. Contra Dworkin I take into consideration that 
the criteria for evaluating what to count valuable and what trivial 
often change within a human biography. The good news is that 
in the Ulysses contract case the lifelong persistence of values and 
interests is not of overriding importance. Psychosis is an episodic 
phenomenon and misjudgments can be rectified afterwards. 
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The upshot for the moral assessment of Ulysses contracts is 
this: accepting the primacy of respect for autonomy as a starting 
point and taking autonomy as a diachronic matter, the enforce-
ment of Ulysses contracts can be morally justified. First of all, 
enforcing a Ulysses contract we do respect the precedent autono-
mous consent of the patient. In addition, in many cases it will be 
possible to respect the patient’s subsequent autonomous consent 
too. Nevertheless, the moral costs are substantial. Advancing 
identity conferring concerns the person no longer cares about 
and treating a relatively competent protesting person under co-
ercion may be harmful as it may be experienced by patients and 
professionals as traumatic and as an attack on their identities. 
Moreover, whether coercive therapy succeeds is unpredictable 
and partly a matter of luck. But expectations are that a short vio-
lation of autonomy plus a long period in desirable circumstances 
after the compulsory intervention on balance will produce opti-
mal self-governance. 
(iii) Although the idea of pre-commitment may impress as a se-
ductive strategy, my thought is that the use of advance directives 
is limited. This becomes clear, when we consider advance direc-
tives in cases of severe dementia of the Alzheimer’s type. Again, 
my narrative account of personhood and personal autonomy 
turns out to be helpful to illuminate the highly problematic au-
thority of advance directives in cases of severe dementia. Com-
parable with the recurrent psychosis case, the times at which 
there is no narrator can be bound up in a self-constituting narra-
tive, and so those stages can be attributed to the person who nar-
rates and identifies in advance. But the case of dementia is dif-
ferent, of course. Firstly, the narrative disruption of identity now 
is permanent and runs deeper. The person disappears. Secondly, 
identification with the incompetent state of dementia is more 
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difficult than identification with a period of recurrent psychosis, 
because the person cannot show own experience with dementia. 
Thirdly, allowing for possible changes of heart is not an option. 
The moral justification of advance directives as a vehicle of 
precedent autonomy also faces new problems in the Alzheimer’s 
case. I considered advance directives requesting that the severely 
demented patients not receive life-sustaining treatment should 
they become life-threatening ill. The first problem is that, in 
my view, at this stage of dementia the distal binding powers of 
precedent autonomy have expired. I take a person to be exer-
cising autonomy as long as he is capable, or will be capable at 
some point in the future to identify with his self-narrative. As a 
consequence, an advance directive enforcing pre-commitment 
choices now competes with the moral responsibilities to protect 
actual vulnerable incompetent patients from harm. My narrativ-
ist account of autonomy cannot deliver a decisive moral justifica-
tion for trumping the actual interests of the severely demented 
post-person with the interests of the person prior to the onset of 
dementia. This gave me reason to look elsewhere for an extra 
argument. To no avail. 
The second problem is that the moral debate on advance di-
rectives is dominated by the patient-centred perspective. This 
strikes me as a fatal flaw. We are in the business of life and death 
now, not of precarious compulsory treatment. Others have to 
enforce the directive, that is, to withhold treatment and to let the 
patient die. The moral costs of killing another person who feels 
happy and comfortable and does not suffer and who can easily 
be saved, are high and tip the scale. I argued that we have to 
show mercy not only for the incompetent patient but also for the 
vulnerability of the care providers. We cannot expect doctors to 
expose themselves to such moral risks. The moral costs are even 
so high, in my view, that they put the command envisioned by 
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advance directives beyond reach. In the case of Alzheimer’s dis-
ease advance directives are an ineffective method of orchestrat-
ing one’s future care. They can be no more than a bit of support.
(iv) This leaves persons diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease and 
confronted with a catalogue of horrors with two strategies that 
stand as alternatives to advance directives. One possibility is 
that they accept that autonomy in their future incompetent state 
of dementia is not an issue and that they will be dependent on 
others to protect them from harm and indignities. Surely, they 
can draw up an advance directive, but this is not a necessary 
means. When severe dementia is setting in, others decide. The 
second possibility is that they commit pre-emptive suicide af-
ter Alzheimer’s disease is diagnosed. This is not claiming that it 
is better to be dead than to be demented. But for some people 
autonomy, including autonomy over future treatment, is a trea-
sured value that cannot be abandoned and is more valuable than 
life itself. They want to remain in control and avoid what they 
see as a troubling, lost existence. For those patients Romana mors 
in the face of Alzheimer is a morally justifiable autonomous act.
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Mijn proefschrift gaat over psychiatrie en filosofie. Ik denk dat 
filosofen de psychiatrie een dienst kunnen bewijzen. Volgens de 
arts, psycholoog en filosoof William James (-9) is filosofie 
‘an unusually stubborn effort to think clearly’, een ongebrui-
kelijk hardnekkige poging om helder te denken. En binnen de 
psychiatrie is de behoefte aan helder denken groot. Filosofen 
kunnen helpen om de betekenis te completeren van lastige con-
cepten waarmee hulpverleners in de geestelijke gezondheidszorg 
hun patiënten proberen te begrijpen en bij te staan. Mijn proef-
schrift wil zo’n bijdrage zijn. Ik probeer er in te verhelderen wat 
persoon-zijn is. 
Grosso modo zijn er drie filosofische manieren om de vraag ‘wat 
is een persoon?’ te benaderen. De eerste insteek is een conceptu-
ele en gaat terug op inzichten van de ordinary language filosoof 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (9-9). Hier wordt als volgt gerede-
neerd: ons concept ‘persoon’ is bij uitstek toepasbaar op men-
selijke wezens – belichaamde sociale wezens die deel uitmaken 
van een morele gemeenschap –, en voldoet uitstekend in ons 
dagelijks spreken over onszelf en anderen. Maar Jekyll-en-Hyde 
fenomenen of psychotische mensen vormen een grensgeval, een 
afwijking van de norm. In dergelijke gevallen is ons gangbare 
persoonsbegrip niet langer inzetbaar. Daar is weinig aan te doen. 
De tweede denkroute stelt de vraag centraal naar letterlijke 
identiteit. Ze is de inzet van een zeer ingewikkeld debat over 
ontologische identiteit. De precieze vraag luidt hier: is er een crite-
rium te vinden voor persoonlijke identiteit dat de noodzakelijke 
en voldoende voorwaarden levert, op grond waarvan we kunnen 
volhouden dat een persoon op een later tijdstip en een persoon 
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op een eerder tijdstip fasen van een en dezelfde persoon zijn? 
Vinden we bijvoorbeeld dat we een en dezelfde persoon zijn om-
dat er sprake is van een bestendig aanwezig lichaam? Dan kiezen 
we voor een lichamelijk criterium voor persoonlijke identiteit. Of 
zijn we misschien een en dezelfde persoon omdat onze actuele 
mentale toestanden (intenties, overtuigingen, voorkeuren, herin-
neringen, waarden, karaktertrekken…) verbonden zijn met onze 
eerdere en latere mentale toestanden? In dat geval horen we bij 
het kamp van de voorstanders van een psychologisch criterium 
voor persoonlijke identiteit. Er zijn nog meer opties. Misschien 
denken we dat een persoon een tijdloze kern is, die een leven 
lang (en mogelijk ook voorbij de grenzen van geboorte en dood) 
identiek blijft. Dan hangen we een (overigens lastig verdedigba-
re) ‘strikte identiteitstheorie’ aan. De strijd over de ontologische 
vraag naar persoonlijke identiteit is nog onbeslecht. 
Een aantal filosofen kiest daarom voor een praktische benade-
ring van het raadsel van persoon-zijn. In ons dagelijks leven gaan 
we uit van een sterke eenheid van de persoon. Ik ben het die mij 
vandaag iets voorneem bijvoorbeeld, en ik ben het vervolgens 
weer die mij over vijf jaar gebonden weet door mijn eerdere voor-
nemen. Zonder een sterk element van identiteit zou het zinloos 
zijn om mij iets voor te nemen. Ik ga ervan uit dat mijn leven 
en mijn persoon door de tijd heen een eenheid vormen; en dat 
niet een invaller maar ik zélf over vijf jaar mijn voornemen al of 
niet zal uitvoeren. In deze derde, praktische benadering staat de 
vraag centraal welke handelingen, ervaringen en psychologische 
karakteristieken aan een persoon toegeschreven dienen te wor-
den om haar te maken tot de persoon die ze is. 
Het is de vraag naar praktische identiteit die ik probeer te beant-
woorden in voorliggend proefschrift, dat uit twee delen bestaat. 
In het tweede deel (hoofdstuk ) pas ik mijn visie op persoon-
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zijn en autonomie toe op zelfbindingscasus in de psychiatrie. In 
het eerste deel (de hoofdstukken ,  en ) ontwikkel ik die visie 
in termen van actorschap. Mensen zijn handelende wezens die 
beschikken over een zekere mate van zelfbewustzijn. Anders dan 
de meeste andere dieren zijn ze zich bewust van de redenen voor 
hun handelingen. Dat mensen zelfbewuste gevers en nemers van 
redenen zijn brengt twee vermogens met zich mee. Ten eerste 
stelt het hen in staat om controle uit te oefenen over hun hande-
len; ze kunnen manieren vinden om richting aan hun handelen 
te geven. Laten we dit het vermogen tot normatieve zelfsturing 
noemen. En ten tweede: telkens wanneer menselijke actoren 
door afwegingen en keuzes te maken de regie voeren over hun 
handelen maken ze zichzelf tot de auteurs van hun handelen. Ze 
beslissen tegelijk wie ze willen zijn. Als rationele actoren hebben 
mensen, naast het vermogen tot normatieve zelfsturing, ook een 
vermogen tot normatieve zelf-constitutie, d.w.z. tot het construe-
ren van norm-gestuurde, praktische vormen van identiteit. Over 
dit laatste vermogen gaan hoofdstuk  en  van mijn proefschrift.
In het eerste hoofdstuk neem ik het lopend wijsgerig debat over 
actorschap als uitgangspunt, in het bijzonder de visie op zelf-
constitutie van Christine Korsgaard (9), die een beschrijving 
geeft van reflectief actorschap en daar een uitgewerkte kijk op 
persoonlijke identiteit uit afleidt in termen van deliberatief han-
delen. Mensen zijn geboren om te handelen, stelt ze, en actoren 
bewegen zich door een ‘ruimte van redenen’. Ze hebben het ver-
mogen om te delibereren, i.e. om te kiezen voor bepaalde han-
delingen op grond van redenen die eerst door een proces van 
nauwgezet rationeel onderzoek zijn gegaan. Wanneer een actor 
beredeneerd kiest op grond van welke reden zij tot handelen wil 
overgaan, en vervolgens ook handelt op grond van die reden, 
dan handelt zij op een manier die bepalend is voor wie zij is, met 
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andere woorden op een manier die haar identiteit constitueert. 
Volgens Korsgaard is persoonlijke identiteit praktische identiteit 
en verknoopt met praktisch redeneren. De substantia nigra van 
zelf-constitutie is volgens haar de normatieve kracht van prak-
tisch redeneren. Het is ten diepste de normatieve consistentie 
van redenen die persoon-zijn constitueert en personen tot een 
eenheid maakt. Daar kan ik mij wel in vinden, maar niet zonder 
een paar twijfels op tafel te leggen. 
Ik denk namelijk dat Korsgaard de unificerende kracht van de 
menselijke rationele vermogens overschat. Haar overtuiging dat 
menselijke wezens van nature zijn toegerust met rationele vermo-
gens, die wel tot rationele eenheid van de persoon moeten leiden, 
is mijns inziens ongedekt. Al wat uit Korsgaards visie kan volgen 
is dat personen alomvattende rationele eenheid binnen zichzelf 
kunnen bereiken. De natuurlijke menselijke rationele vermogens 
dicteren niet uit zichzelf in welke mate mensen rationele eenheid 
moeten bereiken en langs welke wegen. Het is waar dat Kors-
gaard, zich baserend op Aristoteles, probeert extra argumenten 
toe te voegen ter ondersteuning van haar éénmakingsargument. 
Desalniettemin blijft haar nadruk op de unificerende rol van de 
praktische rede, i.c. het Korsgaardiaanse principe van autonomie 
(universaliseerbaarheid), naar mijn overtuiging overtrokken. We 
kunnen toe met een minder formele, minder principe-gestuurde, 
meer instrumentele rol voor de redenen die persoon-zijn consti-
tueren en personen tot een eenheid smeden. Bij implicatie dient 
dan ook de unificatievereiste te worden gematigd. Personen wor-
den geconstitueerd door een weefsel van zichzelf corrigerende re-
denen. Elke reden kan onder kritiek worden gesteld, zij het niet 
alle redenen tegelijk. We kunnen hier denken aan het fameuze 
schip van Neurath. Alle persoonlijke redenen zijn experimenteel, 
feilbaar en vervangbaar zoals de planken van de boot van Neu-
rath. Dat wil niet zeggen dat personen helemaal niet uit zouden 
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zijn op eenheid. Meestal kiezen personen er niet voor om als een 
scheepswrak door het leven te gaan. Maar om de min of meer 
vereende levens te leiden van min of meer vereende personen 
is niet meer nodig dan een humeaanse instrumentele opvatting 
van redelijkheid. Personen kunnen zich behalve op doel-middel 
redeneren verder nog beroepen op een humeaanse conceptie van 
‘reflectieve rationaliteit’: een duurzaam, algemeen standpunt 
vanwaaruit idiosyncrasieën kunnen worden gecorrigeerd. Kort 
en goed, Korsgaards ‘reason view’ is niet helemaal bevredigend 
en kan niet meer zijn dan een veelbelovende eerste stap op weg 
naar een persoonstheorie in termen van actorschap.
Mijn voorstel is vervolgens om de redenen visie op personen op 
te werken tot een narratieve visie op persoon-zijn. We kunnen 
redenen beter beschouwen als het begin van een verhaal over 
onszelf, d.w.z. als een ‘rationale’ die onze handelingen begrijpe-
lijk maakt als coherente ontwikkelingen van een levensverhaal. 
Ik heb tenminste drie argumenten voor zo’n zet. Ten eerste: ver-
halen zijn naar alle waarschijnlijkheid de meest natuurlijke en 
eenvoudige manier om menselijke ervaringen en menselijke ken-
nis te ordenen. Zij lijken een aangewezen vindplaats voor wie op 
zoek is naar een adequaat begrip van persoon-zijn. Ten tweede: 
een coherent zelf-constituerend verhaal doet meer recht aan de 
multiplexiteit, discontinuïteiten en veranderingen van personen 
dan unificerende redenen kunnen doen. In een narratieve visie 
op personen kan de unificatie-eis worden vervangen door een 
coherentie-eis en kan de rede een minder potente, meer instru-
mentele rol vervullen. Een derde argument om een visie op per-
sonen in termen van redenen uit te breiden naar een narratieve 
visie op persoon-zijn is dat narratieve zelf-constitutie beter kan 
worden verbonden met het menselijk lichaam. Zo kan een nar-
ratieve benadering ook nog een lacune in Korsgaards visie op 
zelf-constitutie opvullen: het ontbreken van uitgewerkte ideeën 
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over de belichaming van personen. Redenen alleen kunnen niet 
geacht worden al het zelf-constituerende en éénmakende werk te 
doen. Een persoon is meer dan haar rationele natuur. Ook emo-
ties, verlangens en lichamelijkheid dragen bij aan persoon-zijn.
In het tweede hoofdstuk ontwikkel ik zo’n narratieve visie op 
zelf-constitutie gebaseerd op het werk van Marya Schechtman 
(9). Persoonlijke identiteit bestaat nu uit narratief zelf-ver-
staan, uit het vermogen om een autobiografisch narratief gaande 
te houden. Zo’n zelf-narratief organiseert en integreert disparate 
ervaringen en handelingen synchroon en diachroon tot een min 
of meer coherent verhalend geheel en constitueert zo de persoon. 
Interne samenhang, een zekere mate van articuleerbaarheid, 
overeenstemming met de feiten van de wereld en consensus met 
de interpretaties van anderen zijn de belangrijkste standaards 
voor gelukte zelf-narratieven. Zo’n Schechtmaniaanse visie op 
zelf-constitutie vermijdt de Korsgaardiaanse overschatting van 
de formele, eenmakende krachten van de rede en neemt genoe-
gen met het meer inhoudelijk, vernaculair criterium van cohe-
rentie voor zelf-narratieven. De door mij voorgestelde narratieve 
kijk op zelf-constitutie beschouwt zelf-narratieven bovendien als 
belichaamde en gesitueerde structuren (Schechtman zelf onder-
beschrijft de rol van het lichaam). 
Om het idee van de belichaming van zelf-narratieven te verdui-
delijken kies ik voor een empirische lijn. De neurowetenschap-
per Antonio Damasio (9) toont aan dat zelf-constituerende 
narratieven een lichamelijke, neurofysiologische basis hebben. 
Ze bouwen, inter alia, voort op de aanwezigheid van een ‘kern-
zelf ’. Damasio’s bevindingen maken ook ruimte voor de affec-
tieve vereisten waaraan zelf-narratieven moeten voldoen. Zijn 
onderzoek maakt aannemelijk dat autobiografische narratieven 
vervlochten zijn met emotie en gevoel. Persoon is men voor een 
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belangrijk deel door hoe het voelt om die persoon te zijn. En 
gevoelens houden zelf-narratieven op koers. Ook Schechtman is 
zich bewust van het belang van affect en de rol die empathische 
toegang speelt bij de totstandkoming van zelf-narratieven. Da-
masio wijst eveneens – net als Schechtman – op de gesitueerd-
heid van personen. Een volledig begrip van zelf-constitutie hoort 
niet alleen verder te gaan dan de hersenen en het hele menselijk 
lichaam te bestrijken, het dient ook de omringende wereld een 
aandeel te geven. Personen zijn voortdurend in interactie met 
hun omgevingen. Hoe iemand zich voelt of over zichzelf denkt 
wordt deels bepaald door diens (sociale) omgeving. Persoon kan 
men alleen worden wanneer men uitgaat van een sociaal-cul-
tureel bepaalde achtergrondconceptie van zichzelf als een in de 
tijd voortbestaand individu, dat het leven van een persoon leidt. 
Bovendien worden zelf-narratieven meebepaald door de waarne-
mingen en interpretaties van anderen. De individuele persoon 
heeft om zo te zeggen niet het laatste woord.
Ik denk dat een van Schechtmans werk uitgaande visie op nar-
ratieve zelf-constitutie serieus kan bijdragen aan een beter be-
grip van de constitutie van personen. Toch moet haar positie 
enigszins worden aangepast. Niet alleen moet er meer aandacht 
zijn voor de rol van het lichaam, ook de articulatie-eis vraagt 
om enige nuancering. De filosoof Galen Strawson (9) maakt 
bezwaar tegen de in deze eis vervatte suggestie dat personen 
zichzelf al pratend tot leven zouden moeten wekken. Echter, de 
articulatie-eis houdt niet in dat, om een persoon te zijn, iemand 
altijd een volledig uitgewerkte uiteenzetting paraat moet hebben 
over waarom alles in haar leven loopt zoals het loopt. De gedach-
te is veeleer dat personen een soort verplichting moeten voelen 
om desgevraagd tekst en uitleg te geven bij hun doen en laten, 
en daartoe ook tot op zekere hoogte in staat moeten zijn. Daar 
komt bij dat, hoewel zelfbeschrijvingen van personen in taal zijn 
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gevat, personen nooit volledig te vangen zijn onder hetgeen ze 
weten te articuleren over zichzelf. Zelf-concepties opereren ook 
impliciet en automatisch. Het zijn bio-psychologische construc-
ten die zich maar gedeeltelijk laten uitdrukken in verbale vorm.
Zoals eerder aangekondigd wil ik mijn ideeën over praktische 
identiteit vruchtbaar maken voor de praktijk van zelfbinding in 
de psychiatrie. Zelfbindingsverklaringen in de psychiatrie zijn 
geschreven documenten waarin de auteur in goede tijden – op 
een moment in haar leven waarop zij vrij van symptomen is en 
competent om te beslissen over latere medische behandeling – 
aangeeft dat zij onder dwang behandeld wil worden in ‘slechte’ 
tijden, d.w.z. in een fase van haar leven waarin ze tijdelijk aan 
een psychiatrische stoornis lijdt (een manische psychose bij-
voorbeeld of een periode van splitszinnigheid). Ook een hieraan 
verwante biomedische procedure wil ik tegen het licht houden: 
wilsverklaringen van alzheimerpatiënten. Bij beide strategieën 
lijkt er sprake van een ‘eerder zelf ’ dat autoriteit uitoefent en haar 
wil oplegt aan een ‘later zelf ’. Dit roept vragen op over (respect 
voor) autonomie. Alvorens ik mijn ideeën over praktische iden-
titeit vruchtbaar kan maken voor de psychiatrische praktijk zal 
ik daarom eerst ook nog na moeten denken over het vraagstuk 
van de zelfsturing van personen. In hoofdstuk  ontwerp ik een 
theorie over autonomie van personen, die voortbouwt op mijn 
narratieve identiteitstheorie. 
Schechtmans narratieve persoonstheorie zegt weinig over au-
tonomie maar kan beslist worden aangevuld met een visie op 
persoonlijke autonomie. Voortbouwend op het werk van Harry 
Frankfurt en Michael Bratman over autonomie is dit de oplos-
sing die ik voorstel: een persoon handelt autonoom, wanneer zij 
zich identificeert met (delen van) haar zelf-narratief. Identifi-
catie acht ik fundamenteel voor autonoom actorschap en dito 
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persoon-zijn. Vanuit mijn oogpunt wordt het menselijk zelfbe-
wustzijn gekarakteriseerd door een hiërarchie van attitudes over 
attitudes. Met hiërarchie bedoel ik dan dat er mentale ruimte is 
voor een inschatting en bekrachtiging (of verwerping) van een 
zelf-narratief. Menselijke wezens zijn in staat om zich tot hun 
mentale attitudes te verhouden. Dit kan verschillende vormen 
aannemen. Een zich ontwikkelend zelf-narratief bevat rede-
nen, herinneringen, intenties, bekommernissen, emoties en dies 
meer. Deze zijn zo met elkaar verknoopt dat het moeilijk is om 
ze scherp af te bakenen. Maar we kunnen onderscheid maken 
tussen tenminste drie aspecten van identificatie. Deels is iden-
tificatie een daad van reflectieve bekrachtiging van redenen tot 
handelen; dit was Korsgaards benaderwijze. Zoals we kunnen 
leren van Harry Frankfurt (99) kan identificatie ook een daad 
zijn van acceptatie van carings; met deze laatste worden mensen 
of zaken bedoeld waar personen om geven, vaak zonder dat ze 
daar zelf veel aan kunnen doen. Frankfurt is vooral gespitst op 
de conatieve aspecten van autonomie en laat hiermee de grenzen 
zien van beredeneerd zelf-gestuurd handelen. Autonome perso-
nen zijn zowel ruiter als paard. Soms ziet een ruiter zich genoopt 
om, wil hij niet van zijn paard geworpen worden, zijn paard dan 
maar in de richting te sturen die het uit wil. Tenslotte is identi-
ficatie voor een deel ook een daad van emotionele instemming. 
Emoties geven aan wat relevant is in ons zelf-narratief. Die re-
levantie is niet altijd met intellectuele middelen vaststelbaar en 
blijkt vaak een gevoelskwestie. En dat gevoel kunnen we bevesti-
gen. Autonomie is ook een kwestie van gevoelde intensiteit, van 
jezelf intenser ervaren.
Wat ik verder nog beargumenteer is dat de autonomie van een 
persoon toeneemt wanneer zij een attitude bekrachtigt die sa-
menhangt met andere attitudes in de psychische huishouding 
van die persoon. Coherentie speelde al een belangrijke rol in 
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Schechtmans narratieve kijk op zelf-constitutie. Maar niet al-
leen het zelf-narratief dient aan de coherentievereiste te voldoen. 
Ook de voortdurende bekrachtiging ervan dient enigszins stabiel 
te zijn en een aantal centrale, samenhangende waarden van de 
betreffende persoon te weerspiegelen. Michael Bratman (9) 
benadrukt dit, en ik volg hem hierin. Zelf-sturend op narratio 
gebaseerd actorschap bevat normen van praktische rationaliteit: 
een hang naar consistentie, naar doel-middel-coherentie en naar 
redelijke stabiliteit door de tijd heen. Opnieuw blijkt coherentie 
dus een belangrijke standaard te zijn. Normaliter proberen auto-
nome personen uit te stijgen boven een onsamenhangende stoof-
pot van intenties, emoties en overwegingen. In geval van onsa-
menhangende intenties, gedragslijnen en plannen of in gevallen 
van een onsamenhangend zelf-narratief weet de persoon immers 
niet langer waar hij staat en hoe hij zijn leven als persoon moet 
leiden. Nu zou men zich kunnen afvragen: waarom moeten we 
eigenlijk kiezen voor het genoemde lijstje normen van praktische 
rationaliteit? Ik denk dat de meest relevante reden voor de eis 
van coherentie is dat we reden hebben om sturing te geven aan 
onze eigen levens. Mijn opvatting van autonomie is, net als die 
van Bratman, ten diepste een prudente. Coherentie draagt bij 
aan de effectiviteit van ons actorschap en aan de rijkdom van 
onze (sociale) levens. Ze draagt ertoe bij dat we onze levensdoe-
len bereiken en onszelf niet voor de voeten lopen. In het beeld 
van autonomie dat ik schets staan de keuzes en waarden van de 
persoon centraal en wordt niets uitgesloten. Het autobiografisch 
narratief van de persoon en de bekrachtiging ervan zijn wat telt. 
Ik beschouw een persoon als autonoom zolang ze in staat is, of 
in staat zal zijn op enig moment in de toekomst, om haar eigen 
waarden en keuzes te bekrachtigen of verwerpen. In één woord: 
om zich te identificeren met haar zelf-narratief. 
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In het vierde hoofdstuk pas ik mijn narratieve kijk op persoon-
zijn en autonomie toe op wilsverklaringen in de psychiatrie. 
Duidelijk wordt dat een narratieve benadering van persoon-zijn 
en autonomie in termen van actorschap een aantal problemen, 
die aan het gebruik van wilsverklaringen kleven, kan oplossen. 
Dit zijn mijn belangrijkste bevindingen:
(i) Mijn narratieve visie op zelf-constitutie verheldert de erva-
ringen van patiënten die lijden aan weerkerende psychoses, en 
van hun psychiaters. In geval van een ernstige psychose is de 
patiënt tijdelijk geen persoon meer. In minder ingrijpende geval-
len wordt de psychotische persoon als afwijkend ervaren. Toch 
lijken er geen praktische redenen te zijn om te veronderstellen 
dat de psychotische persoon ‘iemand anders’ is. De psychotische 
ervaringen van de patiënt maken op een of andere manier deel 
uit van het levensomspannende proces van narratieve zelf-con-
stitutie. Ondertussen rijst bij dergelijke ingrijpende persoonsver-
anderingen wel de vraag welk verhaal van die persoon kan wor-
den aangeduid als het verhaal met de meeste autoriteit. Er zijn 
dan immers meerdere, uiteenlopende levensverhalen in omloop: 
dat van de niet-psychoticus, het verhaal van de pre-psychoticus 
en dat van de psychoticus. Het antwoord dat ik voorstel is om 
coherentie doorslaggevend te laten zijn. Het meest coherente ver-
haal heeft het grootste gezag. De interne samenhang van de (pre)
psychotische verhalen is dikwijls serieus verzwakt en belangrijke 
delen van het niet-psychotische levensverhaal blijven daarin vaak 
geheel buiten beeld, terwijl het niet-psychotische zelf-narratief 
daarentegen soms een stuk consistenter is, maar altijd gespitst 
op het integreren van de (pre-)psychotische verhalen in het zelf-
narratief. Maar bovenal is er bij (pre-)psychotische verhalen in 
de regel sprake van een gebrek aan realiteitszin (aan ‘externe’ 
samenhang). Tot op zekere hoogte stroken ze niet met de feiten 
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van de wereld en met de wijze waarop significante anderen het 
(pre-)psychotisch zelf-narratief interpreteren.
(ii) Mijn narratieve benadering van autonomie kan de notie ‘pre-
cedente autonomie’ invulling en betekenis geven en de morele 
rechtvaardiging van het gebruik van zelfbindingsverklaringen 
ondersteunen. Hoewel psychoses dikwijls een narratieve disrup-
tie van identiteit tot gevolg hebben, zijn personen in staat om 
weerkerende psychoses te overbruggen. Dat doen ze door die 
psychoses deel te laten uitmaken van hun levensverhaal. En door 
zich prospectief te identificeren met hun toekomstige psycho-
tische staat (patiënten die een zelfbindingsverklaring opstellen 
hebben de nodige ervaring opgedaan met het fenomeen psycho-
se). Wat mijn narrativistische positie in het bijzonder relevant 
maakt voor het debat over wilsverklaringen is de aandacht voor 
identificatie door de persoon met een set levensomspannende, 
persistente en coherente ‘identity conferring concerns’ (waarmee 
waarden en belangen zijn bedoeld). Zulke entiteiten kunnen 
een ernstige psychose overleven. In mijn optiek staat autonomie 
ten dienste van dergelijke persisterende en coherente waarden 
en belangen; en respecteren we in globo het beste de autonomie 
van een persoon wanneer we voorrang geven aan het moment 
waarop die persoon het meest competent is tot het uitoefenen 
van haar autonomie. Op dat moment kan die persoon het beste 
bepalen welke gedragslijn haar autonomie beschermt over het 
geheel van haar leven bezien. Ik heb echter wel enige aarzeling 
over hetgeen Ronald Dworkin (9) de ‘integriteitswaarde’ van 
iemands leven muntte. Meer dan Dworkin hou ik er rekening 
mee dat de criteria, waarmee wordt gewogen wat waardevol is 
en wat triviaal, nogal eens willen veranderen in de loop van een 
mensenleven. Het goede nieuws is dat in het geval van zelfbin-
dingsverklaringen de levenslange houdbaarheid van waarden en 
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belangen niet van doorslaggevend belang is. Psychose is een epi-
sodisch fenomeen, en verkeerde inschattingen kunnen na afloop 
worden bijgesteld.
Voor wat betreft de morele beoordeling van zelfbindingsver-
klaringen kom ik tot de volgende slotsom: wanneer we het pri-
maat van respect voor andermans autonomie als startpunt kie-
zen en autonomie diachroon opvatten, dan kan het ten uitvoer 
leggen van zelfbindingsverklaringen moreel gerechtvaardigd 
worden. Eerst en vooral respecteren we daarbij de precedente au-
tonome toestemming van de patiënt. Bovendien zal het in veel 
gevallen mogelijk zijn om daar respect voor de autonome instem-
ming achteraf bij op te tellen. Niettemin zijn de morele kosten 
aanzienlijk. Voorrang geven aan ‘identiteit verlenende bekom-
mernissen’ waar een patiënt op dat moment vaak niet meer om 
geeft, en op grond daarvan een relatief competente, protesteren-
de persoon onder dwang behandelen kan beschadigend uitpak-
ken; veel patiënten en hulpverleners ervaren zo’n interventie ook 
als traumatiserend en een aanslag op hun identiteit. Bovendien 
is het succes van dwangbehandeling onvoorspelbaar en deels een 
kwestie van geluk. Maar alles in aanmerking nemend mogen we 
verwachten dat korte schendingen van iemands autonomie door 
middel van dwangtoepassing, afgewisseld met lange periodes in 
gewenste condities na een ingreep onder dwang, per saldo de 
best mogelijke zelfsturing opleveren.
(iii) Hoewel het idee van zelfbinding een verleidelijke strategie 
mag lijken, denk ik dat het gebruik ervan begrensd is. Dit wordt 
duidelijk wanneer we wilsverklaringen van alzheimerpatiënten 
onder de loep nemen. Opnieuw blijkt mijn narratieve visie op 
personen en hun autonomie behulpzaam te zijn bij het verhel-
deren van de uiterst problematische autoriteit van wilsverkla-
ringen in geval van ernstige dementie. Net als in gevallen van 
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weerkerende psychose kan de episode van ernstige dementie, 
waarin geen eigen verhaal meer mogelijk is, al in een eerder le-
vensstadium zijn opgenomen in het zelf-constituerend narratief 
van de persoon in kwestie, en kan de fase van dementie worden 
toegeschreven aan deze persoon die zich er vooruitziend over 
uitspreekt en mee identificeert. Maar gevallen van Alzheimer 
verschillen op een aantal punten ook grondig van gevallen van 
weerkerende psychose. Primo, de narratieve ontwrichting van de 
identiteit is nu permanent en gaat veel dieper. De persoon ver-
dwijnt. Secundo, identificatie vooraf met de incompetente staat 
van dementie is moeilijker dan identificatie met een periode van 
weerkerende psychose, omdat de betreffende persoon geen eigen 
ervaring heeft met dementie. Tertio, er is geen gelegenheid tot 
bijstellen.
Ook bij de morele rechtvaardiging van wilsverklaringen als ve-
hikel voor precedente autonomie loop ik tegen nieuwe vragen op 
in het geval van Alzheimer. Ik kies als voorbeeld wilsverklarin-
gen waarin verzocht wordt om een ernstig demente patiënt niet 
te behandelen als hij een levensbedreigende maar behandelbare 
ziekte oploopt. Het eerste probleem is dat, vanuit mijn oogpunt, 
in de ernstige fase van Alzheimer de oorspronkelijke bindende 
kracht van precedente autonomie is uitgewerkt. Ik ga er immers 
van uit dat een persoon autonomie uitoefent zo lang hij in staat is, 
of in staat zal zijn op enig moment in de toekomst, om zich met 
zijn zelf-narratief te identificeren. Zo’n moment komt er, naar 
mijn weten, niet meer. Het gevolg daarvan is dat een wilsverkla-
ring die vast wil houden aan eerder gemaakte bindende keuzes 
nu moet wedijveren met de morele verantwoordelijkheid om een 
op dat moment kwetsbare, incompetente patiënt geen schade toe 
te brengen. Aan een narrativistische uitleg van autonomie kan ik 
niet langer een beslissende morele rechtvaardiging ontlenen voor 
het overklassen van de actuele belangen van de ernstig demente 
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post-persoon met de belangen van de persoon die aan de komst 
van Alzheimer voorafging. Het is reden geweest voor mij om 
elders te zoeken naar een extra argument. Tevergeefs.
Het tweede probleem is dat in het morele debat over wilsver-
klaringen steevast de individuele patiënt centraal wordt gesteld. 
Dat lijkt me een ernstig en uiteindelijk onoverkomelijk tekort. 
Het gaat hier niet langer om hachelijk ingrijpen met gebruik van 
dwang, maar over kwesties van leven en dood. Anderen moe-
ten de wilsverklaring uitvoeren door af te zien van behandeling 
en de patiënt te laten sterven. De morele kosten van het doden 
van een medemens die zich redelijk behaaglijk voelt, niet lijdt en 
makkelijk kan worden gered, zijn hoog en doen wat mij betreft 
de balans doorslaan. Ik betoog dat we in zo’n geval mededogen 
moeten hebben, niet alleen met de incompetente patiënt maar 
ook met de kwetsbare zorgverlener. We kunnen niet van artsen 
verwachten dat ze zichzelf blootstellen aan zulke morele risico’s. 
De morele kosten zijn, zover ik kan zien, in dit geval zo hoog 
dat ze het doel dat met de wilsverklaring wordt beoogd buiten 
bereik plaatsen. In geval iemand de diagnose Alzheimer meege-
deeld krijgt is een wilsverklaring een ineffectieve methode om 
toekomstige zorg te organiseren. Voor wilsverklaringen is dan 
hooguit een ondersteunende rol weggelegd. 
(iv) Voor personen met de diagnose Alzheimer, die zich gecon-
fronteerd zien met een catalogus aan verschrikkingen, staan 
twee strategieën open als alternatieven voor een wilsverklaring. 
Eén mogelijkheid is dat ze accepteren dat autonomie niet lan-
ger een issue is in hun toekomstige incompetente toestand van 
ernstige dementie en dat ze afhankelijk zullen zijn van de hulp 
van anderen om beschermd te worden tegen letsel en krenking. 
Natuurlijk kunnen ze een wilsverklaring opstellen, maar nodig is 
het niet. Zodra de fase van ernstige dementie inzet beslissen an-
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deren. De tweede mogelijkheid is dat ze zich preventief van het 
leven beroven nadat de diagnose Alzheimer is gesteld. Daarmee 
is niet gezegd dat het beter is om dood te zijn dan dement. Maar 
voor sommige mensen is autonomie, meester zijn over het eigen 
leven inclusief toekomstige verzorging, een gekoesterde waarde 
die onopgeefbaar is en waardevoller dan het leven zelf. Zij willen 
kost wat kost controle houden en voorkomen dat ze terechtko-
men in wat ze beschouwen als een verward en verloren bestaan. 
Voor deze patiënten is Romana mors, sterven in eigen beheer in 
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